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BATTERED SPOUSES' DAMAGE ACTIONS AGAINST
NON-REPORTING PHYSICIANS
James T. R. Jones*
INTRODUCTION
The national disgrace of spouse abuse' continues to be an immense
* B.A., University of Virginia; J.D., Duke University School of Law; Associate Professor of
Law, University of Louisville School of Law. The author wishes to express his special thanks to
Travis A. Fritsch, domestic violence consultant and former Staff Assistant, Office of the Attor-
ney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky, for her invaluable assistance.
1. As one domestic violence scholar recently stated about the name for the type of behavior
about which this Article is written:
In the social science literature, various terms have been used to describe violence and
abuse within an intimate relationship (including spouse abuse, domestic violence, mari-
tal assault, woman abuse, and battering), although there is little substantive difference
among them in the types of phenomena described. Throughout this Article and in the
scientific field generally, these terms are. used interchangeably to refer to the broad
range of behaviors considered to be violent and abusive within an intimate relationship.
Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of
Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HoFsmRA L. REV. 1191, 1204 (1993) (footnotes omitted). This
Article adopts this same approach to domestic violence terminology.
Exactly what sort of behavior qualifies as "abuse/domestic violence" is somewhat controver-
sial. Kentucky basically defines spouse "abuse" as "a situation in which a person inflicts physical
pain or injury upon a spouse .... " Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.020(7) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1991). California defines "abuse of spouse or cohabitant" as "corporal injury resulting in a trau-
matic condition" where "'traumatic condition' means a condition of the body, such as a wound
or external or internal injury, whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by a physical force."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5(a), (c) (West Supp. 1995). Most commentators define abuse far more
broadly, focusing on both physical and emotional/mental injury and suffering. E.g., Jean Abbott
et al., Domestic Violence Against Women: Incidence and Prevalence in an Emergency Depart-
ment Population, 273 JAMA 1763, 1764 (1995) ("either an injury (hitting, punching, slapping, or
other trauma) or stress (from threats or violent behavior..."); Council on Ethical & Judicial
Affairs, American Medical Association, Physicians and Domestic Violence: Ethical Considera-
tions, 267 JAMA 3190, 3190 (1992) [hereinafter Physicians and Domestic Violence] ("physical,
sexual, and psychological abuse"); Dutton, supra, at 1204 ("physical, sexual, and psychological");
Howard Holtz & Kathleen K. Furniss, The Health Care Provider's Role In Domestic Violence, 8
TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE, L. & Elrncs 47, 47 (1993) ("physical abuse, emotional abuse, sexual
abuse, economic control or destruction of pets or cherished property"); Christine A. Picker, The
Intersection of Domestic Violence and Child Abuse: Ethical Considerations and Tort Issues for
Attorneys Who Represent Battered Women With Abused Children, 12 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV.
69, 73 (1993) ("physical, sexual and psychological abuse within the family or household"). Obvi-
ously, a jurisdiction must settle on an exact definition of what behavior constitutes "spouse
abuse/domestic violence" before it can hold physicians civilly liable for not reporting it. In many
cases, the abuse will be physical and obvious, so no definitional problem should exist there. In
cases involving non-physical harm, counsel for battered spouses must research the issue carefully
and then be prepared to argue that what their clients suffered qualifies as "abuse."
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modern tragedy2 which afflicts large numbers 3 of mostly female 4 vic-
tims. 5 Various authors have suggested that one way to attack this ter-
In this Article terms like "abused spouse," "battered spouse," "spouse abuse victim," and
"domestic violence victim" refer to both the person who currently is legally married to her
abuser and to the one who is not now (and may never have been) married to the abuser, i.e., to
past or present intimate partnership relationships. See EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 9 (1990) (defining domestic violence
as violence between adults who are living together or who have previously lived together in a
conjugal relationship); [FLORIDA] GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THE
FIRST REPORT OF THE [FLORIDA] GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE at v (Jan.
31, 1994) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT] (indicating that a "partner" can be a wife, a hus-
band, former spouse, or a co-habitating intimate in a heterosexual or homosexual relationship);
James T. R. Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions Against the Unresponsive Police,
23 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 2 & n.4 (1991) [hereinafter Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions]
(noting that many domestic violence situations involve those who never were married to each
other).
2. For citations to some of the vast literature on this subject, see Daniel J. Jacobs, Battered
Women and Related Domestic Violence Issues: A Selective Bibliography, 49 REC. ASS'N B. CITY
N.Y. 786 (1994); Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1, at 1 n.1. For
an interesting discourse on the history of domestic violence, see Henry Ansgar Kelly, Rule of
Thumb and the Folklaw of the Husband's Stick, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 341 (1994).
3. See, e.g., BEVERLY BALOS & MARY LOUISE FELLOWS, LAW AND VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: CASES AND MATERIALS ON SYSTEMS OF OPPRESSION 183 (1994); Michele Lang, Re-
cent Development, Professionals, Activists, Crows: The Family Violence Program at Boston Uni-
versity School of Medicine (Notes From the Field), 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 222, 223 (1991)
("One-third to one-half of all American women will be in violent relationship during their life-
time."); Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the
Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 229 n.119 (1992) (stating that some au-
thors estimate that battering occurs in 28 percent of all marriages): Antonia C. Novello, A Medi-
cal Response to Domestic Violence, 267 JAMA 3132, 3132 (1992) ("Domestic violence may touch
as many as one-fourth of all American families."); M. VandeCastle et al., Physical Violence Dur-
ing the 12 Months Preceding Childbirth-Alaska, Maine, Oklahoma, and West Virginia, 1990-
1991, 271 JAMA 1152, 1152 (1994) (noting that public and private health care settings indicate
that four to seventeen percent of women experience violence during pregnancy).
4. See, e.g., BALOS & FELLOWS, supra note 3, at 183; Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra
note 1, at 3190 (indicating that "domestic violence is predominately perpetuated by men against
women"); Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, Violence Against
Women: Relevance for Medical Practitioners, 267 JAMA 3184, 3185-86 (1992) [hereinafter Vio-
lence Against Women] ("In general, men perpetrate more aggressive actions against their female
partners .... "); Nancy S. Jecker, Privacy Beliefs and the Violent Family: Extending the Ethical
Argument for Physician Intervention, 269 JAMA 776, 776 (1993). A recent Kentucky state pro-
file of spouse abuse reports disclosed that from 1992-94 roughly 90% of Kentucky spouse abuse
victims were women. KY. DEP'T FOR SOCIAL SERVS., CABINET HUMAN RESOURCES, PROFILE
ON ADULT ABUSE FISCAL YEAR 1994, at 7 (1994) [hereinafter PROFILE ON ADULT ABUSE].
5. Many scholars agree that concepts of power and control are the key issues in domestic
violence, as they are what the batterer really strives to gain through his behavior. See generally
ELLEN PENCE & MICHAEL PAYMAR, POWER AND CONTROL: TACTICS OF MEN WHO BATTER:
AN EDUCATIONAL CURRICULUM (1986); Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse
Cases in Duluth: Developing Effective Prosecution Strategies From Understanding the Dynamics
of Abusive Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 132-34, app. A (1991); Andrea Brenneke,
Civil Rights Remedies for Battered Women: Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 LAW & INEO. J. 1, 11-14
(1992); Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic
Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2126-39 (1993); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
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ribly costly6 problem is to compel the police 7 to get involved in
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 34 (1991); Joan S.
Meier, Notes From the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives On Do-
mestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1317-21 (1993). A recent
article described the most accepted theory as to
the dynamics that fuel domestic violence. Violence is the means by which control is
attained. Lenore Walker, a psychologist who is one of the earliest social scientists to
define domestic violence, suggests that there is a pattern in domestic violence, which
she calls the Cycle of Violence. Although this theory does not accurately reflect every
battering relationship, it is a helpful way to conceptualize the dynamics of domestic
violence. The Cycle contains three stages. The first is called the tension-building
phase. During this phase, minor battering incidents occur, such as verbal abuse, con-
trolling behavior, slaps and pinches. The woman is aware of this tension, and usually
tries to appease the batterer, in an attempt to prevent worsening abuse. However, this
task is emotionally draining and frequently the batterer will perceive the emotional
withdrawal of his victim. Because the violence stems from the batterer and not the
woman, there is nothing a woman can do to prevent more violent attacks. She may be
able to delay it or distract the batterer for a period of time, but ultimately, the next
phase is reached, where acute battering occurs.
The most severe battering occurs during the acute battering phase. This stage of
battering frequently includes broken bones, forced sexual relations, the use of weapons,
death threats and sometimes even death. A woman is usually unable to escape during
such an incident, as an attempt to do so could result in her death.
The final stage is the tranquil, loving phase. The batterer apologizes, and promises
that he will never again hurt the woman. The woman, out of emotional need or eco-
nomic dependency, wants to believe this and frequently will. The batterer again be-
comes the man the woman cared for at the beginning of the relationship, and for a
period of time, there is no violence, and the interdependency of the couple grows. Un-
fortunately, this phase usually ends and the tension-building stage begins again.
There are several important implications of this Cycle of Violence theory. Dr.
Walker notes that each rotation through the cycle usually results in increasing violence.
For example, by the third time a woman has progressed through the cycle, the battering
in the tension-building and acute battering phases is worse than it was the first time
through the cycle and the tranquil, loving phase usually gets shorter.
Picker, supra note 1, at 74-75 (footnotes omitted). See Dutton, supra note 1, at 1208 (finding
that "[tihe pattern of violence and abuse can be viewed as a single and continuous entity"); Mark
Hansen, New Strategy in Battering Cases, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 14 (recognizing that domestic
violence usually follows a cyclical pattern that becomes progressively worse). Readers who have
watched the landmark made-for-television motion picture The Burning Bed (1984), have wit-
nessed a remarkable depiction of this sort of abusive behavior. Experts agree that a battered
spouse is in the greatest danger of death or serious injury at the time she tries to leave the
abusive relationship, probably due to her challenge to the abuser's control over her. See, e.g.,
Dutton, supra note 1, at 1212; Fischer et al., supra, at 2138-39; Mahoney, supra, at 5-6; Joan
Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiality Needs of Battered Women, 29
FAM. L.Q. 273, 274-75 (1995) [hereinafter Zorza, Privacy and Confidentiality Needs of Battered
Women].
6. The human and economic costs of domestic violence are incalculable. One recent author in
particular has quantified some of the prices society pays because of this criminal behavior. Joan
Zorza, Women Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 383
(1994) [hereinafter Zorza, High Costs]. For example, the medical expense for spouse abuse may
equal "$31 billion per year nationally, or $124 annually for each living person." Id. at 383. This
does not consider the huge psychological costs and the expenses of counselling or providing
medical treatment for children injured or traumatized when their mothers are battered, often
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domestic violence cases by holding them civilly liable when they do
not intervene and their inaction contributes to harm to a spouse abuse
victim. 8 Numerous victims have asserted both state and federal causes
of action against unresponsive law enforcement officials.9 Victims in
the United States 10 have ignored another potential class of defend-
right in front of them. Id.; see also, e.g., Patricia Ann S. v. James Daniel S., 435 S.E.2d 6, 18 (W.
Va. 1993) (Workman, C.J., dissenting) (noting the substantial amount of documentation support-
ing the fact that a spousal abuser's violence causes a variety of psychological problems for chil-
dren); Howard A. Davidson, Child Abuse and Domestic Violence: Legal Connections and
Controversies, 29 FAM. L.Q. 357, 359, 369-71 (1995) (addressing the costs and consequences to
society of children exposed to domestic violence); Alan J. Tomkins et al., The Plight of Children
Who Witness Woman Battering: Psychological Knowledge and Policy Implications, 18 LAw &
PSYCHOL REV. 137, 139 (1994) (noting the lack of attention devoted to an estimated three mil-
lion children who witness their mothers being abused). The nation pays a high price when nu-
merous infants are born suffering from birth defects because their mothers were attacked during
pregnancy. Zorza, High Costs, supra, at 383. Abused women are far more likely to become
alcoholics (sixteen times) and/or drug abusers (nine times) than those who are not abused,
thereby causing society considerable expenditures for, inter alia, treatment, incarceration and
foster child care. Id. at 384. Unfortunately, but perhaps predictably, while they are abused bat-
tered women may be more likely to abuse their own children than those who are not spouse
abuse victims, thereby perpetuating a vicious cycle of violence from one generation to the next.
See, e.g., Davidson, supra, at 359, 368-69; Picker, supra note 1, at 71, 104; Tomkins et al., supra, at
152-53. Housing the battered and their children costs millions, Zorza, High Costs, supra, at 384,
while as many as half of homeless women and children in America are fleeing from domestic
violence. Zorza, Privacy and Confidentiality Needs of Battered Women, supra note 5, at 276;
Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: A Major Cause of Homelessness, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 421,
421 (1991). Employers of domestic violence victims lose up to thirteen billion dollars annually
due to the abuse of their employees. Zorza, High Costs, supra, at 384-85. The police spend as
much as one-third of their time responding to spouse abuse calls. Id. at 385. And the risk of
suicide for battered women and their children who witness the battering is appallingly higher
than that for those not subjected to such violence. Id. at 384, 385. Clearly, domestic violence is
expensive enough for society to take all reasonable steps to reduce, if not eliminate it. See, e.g.,
FREDERICK J. COWAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY, ADULT ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND
EXPLOITATION: A MEDICAL PROTOCOL FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND COMMUNITY
AGENCIES 15 (1991); ANN JONES, NEXT TIME, SHE'LL BE DEAD: BATTERING & How TO STOP
IT 145-46 (1994) [hereinafter A. JONES, BATTERING & HOW TO STOP IT]; Elizabeth A. De-
lahunta, Hidden Trauma: The Mostly Missed Diagnosis of Domestic Violence, 13 AM. J. EMERG.
MED. 74, 74 (1994); Robert E. McAfee, Physicians' Role in the Fight Against Family Violence:
Breaking the Cycle, Controlling the Costs, 55 N.C. MED. J. 398, 398 (1994).
7. In this Article, the terms "police" and "law enforcement" are used interchangeably.
8. See, e.g., James T. R. Jones, Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage Actions Against the
Unresponsive Police After DeShaney, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 251, 254-55 (1991) [hereinafter Jones,
Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage Actions] ("Many believe that the best way to encourage
police intervention ... is to hold police departments and their individual officers civilly liable
..... ); Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1, at 3-4 (listing the
various types of suits battered spouses have pursued against police including negligence and
state constitutional law claims).
9. See, e.g., Jones, Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage Actions, supra note 8; Jones, Bat-
tered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1.
10. This Article focuses on physicians and domestic violence victims in the United States,
although this is truly an international problem. See Jones, Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Dam-
age Actions, supra note 8, at 254 & n.6 (citing Torgbar, Police Intervention in Domestic VIo-
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ants, the physicians'1 who treat injuries they recognize, or should sus-
pect,'2 were caused by abuse yet do not report the harm to the
authorities.'
3
lence-A Comparative View, 1989 FAM. L. 195) (providing an overview of the international
spouse abuse problem)).
11. This Article concentrates on the obligations of physicians. As provisions like those of
Kentucky make clear, various other health care professionals such as nurses, hospital workers,
coroners, medical examiners, dentists, optometrists and clinical psychologists may have similar
responsibilities. Ky. REV. STAT. ANNm. § 209.030(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); see infra note
40 (discussing the Kentucky statute further). Exactly how far the duty to report abuse extends
may have to be explored as the case law develops, in particular in light of different considera-
tions which may apply to non-physician health care worker observers of domestic violence. Cf.,
e.g., Jody Aaron, Note, Civil Liability for Teachers' Negligent Failure to Report Suspected Child
Abuse, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 183, 186 n.14, 208-09 (1981); Lawrence W. Miles Jr., Comment, The
Guardian Ad Litem and Civil Liability in California Child Maltreatment Cases, 12 U.C. DAvis L.
REV. 700, 707, 709-14 & n.92 (1979). Arguably all these (and similar) enumerated groups should
be treated like physicians for both reporting and liability purposes in all reporting scenarios in
order to uphold the principles which dictate mandatory reporting.
California has demonstrated how to deal with the situation which arises when multiple individ-
uals have a reporting obligation as to the same domestic violence victim. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 11160(e) (West Supp. 1995).
12. This Article focuses on the physician's legal obligation to report spouse abuse to the au-
thorities. As a preliminary matter, obviously the physician must at least suspect that a patient is
a domestic violence victim before he or she will report the patient's condition. See Ky. REV.
STAT. AN. § 209.030(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); see also infra note 40 (discussing this stat-
ute further). That, in turn, requires professional evaluation and judgment. In Landeros v. Flood,
551 P.2d 389, 393-94 (Cal. 1976), a landmark child abuse case, the California Supreme Court
discussed the common law duty properly to diagnose child abuse and indicated an unreasonable
failure to diagnose could constitute negligence. See, e.g., Rowine Hayes Brown & Richard B.
Truitt, Civil Liability in Child Abuse Cases, 54 Cmi.-KENr L. REV. 753, 758-59 (1978); Richard J.
Kohlman, Malpractice Liability for Failing to Report Child Abuse, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 118, 122
(1974); Neil J. Lehto, Civil Liability for Failing to Report Child Abuse, 1977 DET. C.L. REv. 135,
145-47; Adrianne C. Mazura, Case Note, Negligence-Malpractice-Physician's Liability for
Failure to Diagnose and Report Child Abuse, 23 WAYNE L. RExv. 1187, 1194 (1977). When liabil-
ity for failure to report is based on a civil and/or criminal statute, Landeros and most other
authorities hold the non-reporting physician actually must have recognized the patient intention-
ally was abused and still not report the battering before being responsible for not doing so. E.g.,
Landeros, 551 P.2d at 397-98 (holding that a doctor must form the opinion that the injuries were
intentionally inflicted to be held liable); Lehto, supra, at 153-55 (noting the disagreement as to
the required state of mind a doctor needs before reporting); Mazura, supra, at 1196-97 (holding
that a doctor's mental state must be adduced before a violation can be proven). In this Article,
any discussion of a physician's obligation to report abuse is premised upon that physician being
compelled by common law or statute at minimum to suspect the behavior is abuse.
13. This Article focuses upon physicians who fail to report injuries to their patients inflicted
through spouse abuse and who learn of this abuse from their patients - the battered spouses -
directly or by observation of the patients. The Article does not focus on physicians who learn of
abuse from some other source, such as psychotherapy or counselling of the abuser. While there
may, and probably ought to, be a duty under reporting statutes and/or common law to report
abuse about which the physician learns from the abuser or someone else, this scenario arguably
raises additional roadblocks to the civil liability of the non-reporting physician which are not
present when the patient/victim is the source of information. The principal roadblock is confi-
dentiality concerns of those treating abusers, including psychiatrists or other mental health work-
ers, attorneys, or clergy. See, e.g., David Joseph Agatstein, Child Abuse Reporting in New York
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The treating physician can be an important participant in the fight
against domestic violence.14 Many victims are very reluctant (if not
downright unwilling) to go to the police about the attacks upon them,
instead often turning to their physicians for aid. 15 Many women
State: The Dilemma of the Mental Health Professional, 34 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 115, 117-18
(1989); Phyllis Coleman, "Shrinking" the Clergyperson Exemption to Florida's Mandatory Child
Abuse Reporting Statute, 12 NOVA L. REV. 115, 116 (1987); Phyllis Coleman, Creating Therapist-
Incest Offender Exception to Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Statutes-When Psychiatrist
Knows Best, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1986) [hereinafter Coleman, When Psychiatrist
Knows Best]; Mary M. Hurley, Duties in Conflict Must Psychotherapists Report Child Abuse
Inflicted by Clients and Confided in Therapy?, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645, 654-57 (1985); Murray
Levine, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Mandated Reporting of Child Maltreatment by
Psychotherapists, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 711, 719-30 (1993); Robert D. Miller & Robert
Weinstock, Conflict of Interest Between Therapist-Patient Confidentiality and the Duty to Report
Sexual Abuse of Children, 5 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & LAW 161, 166-67 (1987); Robert P. Mosteller,
Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of
Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203, 207 (1992); Steven R. Smith, Mental Health Malpractice
in the 1990s, 28 Hous. L. REV. 209, 250-52 (1991) [hereinafter Smith, Mental Health Malprac-
tice]; Michele Smith-Bell & William J. Winslade, Privacy, Confidentiality, and Privilege in Psy-
chotherapeutic Relationships, 64 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 180, 186-92 (1994). Certainly, any
duty the therapist of the abuser would owe the domestic violence victim, about whose abuse the
therapist only learned from the patient-abuser, would be more attenuated than the one she
would have towards her own patient who told her of the abuse. See infra note 148.
14. As the Florida Governor's Task Force On Domestic Violence reported:
[T]he health professional can be a safe, primary focal point for the identification of
battered women, the counselling of battered women, the referral of battered women to
community resources and the advocacy for the prevention of battering. The role of the
health professional is a critical one in lessening both the incidence and the destructive-
ness of domestic violence.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 22. Indeed, in the early days of mandatory child abuse
reporting laws the "statutes singled out the physician as the mandated reporter.., because it was
felt that they had the necessary training and expertise to identify child abuse. As a profession,
they were mandated to report because it was felt that they often saw the child abuse case but
chose not to report." Brian G. Fraser, A Glance At the Past, A Gaze At the Present, A Glimpse
At the Future: A Critical Analysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 C-.-
KENT L. REV. 641, 656 (1978) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Douglas J. Besharov, The Legal
Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REV. 458, 466-
67 (1978) [hereinafter Besharov, Child Abuse and Neglect]; Ralph Slovenko, Child Abuse and
the Role of the Physician in the Proof of a Case, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 477,480-81 (1989); Alan
Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse: A Review of the Literature, 8 FAM. L.Q. 245, 269-70 (1974).
15. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 1, at 37. See, e.g., COWAN, supra note 6, at 21; R. EMER-
SON DOBASH & RUSSELL DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES 183, 249 (1979) (stating that the
doctor may be the first person approached); Sandra K. Burge, Violence Against Women as a
Health Care Issue, 21 FAM. MED. 368, 370 (1989) (stating women who are victims of violence
turn more to physicians than to police officers); Robert E. McAfee, Physicians and Domestic
Violence: Can We Make a Difference?, 273 JAMA 1790, 1790 (1995) [hereinafter McAfee, Physi-
cians and Domestic Violence] (Dr. McAfee is President of the American Medical Association)
(citing the national survey of attitudes toward family violence which revealed that than 85 per-
cent of Americans felt they would tell a physician if they were a victim of family abuse-a
considerably higher percentage than those stating they would tell a police officer); E. McLough-
lin et al., Emergency Department Response to Domestic Violence-California, 1992, 42 MORBID-
r-Y & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 617, 618-19 (1993).
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treated by physicians, especially in hospital emergency rooms, are
there because of spouse abuse. 16 Physicians, in turn, can assist bat-
tered women by reporting the numerous known or suspected abuse
cases they see to the proper authorities, who then can fulfill their vari-
ous obligations such as to investigate, offer protective services, and, if
appropriate, trigger arrest and/or prosecution of the batterers.' 7 Yet
physicians traditionally do not do so for a variety of reasons.'
8
Some physicians do not act because they fail to diagnose abuse.
They often do not recognize its signs,' 9 or they may be biased against
16. See, e.g., J. Abbott et al., supra note 1, at 1766 (revealing in a study that 11.7 percent of
women who had current husbands or boyfriends attributed their emergency room visits to do-
mestic violence); Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Battered Women's Experiences in the Emergency
Department, 20 J. EMERG. NURS. 280, 280, 286-87 (1994) [hereinafter Campbell et al., Emer-
gency Department] (revealing that battering is the leading cause of trauma to women seen in
emergency rooms); Emergency Department Response to Domestic Violence-California, 1992,
270 JAMA 1296, 1296 (1993) [hereinafter Emergency Department Response] (suggesting that as
many as 30 percent of women treated in emergency rooms have injuries or symptoms related to
physical abuse); Holtz & Furniss, supra note 1, at 48.
17. There is considerable evidence that the best way to prevent spouse abuse is to arrest and
prosecute the abusers, who then are deterred from further misbehavior. See, e.g., Alana Bow-
man, A Matter of Justice: Overcoming Juror Bias in Prosecutions of Batterers Through Expert
Testimony of the Common Experiences of Battered Women, 2 S. CAL REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
219, 225-26 (1992); Sarah Mausolff Buel, Recent Developments, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic
Violence, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 213, 215-16 (1988); Developments in the Law-Legal Re-
sponses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1534-41 (1993); Nancy James, Domestic
Violence: A History of Arrest Policies and a Survey of Modern Laws, 28 FAM. L.Q. 509, 513
(1994); Joan Zorza, Must We Stop Arresting Batterers?: Analysis and Policy Implications of New
Police Domestic Violence Studies. 28 NEw ENG. L. REV. 929, 929 (1994). But see Miriam H.
Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest. An Analysis of Race and Gender in Do-
mestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 171, 172-74 (1994) (questioning racial impact of
mandatory arrest policy); Donna M. Welch, Comment, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers:
Panacea or Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1156-64 (1994)
(questioning wisdom of mandatory arrest policy in some situations).
18. See, e.g.. Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Public-Health Conceptions of Family Abuse, in ABUSED
AND BATTERED: SOCIAL AND LEGAL RESPONSES TO FAMILY VIOLENCE 35, 37-38 (Dean D.
Knudsen & JoAnn L. Miller eds., 1991) [hereinafter Campbell, Family Abuse]; Andrea Dworkin,
16 Living in Terror, Pain: Being a Battered Wife, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE BLOODY
FOOTPRINTS 237, 238 (Pauline B. Bart & Eileen Geil Moran eds., 1993); Carole Warshaw, Limi-
tations of the Medical Model in the Care of Battered Women, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
THE BLOODY FOOTPRINTS, supra, at 134, 142-44; Ronald A. Chez, A Physician's Perspective on
Woman Battering, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1994, at 68, 69-71; Wesley B. Crenshaw et al., Proposed Revi-
sions to Mandatory Reporting Laws: An Exploratory Survey of Child Protective Service Agen-
cies, 73 CHILD WELFARE 15, 16 (1994); Andrew A. Skolnick, Physician, Heal Thyself-Then Aid
Abused Women, 273 JAMA 1744, 1744-45 (1995); see also, e.g., Genell Sandberg et al., Physician
Reporting Practices In Child Physical Abuse, 9 RESPONSE To VICTIMIZATION WOMEN & CHIL-
DREN 6 (1986).
19. See, e.g., Cynthia Lynne Pike, Note, The Use of Medical Protocols in Identifying Battered
Women, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1941, 1944 (1992); Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra note 1,
at 3191; Virginia P. Tilden, Response of the Health Care Delivery System to Battered Women, 10
ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH NURS. 309, 314 (1989).
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domestic violence victims. 20 They may accept the sometimes plausi-
ble-sounding non-abuse-related "alternative" explanations for their
patients' injuries which their patients fabricate for various reasons,
such as fear of retaliation or humiliation or the desire to protect their
assailants. 21 Other physicians do not want to "trespass[] into the ter-
ritory of social workers or the police, ' 22 or to get involved with the
legal system and risk being disciplined and/or sued for defamation, a
breach of confidentiality/physician-patient privilege, or some other
tort/ethical violation.23 Physicians may suspect that if they intervene
their action only will incite further violence against their patients by
enraged abusers,24 believe that domestic violence is a private matter
to be dealt with within the family without outside interference, 25 think
that victims want to be left alone,26 or generally be so disheartened by
society's lack of response to spousal violence that they feel the situa-
tion is hopeless and their intervention will accomplish nothing.27 Phy-
sicians even may worry about their own safety or that of their loved
ones if they report abuse against their patients and the abusers then
discover who reported them.28 Regardless of the reasons for physi-
cians' inaction,29 it has serious consequences for their battered
patients.
Physician inaction can facilitate a variety of negative results. Fail-
ure properly to diagnose and act upon battering can permit it to con-
tinue, and even escalate in severity, with homicide of the abused, or
20. See, e.g., Campbell, Family Abuse, supra note 18, at 38-40; Campbell et al., Emergency
Department, supra note 16, at 280, 283; David H. Gremillion & Gigi Evins, Why Don't Doctors
Identify and Refer Victims of Domestic Violence?, 55 N.C. MED. J. 428,428-29 (1994); Pike, supra
note 19, at 1945; Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 3191.
21. See, e.g., Pike, supra note 19, at 1944.
22. Burge, supra note 15, at 372; see also Lucy M. Candib, Violence Against Women: No More
Excuses, 21 FAM. MED. 339, 339 (1989); Pike, supra note 19, at 1945; Tei Randall, Domestic
Violence Begets Other Problems of Which Physicians Must Be Aware to Be Effective, 264 JAMA
940, 940 (1990); Tilden, supra note 19, at 314.
23. See, e.g., Chez, supra note 18, at 69-70; Gremillion & Evins, supra note 20, at 430; Pike,
supra note 19, at 1946, 1955.
24. See, e.g., Chez, supra note 18, at 70-71.
25. See, e.g., Burge, supra note 15, at 372; Gremillion & Evins, supra note 20, at 430; Jecker,
supra note 4, at 777; Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 3191.
26. See, e.g., Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 3191.
27. See, e.g., Burge, supra note 15, at 372; Chez, supra note 18, at 70; Tilden, supra note 19, at
314; Carole Warshaw, Domestic Violence: Challenges to Medical Practice, 2 J. WOMEN'S HEALTH
73, 76-77 (1993) [hereinafter Warshaw, Domestic Violence].
28. See, e.g., Loma Bell & Patrick Tooman, Mandatory Reporting Laws: A Critical Overview,
8 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 337, 344 (1994); Chez, supra note 18, at 70-71; David P. Sklar, Emergency
Medicine, 271 JAMA 1665, 1665 (1994).
29. Cf Linda L. Hale & Julie Underwood, Child Abuse: Helping Kids Who Are Hurting, 74
MARO. L. REV. 560, 561 (1991) (listing interestingly similar reasons why educators do not report
child abuse).
[Vol. 45:191
1996] BATTERED SPOUSES' DAMAGE ACTIONS 199
perhaps the abuser, their children, and others always a real possibil-
ity.30 Inappropriate or harmful medical treatment, such as prescribing
medications a domestic violence victim may use for addictive or sui-
cidal purposes or which may tranquilize the victim and thus render her
more vulnerable to abuse, also is possible.31 Such physician behavior
can contribute to the victim's already strong feelings of helplessness,
entrapment, and victimization. 32 Finally, physician inaction even may
encourage the abuser to continue the battering because the abuser
may view the silent acquiescence by a high-status member of society
as a form of acceptance or tolerance of the abusive behavior.33
Increasingly, the medical (and other34) establishments have recog-
nized that physicians must become more involved with their patients
who are spouse abuse victims. The Joint Commission on the Accredi-
tation of Healthcare Organizations ("JCAHO")35 now requires all
30. See, e.g., Susan A. Collier, Comment, Reporting Child Abuse: When Moral Obligations
Fail, 15 PAC. L.J. 189, 191 (1983); Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 3190; Vio-
lence Against Women, supra note 4, at 3184. "Among battered women who are first identified in
a medical setting, 75% will go on to suffer repeated abuse." Warshaw, Domestic Violence, supra
note 27, at 74.
31. See, e.g., Jecker, supra note 4, at 779; Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at
3190; see also DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 15. at 190-92; GILL HAoUE & ELLEN MALOS,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: ACTION FOR CHANGE 159-61 (1993).
32. See, e.g., DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 15, at 192; A. JONES, BArEING & How TO
STOP IT, supra note 6, at 148; Dworkin, supra note 18, at 238; Physicians and Domestic Violence,
supra note 1, at 3190; Warshaw, Domestic Violence, supra note 27, at 76.
33. Cf. Collier, supra note 30, at 191 (discussing child abuse).
34. In 1991 the Attorney General of Kentucky noted that adult abuse cases:
usually require more than the traditional medical responses to serve victims ade-
quately. Some reasons abuse victims require special attention are:
- Victims may present with problems not readily identified from a strictly medical
standpoint; injuries may not be serious and complaints may not be supported with
physical evidence.
- Victims may deny or minimize the abuse, neglect, or exploitation.
- Victims may be inappropriately diagnosed and treated, prescribed unnecessary
medications or admitted to mental health facilities.
- Victims may return to the relationship in which they were abused, frustrating the
service provider's attempts to deliver assistance and still at-risk of further
maltreatment.
- Victims may be blamed for their situation and left to deal with it alone.
CowA, supra note 6, at 3; see also Roberta Cooper Ramo, ABA President-Elect Announces
Domestic Violence Initiative, 29 FAM. L.Q. at ix, ix-xi (1995).
35. The JCAHO accredits hospitals and hospital-sponsored ambulatory care facilities in the
United States. Pike, supra note 19, at 1948. Effectively, such facilities cannot operate without
JCAHO accreditation. Id. For more on JCAHO see, e.g., Carol Jack Scott & Roseanne M.
Matricciani, Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations Standards to Im-
prove Care for Victims of Abuse, 43 MD. MED. J. 891,891-92 (1994) (describing the JCAHO and
its 1995 standards for abuse victims); Andrew A. Skolnick, Joint Commission Will Collect, Publi-
cize Outcomes, 270 JAMA 165, 165, 168, 171 (1993) (discussing JCAHO, its policies, and its
critics).
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hospitals to develop and follow protocols to help in identifying, evalu-
ating, and treating adult abuse victims.36 Unfortunately, however, a
failure properly to monitor the enforcement of this policy and a lack
of adequate training of emergency department staff seriously may
have hampered achieving these lofty goals.3 7 The American Medical
Association ("AMA") has determined that its members have an ethi-
cal duty to diagnose and treat domestic violence.38 Significantly, how-
ever, the AMA generally advises a physician who diagnoses abuse of a
competent adult patient not to report it to law enforcement authori-
ties unless the victim consents for the physician to do so or a state
statute requires such action. 39 Thus, in the states which lack such stat-
utes, the AMA-mandated diagnosis and treatment of battered women
will be of limited utility if the abused patient is unwilling for the physi-
cian to contact the authorities. In such cases, her batterer can con-
tinue his abusive behavior, possibly resulting in the serious injury or
death of the patient, while the physician stands by silently.
36. 1 THE JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, 1995
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 7, 9, 10 (1994); see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
1, at 25; Teri Randall, AMA, Joint Commission Urge Physicians Become Part of Solution to Fam-
ily Violence Epidemic, 266 JAMA 2524, 2524 (1991); Scott & Matricciani, supra note 35, at 892-
98. For a discussion of the potential impact of such protocols, see Pike, supra note 19, at 1948-57
(analyzing the import of the JCAHO decision on medical and legal personnel). At least one
medical center has instituted special training for physicians to assist them in evaluating trauma
victims, specifically including battered spouses. See William S. Smock, Development of a Clinical
Forensic Medicine Curriculum for Emergency Physicians in the USA, 1 J. CLINICAL FORENSIC
MED. 27, 27 (1994) (program initiated by Department of Emergency Medicine at the University
of Louisville School of Medicine and the Kentucky Medical Examiner's Office); William S.
Smock et al., Development and Implementation of the First Clinical Forensic Medicine Training
Program, 38 J. FORENSIC Sci. 835, 838 (1993).
37. See, e.g., FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL EMERGENCY DE-
PARTMENTS RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE-SURvEY REPORT (1993); ARIELLA HYMAN,
MANDATORY REPORTING OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS: A MIS-
GUIDED APPROACH 1 (1994); Emergency Department Response, supra note 16, at 1296; Gremil-
lion & Evins, supra note 20, at 431; Ariella Hyman et al., Laws Mandating Reporting of Domestic
Violence: Do They Promote Patient Well-Being?, 273 JAMA 1781, 1781 (1995) [hereinafter Hy-
man et al., Reporting of Domestic Violence]; Nancy E. Isaac & Ricardo L. Sanchez, Emergency
Department Response to Battered Women in Massachusetts, 23 ANNALS EMERG. MED. 855, 857-
58 (1994); Demie Kurz, Emergency Department Responses to Battered Women: Resistance to
Medicalization, 34 Soc. PROBs. 69, 71-75 (1987).
38. Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 3190; see Dianne Aprile, Popping the
Question, LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, Oct. 6, 1992, at C1; Jill Smolowe, What the Doctor
Should Do, TIME, June 29, 1992, at 57; infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text (discussing in
more detail the ethical basis for the AMA's finding). For more on the AMA's response to the
family violence issue, see its president's recent editorial on the subject. McAfee, Physicians and
Domestic Violence, supra note 15, at 1790-91 (encouraging physician intervention in domestic
violence cases).
39. Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 3192. The result is different in cases of
child abuse or abuse of the elderly or disabled. Id.
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Some states have chosen to demand more of physicians via statute,
to require them to report the abuse of their patients to the authorities.
For example, in Kentucky a physician must report known or suspected
abuse of an adult to the Commonwealth's Department for Social
Services, Cabinet for Human Resources for investigation and the offer
of protective services (usually voluntary) where appropriate.40 The
physician is immune from civil or criminal liability for reporting in
good faith4' (so the traditional physician-patient privilege42 is inappli-
cable 43), and is guilty of a misdemeanor upon failing to report abuse.44
40. A Kentucky statute provides, in pertinent part that:
(2) Any person, including, but not limited to, physician, law enforcement officer,
nurse, social worker, cabinet [for Social Services] personnel, coroner, medical examiner,
alternate care facility employee, or caretaker, having reasonable cause to suspect that
an adult has suffered abuse, neglect, or exploitation, shall report or cause reports to be
made in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Death of the adult does not
relieve one of the responsibility for reporting the circumstances surrounding the death.
(3) An oral or written report shall be made immediately to the cabinet upon knowl-
edge of the occurrence of suspected abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an adult. Any
person making such a report shall provide the following information, if known: The
name and address of the adult, or of any other person responsible for his care; the age
of the adult; the nature and extent of the abuse, neglect, or exploitation, including any
evidence of previous abuse, neglect, or exploitation; the identity of the perpetrator, if
known; the identity of the complainant, if possible; and any other information that the
person believes might be helpful in establishing the cause of abuse, neglect, or
exploitation.
(4) Upon receipt of the report, the cabinet [for Human Resources] shall take the
following action as soon as practical:
(a) Notify the appropriate law enforcement agency;
(b) Initiate an investigation of the complaint; and
(c) Make a written report of the initial findings together with a recommendation
for further action, if indicated.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Chris
Gorman, Reporting of Spouse and Partner Abuse: Legal Responsibilities and Liabilities, Louis-
VILLE MED., Apr. 1992, at 24; Stephen L. Henry et al., Domestic Violence-The Medical Com-
munity's Legal Duty, 90 Ky. MED. ASS'N J. 163, 166-68 (1992). The physician must report abuse
regardless of the wishes of the patient. Henry, supra, at 166.
41. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.050 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); see Gorman, supra note 40,
at 26; Henry, supra note 40, at 166-67.
42. See infra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing related, but different, concepts of
physician-patient confidentiality and privilege).
43. A Kentucky Attorney General's opinion concluded that the mandatory reporting statute
controls over any privilege claim, whether physician-patient or psychotherapist-patient. Op. Ky.
Att'y Gen. 83-187 (1983). "In a legal opinion (February 12, 1991) from the Cabinet for Human
Resources on the subject of privileged communications of psychologists as it relates to the re-
porting requirements of both child and adult abuse, neglect or exploitation it was determined
that psychologists have the legal obligation to report both child and adult maltreatment."
Gorman, supra note 40, at 24. The actual opinion concluded that "psychologists have the obliga-
tion to report both child abuse . . . and adult abuse ... notwithstanding . . . the statute in
Kentucky which addresses the psychologist-patient privilege." Privileged Communications of
Psychologists, Op. Off. Counsel, Ky, Cabinet Human Resources 1 (Feb. 12, 1991). Another
opinion found an exception when attorney-client privilege was the issue. Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 83-
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Similarly, since 1994, California physicians must report to a local law
enforcement agency, among other things, injuries to their patients in-
flicted in the course of spouse abuse.45 They are immune from liabil-
ity for making the reports, 6 and physician-patient privilege is
abrogated. 47 They commit a misdemeanor when they do not report.48
New Mexico has a similar, albeit less developed, provision.49 Various
other states have statutes requiring that physicians report some crimi-
nal/violent behavior against their patients, including certain domestic
violence victims. 50 Unfortunately, however, many physicians do not
act notwithstanding such laudable provisions. A 1992 study of physi-
cians in Louisville, Kentucky disclosed that only 24% had ever filed a
spouse abuse report, versus 63% who had reported instances of child
367 (1983). For more on the privilege issue, see, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.060 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1991); Gorman, supra, at 24-26; Henry, supra note 40, at 166-67: Steven R. Smith,
Medical and Psychotherapy Privileges and Confidentiality: On Giving With One Hand and Re-
moving With the Other, 75 Ky. L.J. 473, 511-12 (1986-87) [hereinafter Smith, Privileges and Con-
fidentiality]. Cf. Dawson v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (spousal
testimony privilege does not permit abusive husband to bar hearsay statements of his spouse
abuse victim-wife).
44. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.990(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991), provides that: "Anyone
knowingly and willfully violating the provisions of KRS 209.030(2) shall be guilty of a Class B
misdemeanor as designated in KRS 532.090. Each violation shall constitute a separate offense."
See Henry, supra note 40, at 167 (discussing the consequences of statutory violations).
45. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11160-11161 (West Supp. 1995).
46. Id. § 11161.9. In addition, the California Legislature gives health practitioners protection
against being sued for making reports pursuant to Section 11160 by allowing them to recover
from the California State Board of Control for any obligation for attorneys' fees they incur while
defending themselves from suit. Id. § 11163.
47. Id. § 11163.2.
48. Id. § 11162.
49. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-7-30, -31 (Michie 1994), require anyone who has reasonable cause
to believe an adult has been abused to report this knowledge or be guilty of a misdemeanor. It
grants a good faith reporter immunity from civil or criminal liability for making the report. Id.
50. See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
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abuse.5 1 Thus, physicians do not report abuse even though they risk
criminal, and potential civil,52 liability for not doing so.53
Should the physician who treats a domestic violence victim be liable
in damages to the patient or her survivors for failing to report the
abuse before it was too late? Should the physician have a legal duty
to act whether or not a statute requires the physician to do so? The
better answer is yes in both the analogous child abuse54 situation 5 and
in the elder-abuse one as well.56 When the patient is an apparently
competent adult, the answer may be less clear. This Article will dis-
cuss the various issues which will determine whether the law effec-
tively will require physicians to report spouse abuse to the proper
authorities by holding them civilly liable when they fail to do so and
51. Henry, supra note 40, at 164-65. The same report disclosed that only 29 percent of the
physicians surveyed knew about the Kentucky statutes which require them to report spouse
abuse as compared with over 81 percent who knew about the laws requiring them to report child
abuse. Henry, supra, at 164; see also supra notes 40-41, 43-44 and accompanying text (discussing
Kentucky's statute mandating that a physician must report known or suspected abuse of an
adult); John D. McDowell et al., Recognizing and Reporting Domestic Violence: A Survey of
Dental Practitioners, 14 SPECIAL CARE IN DENTISTRY 49 (1994) (similar results from survey of
Colorado dentists). For comparable data on child abuse reporting, see, e.g., Seth C. Kalichman
& Cheryl L. Brosig, Practicing Psychologists' Interpretations of and Compliance with Child
Abuse Reporting Laws, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 83, 90 (1993) (indicating that in a survey, 32
percent of professional psychologists failed to report suspected abuse of a child); Sandberg et al.,
supra note 18. In 1994, hospital personnel initially reported a mere three percent of the spouse
abuse reported to Kentucky state investigators. PROFILE ON ADULT ABUSE, supra note 4, at 21.
Physicians initially reported a minuscule .002% of the spouse abuse. Id.
52. See Smith, Privileges and Confidentiality, supra note 43, at 530 (stating failure to report
abuse may lead to civil liability).
53. Interestingly, Kentucky reports that state investigators consistently substantiate roughly
70% of all reports of abuse of adults which are filed with them. PROFILE ON ADULT ABUSE,
supra note 4, at 6. From 1988-94, investigators substantiated approximately 76% of spouse
abuse reports. Id. at 9.
54. This Article frequently cites precedents or authorities involving child abuse because courts
often treat abuse victims essentially the same regardless whether they are children or spouses.
See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.4 (1989);
Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662, 663 (D.C. 1987); Florida Dep't of Health & Reha-
bilitative Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So. 2d 258, 262 (Fla. 1988); Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482
N.E.2d 70, 75 (N.Y. 1985); A. JONES, BATTERING & How TO STOP IT, supra note 6, at 223-24;
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, The Battered Woman, ACOG TECHNICAL
BULL, No. 124, Jan. 1989, at 2; Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Child Abuse and Wife Abuse: The Con-
nections, 43 MD. MED. J. 349, 349 (1994); Davidson, supra note 6; Mary McKernan McKay, The
Link between Domestic Violence and Child Abuse: Assessment and Treatment Considerations, 73
CHILD WELFARE 29 (1994); Charles Marwick, Health and Justice Professionals Set Goals to
Lessen Domestic Violence, 271 JAMA 1147, 1147 (1994); Picker, supra note 1, at 71, 79; Smith,
Privileges and Confidentiality, supra note 43, at 530.
55. See infra notes 85-127 and accompanying text (discussing a physician's duty to report child
abuse).
56. See infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text (discussing a physician's duty to report elder
abuse).
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the patient subsequently suffers further abuse.57 The threat of civil
liability can be a powerful incentive to inspire physicians to act,58
while the imposition of liability will have the additional beneficial ef-
fect of compensating the injured or her survivors.59 Much like the
57. Of course, any liability will be for injuries suffered subsequent to the time when the abuse
should have been reported. As a leading child abuse expert has explained:
The only harms or injuries that are considered are those that occurred after the report
should have been made. Potential reporters are not held responsible for maltreatment
that occurred before they knew or should have known about the.., situation. And, of
course, there is no liability if there is no further maltreatment.
DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, THE VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER 38 (1985) [hereinafter BESHAROV,
THE VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER]; see also, e.g., Thelen ex rel. Thelen v. St. Cloud Hosp., 379
N.W.2d 189, 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Aaron, supra note 11, at 190, 207.
58. For more on the incentive value of civil litigation against non-reporting physicians, see,
e.g., Besharov, Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 14, at 481 (stating that the prospect of a civil
lawsuit is a strong incentive for complying with reporting mandates); Jeffrey W. Kelley, The
Child Abuse Epidemic: Illinois' Legislative Response and Some Further Suggestions, 1974 U. ILL.
L. REV. 403, 409,412-13 (discussing advantages civil liability has over criminal liability for deter-
rence of physician inaction); Kohlman, supra note 12, at 121, 185 (claiming that criminal sanc-
tions for non-reporting in child abuse cases are ineffectual and the only viable alternative is civil
sanction); Richard Allen McDonald, Note, Torts: Civil Action Against Physician for Failure to
Report Cases of Suspected Child Abuse, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 482, 485, 487 (1977); Jerry A. Ramsey
& Byron J. Lawler, The Battered Child Syndrome, 1 PEPP. L. REV. 372, 374, 381 (1974) (main-
taining that the imposition of civil liability will provide a financial deterrent for physician inac-
tion); cf. Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); BESHAROV, THE
VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER, supra note 57, at 27 (discussing the incentive value of civil litiga-
tion and criminal prosecution against non-reporting social workers and other defendants);
Aaron, supra note 11, at 186 (incentive value of civil litigation against non-reporting teachers);
Jones, Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage Actions, supra note 8, at 255 & n.ll (incentive
value of civil litigation against unresponsive police); Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage
Actions, supra note 1, at 4 & n.10 (citing sources discussing whether the availability of damage
actions against police would encourage action). Contra Mazura, supra note 12, at 1198-1201
(claiming that more than civil litigation is needed to encourage abuse reporting). As one article
discussing the analogous child abuse reporting problem noted:
The number of [children] in our institutions cry out for an effective method to en-
courage those who fail to report to take a hard look at their dereliction of duty. A civil
tort action ... tried before a cross section of society who can impose an effective dollar
penalty, will provide such encouragement. With the penalty measured in the tens and
hundreds of thousands of dollars, the inconvenience of reporting and becoming in-
volved will shrink into insignificance. It is a language that most professionals under-
stand .... Only then will the [children] of our society have the opportunity for a
childhood free of physical abuse.
Ramsey & Lawler, supra, at 381. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the actual imposition of civil
liability will cause many more physicians to report abuse. See Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse
and Neglect: Liability for Failing To Report, TRIAL, Aug. 1986, at 67, 71 [hereinafter Besharov,
Failing to Report] (finding that the prospect of civil litigation for damages is a strong incentive
for compliance with reporting mandates); Kalichman & Brosig, supra note 51, at 90 (stating that
legal concerns influence a psychologist's decision to report child abuse); Kelley, supra, at 409
n.43 (citing an increase in reporting of abuse in areas where civil liability for non-action is
publicized).
59. See, e.g., Brown & Truitt, supra note 12, at 762; Collier, supra note 30, at 192; Mazura,
supra note 12, at 1192-93.
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unresponsive police, physicians may find themselves held liable for
not preventing abuse they did not directly cause on theories of com-
mon law60 negligence,61 common law statutory tort,62 or perhaps ex-
press statutory provision. 63
I. BATTERED SPOUSES' NEGLIGENCE SUITS
In order to prevail in a negligence action against a physician who
did not report abuse of a patient to the authorities, the patient (or her
survivors) must prove the traditional elements of negligence-duty,
breach of duty, causation (both in fact and proximate), and actual in-
jury.64 While proximate cause could prove problematic,65 the ultimate
60. This Article focuses on private physicians treating private patients. If the physician is a
state or federal governmental agent, other issues may be present, such as sovereign and official
immunity, civil rights violation, tort liability of federal officials, the public duty rule, etc. For an
overview of these issues, see Jones, Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage Actions, supra note
8; Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damages Actions, supra note 1, at 5-13, 15-31, 70-74.
This Article does not discuss possible remedies under the Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-
Motivated Violence Act as codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). It is uncertain whether domes-
tic violence victims could use this new civil rights law against non-reporting physicians.
61. See infra notes 64-326 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 327-46 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 347-48 and accompanying text.
For the possibility of holding an abuse non-reporter civilly liable on an "aiding and abetting"
cause of action, see Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 315 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the
plaintiff failed to plead adequate facts to consider aiding and abetting as a theory of recovery);
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 46 (5th ed. 1984 &
Supp. 1988). For (probably unsuccessful) use of the "prima facie" tort in this context, see Brad-
ley, 904 S.W.2d at 315.
64. E.g., Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 155 (Colo. 1986) (en banc); A.L. v. Commonwealth, 521
N.E.2d 1017, 1020 (Mass. 1988); Millman v. County of Butler, 458 N.W.2d 207, 215 (Neb. 1990);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 30; TERRENCE F. KIELY, MODERN TORT LIABILITY: RECOV-
ERY IN Tm '90s § 6.2 (1990); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
65. A battered spouse must establish that the physician was both a cause in fact and a proxi-
mate cause of the spouse's injuries. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, §§ 30, 41-45 (discussing
causation). Proximate causation is a public policy-oriented doctrine. Under it, courts can ab-
solve defendants even though their breaches of duty harmed others. Thus, proximate causation
is clearly analogous with duty. See, e.g., Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1968) (addressing the proximate causation of a negligently moored ship which damaged a bridge,
causing flooding and eventually hindering plaintiff's ability to load cargo); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476
A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984) (discussing liability of host who served alcohol to an eventual drunk
driver); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (majority spoke in terms of
duty rather than proximate cause). For more on the vast field of proximate causation law, see
generally, e.g., 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.1, at 650 (2d ed. 1986 &
Supp. 1995); 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., supra 8H 20.1, 20.4-.6; KEETON ET AL., supra, §§ 42-
44; Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present
Darkness, 69 WASH. U.L.Q. 49 (1991); Jane Stapleton, Law, Causation and Common Sense, 8
OXFORD J LEGAL STUD. 111 (1988); E. Wayne Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate
Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 1.
Numerous cases have held, directly or implicitly, that the police are a cause in fact and proxi-
mate cause of the injuries an abusive spouse inflicts when they did not arrest him. Hence, the
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inquiry is one of duty-did the physician owe the patient a duty to
report suspected abuse to the authorities, and if so did the physician
satisfy this obligation. One who does not owe another a duty to act
reasonably is not liable to the other even when he or she carelessly
harms that other person.66 Conversely, one must act reasonably to-
wards those to whom one owes a duty. Where tribunals draw the line
on duty can determine important policy concerns, 67 and their deci-
sions are driven, to a large extent, by public policy considerations akin
to those in proximate cause cases.68 As the following discussion dem-
onstrates, courts also resolve disputes about the liability of physicians
when they set the parameters of duty.
A. General Common Law Rule of No Duty to Help Others
At common law parties have no duty to aid or protect others unless
the parties have some form of "special relationship" with those
others.69 This rule has led to a number of shocking decisions which
police are liable in damages for the harm the spouse causes. E.g., Raucci v. City of Rotterdam,
902 F.2d 1050, 1058 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying New York law); Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 &
n.14 (Alaska 1976); Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs, 687 P.2d 728. 730 (N.M. 1984); Berliner
v. Thompson, 540 N.Y.S.2d 374, 376-77 (App. Div. 1989); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Note, Battered
Women's Substantive Due Process Claims: Can Orders of Protection Deflect DeShaney?, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1280, 1309-14 (1990); Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra
note 1, at 15 n.44. The law is less developed in the physician context, but should lead to the same
result. In Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389, 395-96 (Cal. 1976), the California Supreme Court
ruled that a physician who failed to report an instance of child abuse to the authorities, when the
abuser then inflicted additional injuries on the child after the physician treated her, may be liable
in negligence for the child's subsequent injuries. As the court observed, a jury could find that
the Landeros victim's subsequent mistreatment by her mother and her mother's common law
husband was foreseeable to the treating physician given what he had witnessed when he saw the
eleven month old child in the hospital, and thus that he helped cause the harm. Id. See J.A.W. v.
Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802, 811-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (dealing with a suit against a clergyman
and a marital counselor for a failure to report abuse, is to the same effect).
The foreseeable criminal conduct of an abusive spouse is not a superseding intervening cause.
Thus, it does not exculpate the defendant. See Landeros, 551 P.2d at 395; KEETON ET AL., supra,
§ 44, at 305; Jones, supra, at 15 n.44.
66. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL, supra note 63, § 53; KIELY, supra note 64, §§ 6.1-.3.
67. For a discussion on the process of determining the existence of a duty, see, e.g., KEETON
ET AL., supra note 63, § 53 ; KIELY, supra note 64, §§ 6.1-.3; Fleming James, Jr., Scope of Duty in
Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 778 (1953).
68. See supra note 65 (discussing proximate causation).
69. See, e.g., Stangle v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 244 Cal. Rptr. 103, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
For further discussion of the common law duty to aid and protect others, see generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 314A, 314B (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 56; John
M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the Current
State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 867; James
B. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 111-13 (1908); Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral
Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability (pts. 1-2), 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 316 (1908);
Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1, at 32-40, 74-77 (from which
this material is excerpted); Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay On the Evolution and
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have exculpated morally censurable, but legally blameless, defendants
who did not help those they easily could have saved.70 Thus, the
priest and the Levite from the renowned New Testament parable, who
refused to aid the crime victim the good Samaritan finally rescued,71
may have had a moral obligation to intervene. The common law,
however, would not hold them liable in tort for their inaction.72 In the
words of an influential early ruling:
For withholding relief from the suffering, for failure to respond to
the calls of worthy charity, or for faltering in the bestowment of
brotherly love on the unfortunate, penalties are found not in the
Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879 (1986); Robert A.
Prentice, Expanding The Duty To Rescue, 19 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 15 (1985); Jay Silver, The Duty
to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 423 (1985); Ernest J.
Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980); Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical
Community of Aid: A Rejoinder To Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1993). As Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 (1965) states: "The fact that
the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protec-
tion does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action." Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 315 (1965) specifically provides that:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person so as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes
a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection.
70. See, e.g., Miller v. Arnal Corp., 632 P.2d 987, 990 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (ski resort not
liable for failing to rescue a hiker stranded in snowstorm); Union Pac. Ry. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281
(Kan. 1903) (railroad employees who did not immediately help trespasser, whom train ran over,
owed no duty to him); Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928) (lessor of canoe who disre-
garded cries for help from lessee after canoe overturned on lake surface had no duty to rescue);
Sullenger ex rel. Sullenger v. Setco Northwest, Inc., 702 P.2d 1139 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (pediatri-
cian had no duty to help child who suffered permanent brain damage because no formal physi-
cian-patient relationship had arisen between them); Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959)
(landowner had no duty to help his drowning invitee); see generally, e.g., MARSHALL S. SHAPO,
THE DUrY TO AcT. TORT LAW, POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY (1977) (discussing several exam-
ples where no duty was found).
71. Luke 10:30-37. At the conclusion of the parable, the author of the gospel reported that
Christ raised a question: "Which now of these three [the priest, the Levite, or the Samaritan],
thinkest thou, was neighbour unto him that fell among the thieves?" Id. at 10:36. The response,
appropriately, was: "He that shewed mercy on him." Id. at 10:37. Christ's final exhortation was
"Go, and do thou likewise," id., an obligation the courts often have refused to enforce. See infra
note 72 and accompanying text; supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (discussing court's
traditional approaches to duty-to-rescue cases).
72. See Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (N.H. 1898) (stating the common law rule).
As the Buch court elaborated:
Suppose A., standing close by a railroad, sees a two year old babe on the track, and a
car approaching. He can easily rescue the child, with entire safety to himself, and the
instincts of humanity require him to do so. If he does not, he may, perhaps, justly be
styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster; but he is not liable in damages for the
child's injury ....
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laws of men, but in that higher law, the violation of which is con-
demned by the voice of conscience, whose sentence of punishment
for the recreant act is swift and sure.73
This principle obviously could make it difficult for those who need
assistance to hold inactive physicians answerable for their failure to
report abuse inflicted upon their patients.74
B. "Special Relationship" Exceptions to No Duty Rule
Notwithstanding the traditional no duty rule, one may have a re-
sponsibility to protect another when he or she has a "special relation-
ship" with the other. 75 Courts have found special relationships in a
variety of situations. Many agree, for example, that occupiers of land
have the burden of shielding their invitees.76 A party may have to
prevent another from harming a third person either because the party
must control the other's conduct or because the party is charged with
protecting the third person from harm.77 A tribunal also may hold
liable one who voluntarily assumes an obligation he or she ordinarily
73. Union Pac. Ry., 72 P. at 282.
74. For more on the continued validity of the no duty to rescue doctrine, see Jones, Battered
Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1, at 74-77.
75. See, e.g., Stangle v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 244 Cal. Rptr. 103, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(finding no special relationship between insurance company and plaintiff whose ring was stolen
in the insurance company's office); Felger v. Latimer County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 776 P.2d
1169, 1171-72 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (sheriff had special relationship with probationer in public
service program); Cansler v. State, 675 P.2d 57, 61-63 (Kan. 1984) (special relationship required
county to notify local police of escapes from county jail); KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 56, at
376-85 (discussing special relationships which may give rise to a duty).
76. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(3) (1965); see, e.g., L. S. Ayres & Co. v.
Hicks, 40 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 1942) (construing a duty of store owners to the its patrons); Mostert
v. CBL & Assocs., 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
Specific sections of the Restatement outline the duty of parents to control the conduct of their
children, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965); e.g., Boyd v. Connell, 739 S.W.2d 536
(Ark. 1987); Huston v. Konieczny, 556 N.E.2d 505 (Ohio 1990), masters the actions of their
servants when the servants are acting outside the scope of their employment, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965); e.g., Nazareth v. Herndon Ambulance Serv., 467 So. 2d 1076
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 478 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1985); Palmer v. Keene Forestry Ass'n,
112 A. 798 (N.H. 1921), and possessors of land or chattels the actions of their licensees. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 (1965); e.g., Wheeler v. Darmochwat, 183 N.E. 55 (Mass.
1932); Parks v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 23 N.W.2d 196 (Mich. 1946).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965) requires:
One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another
under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal power of self-protection
or to subject him to association with persons likely to harm him, is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of third persons as to prevent them
from intentionally harming the other or so conducting themselves as to create an unrea-
sonable risk of harm to him, if the actor
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the conduct of
the third persons, and
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would not have and then performs it carelessly, if at all, to endanger
another person.78 In the words of the leading treatise: "the good Sa-
maritan who tries to help may find himself mulcted in damages, while
the priest and the Levite who pass by on the other side go on their
cheerful way rejoicing. '79
Many courts hold that some statutes and related enactments, in-
cluding both municipal ordinances and administrative regulations,80
can generate a duty if their legislative enactor so intended.81 When
someone violates such a law, the tribunals then may find that he or
she has breached the duty.82 The disobedience is labelled statutory
negligence, and may provide an injured plaintiff with evidence of
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such
control.
A number of courts have imposed duties on defendants in cases which may be classified under
this Restatement section. See, e.g., Felger v. Larimer County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 776 P.2d
1169, 1172 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (sheriff had duty to protect drunk driver ordered to perform
community service as atonement); Comuntzis v. Pinellas County Sch. Bd., 508 So. 2d 750 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (school had duty to protect pupil from attack by other student); Sylvester v.
Northwestern Hosp., 53 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1952) (hospital had duty to protect patient from at-
tack by other patient).
78. See, e.g., Papastathis v. Beall, 723 P.2d 97, 99 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (franchisor which
undertook inspection of soft drink dispenser rack was liable for injuries caused by rack); Bloom-
berg v. Interinsurance Exch., 207 Cal. Rptr. 853, 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (motor club which
dispatched tow truck could be liable for wrongful death of stranded motorist which occurred
after tow truck failed to locate the motorist); Crowley v. Spivey, 329 S.E.2d 774, 785 (S.C. 1985)
(grandparents who undertook supervision of grandchildren were liable for their wrongful deaths
which occurred after they supervised them negligently); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 323, 324, 324A (1965).
79. KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 56, at 378.
80. Id. § 36, at 220 & nn.3-4.
81. For examples and discussion of statutes generating a duty, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 285(a)-(b), 286 (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 63. § 36; James T. R. Jones,
Trains, Trucks, Trees and Shrubs: Vision-Blocking Natural Vegetation and a Landowner's Duty to
Those Off the Premises, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1263, 1284-88 (1994); Paul Sherman, Use of Federal
Statutes in State Negligence Per Se Actions, 13 WFTTIER L. REV. 831, 879-83 (1992).
82. Once tribunals find such a duty, they determine the effect of their discovery by following
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B (1965). It specifies:
(1) The unexcused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regula-
tion which is adopted by the court as defining the standard of conduct of a reasonable
man, is negligence itself.
(2) The unexcused violation of an enactment or regulation which is not so adopted
may be relevant evidence bearing on the issue of negligent conduct.
Id. Thus, in either event the statutory authority can give rise to a duty, and accordingly a special
relationship.
For more on determining whether a particular statute creates such a responsibility, as well as
the effect of a finding that it does, see, e.g., Crown v. Raymond, 764 P.2d 1146 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988) (dealing with a statute prohibiting the sale of handguns to minors); Sanchez v. Galey, 733
P.2d 1234 (Idaho 1986) (construing OSHA regulations); Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y.
1920) (adjudicating an issue arising from a statute requiring certain lights on a motor vehicle);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 36.
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fault. The wrongdoer even can be conclusively negligent-negligent
per se-as a result.83 Thus, judicial construction effectively creates a
special relationship between those the legislature orders to behave in
a certain way and those benefitted by that designation.
In sum, physicians have no common law duty to help battered
women (or anyone else) unless they have special relationships with
them. This situation may be distressing and distasteful, but courts
continue to enforce it.84 Thus, the relevant question becomes can a
domestic violence victim establish a special relationship between her-
self and the physician(s) she consulted during the abuse process suffi-
cient to generate a duty of protection from the physician for whose
breach the physician will be held liable when he or she unreasonably
fails to report the abuse. The answer is yes.
1. Physician Duty to Report Child Abuse
At the outset, one notes the dearth of authority on physicians, spe-
cial relationships, and domestic violence victims. Such a dearth does
not exist, however, in the closely related child abuse field. 85 Much has
been written about physician (and other) 86 liability for failure to re-
83. See, e.g., Thelen ex rel. Thelen v. St. Cloud Hosp., 379 N.W.2d 189, 192-93 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985); McRee v. Raney, 493 So. 2d 1299, 1300 (Miss. 1986); KEETON ET AL, supra note 63, § 36,
at 229-31 (discussing negligence per se).
In this Article, the concept of statutory negligence refers to judicial applications of both the
evidence of negligence and negligence per se approaches. When a court concludes that a non-
reporting physician or other defendant is guilty of negligence per se, its holding is considerably
worse for him or her than if it merely ruled that it would use his or her violation of the law as
evidence of negligence.
For more on statutory negligence in the non-reporting physician context, see infra notes 283-
309 and accompanying text.
84. See Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1, at 38 n.168, 74-77.
For a discussion about why the rule which says those like physicians have no duty to help others
absent a special relationship with them is bad policy, see id. at 74-77.
85. See infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text (discussing elder abuse laws).
86. Those other than physicians, such as school or child welfare workers, counsellors, attor-
neys, or clergy could face liability for failing to report child abuse. See generally, e.g., Letlow v.
Evans, 857 F. Supp. 676 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (educational defendants); Thelma D. v. Board of
Educ., 669 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (educational defendants); Doe "A" v. Special Sch.
Dist., 637 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mo. 1986), aff'd, 901 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1990) (educational defend-
ants); Nelson v. Freeman, 537 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983)
(child welfare defendants); Freehauf v. School Bd., 623 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(educational defendants); J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (counsellor
and clergy defendants); Borne ex rel. Borne v. Northwest Allen County School Corp., 532
N.E.2d 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (educational defendants); Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v.
Specialized Transp. Servs., Inc., 819 P.2d 587 (Kan. 1991) (educational defendants); Williams v.
Coleman, 488 N.W.2d 464 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (social worker defendants); BESHAROV, TiH
VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER, supra note 57, at 22-50 (social worker defendants); Aaron,
supra note 11 (educational defendants); William A. Cole, Religious Confidentiality and the Re-
porting of Child Abuse: A Statutory and Constitutional Analysis, 21 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
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port child abuse.8 7  A number of courts have ruled in this area.88
1, 7 (1987) (clergy defendants); Mary Hatter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting
Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 723,
732-33 (1987) (clergy defendants); Mosteller, supra note 13 (attorney defendants); Raymond C.
O'Brien & Michael T. Flannery, The Pending Gauntlet to Free Exercise: Mandating That Clergy
Report Child Abuse, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1 (1991) (clergy defendants); Robin A. Rosencrantz,
Rejecting "Hear No Evil Speak No Evil": Expanding the Attorney's Role in Child Abuse Report-
ing, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETImcs 327 (1995) (attorney defendants); Lisa M. Smith, Lifting the Veil of
Secrecy: Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Statutes May Encourage the Catholic Church to Re-
port Priests who Molest Children, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 409,419-20 (1994) (clergy and other
church official defendants). The same legal principles should apply to all those mandated by law
to report abuse.
87. See generally, e.g., Agatstein, supra note 13, at 148-49 (discussing liability of mental health
professionals for failure to report); Martha Bailey, The Failure of Physicians to Report Child
Abuse, 40 U. TORONTO FAc. L. REV. 49, 59-64 (1982) (construing Canadian law); Besharov,
Failing to Report, supra note 58; Besharov, Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 14, at 480-83;
Brown & Truitt, supra note 12; James N. Clymer, Comment, Torts: The Battered Child-A Doc-
tor's Civil Liability for Failure to Diagnose and Report, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 543 (1977); Collier,
supra note 30; Orville R. Endicott, Civil Liability for Failure to Report Child Abuse, 3 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 633 (1979) (construing Canadian law); Fraser, supra note 14, at 666-67 (dis-
cussing possible liability of physicians and other professionals); Jeffrey Hannig, Recent Case, 52
N.D. L. REV. 736 (1976) (discussing Landeros v. Flood); Hurley, supra note 13 (discussing liabil-
ity for psychotherapists' failure to report); Lon B. Isaacson, Child Abuse Reporting Statutes: The
Case for Holding Physicians Civilly Liable for Failing to Report, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 743
(1975); Kohlman, supra note 12 (discussing physician liability for failure to report abuse); Lehto,
supra note 12 (discussing physician liability for failure to report abuse); Mazura, supra note 12
(discussing liability of physicians for failure to report); McDonald, supra note 58 (discussing
liability of physicians for failure to report); Miles, supra note 11, at 707-17 (discussing liability of
physicians and other professionals for failure to report abuse); Monrad G. Paulsen, Child Abuse
Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34-36 (1967) [hereinafter
Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws]; Physician's Civil Liability for Negligent Noncompliance
with Child Abuse Reporting Statute, 27 ATLA L. REP. 391 (1984) [hereinafter Physician's Civil
Liability] (discusses three successful suits against physicians who did not report child abuse);
Melvin Rogow, Note, Child Abuse - The Battered Child Syndrome - Liability Arising From
Reporting Laws - Landeros v. Flood, 1 GLENDALE L. REV. 292 (1976), Slovenko, supra note
14, at 484; Thomas A. Moore, Physician Liability for Failure to Report Child Abuse (pts. I & II),
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 7, 1992, at 3 & Feb. 4, 1992, at 3 (discussing physician liability).
88. See, e.g., Letlow, 857 F. Supp. at 676 (educational defendants); Thelma D., 669 F. Supp. at
947 (educational defendants); Doe "A", 637 F. Supp. at 1138 (educational defendants); Nelson,
537 F. Supp. at 602 (child welfare defendants); Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976);
Freehauf, 623 So. 2d at 761 (educational defendants); Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (psychiatrist defendant); Cechman v. Travis, 414 S.E.2d 282 (Ga. Ct. App.
1991) (hospital and other medical professional defendants); J.A.W., 627 N.E.2d at 802 (counsel-
lor and clergy defendants); Borne, 532 N.E.2d at 1196 (educational defendants); Kansas State
Bank, 819 P.2d at 587 (educational defendants); Marcelletti v. Bathani, 500 N.W.2d 124 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1993) (physician defendants); Williams, 488 N.W.2d at 464 (social worker defendants);
Physician's Civil Liability, supra note 87 (discussing three successful suits, including Landeros,
against physicians who did not report child abuse); see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 372
N.E.2d 246, 253 n.8 (Mass. 1978) (criminal homicide case); Commonwealth v. Labbe, 373 N.E.2d
227, 233 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (Brown, J., concurring) (criminal homicide case in which the
concurring justice noted that a battered child may bring a tort action for "failure to report a
probable case of child abuse, where subsequently there is further injury to the child. In addition,
an attending physician may be subject to personal liability for the consequences of any negligent
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These authorities help indicate the appropriate result when a battered
woman seeks to recover for a physician's failure to report her abuse.
When failure to report child abuse is at issue, courts have consid-
ered several theories for imposing civil liability-most frequently
common law negligence,89 statutory negligence,90 or perhaps an ex-
press statutory liability provision.91 As a starting point, by statute all
states require physicians to report known or suspected child abuse to
specified authorities.92 What is the effect of not following the law?
Many states impose criminal penalties for a failure to report child
abuse.93 While criminal prosecutions for violations are rare, they are
not unprecedented. 94 Still, their infrequency markedly reduces
whatever incentive to report the existence of criminal sanctions other-
wise would provide. Moreover, criminal penalties do little or nothing
actually to help the individual child who was battered or killed. Thus,
civil suits are brought both to compensate the injured and to motivate
recalcitrant physicians to report abuse of future patients. 95
Landeros v. Flood96 is the leading pro-liability decision. In that
case, the mother of an eleven month old child and the mother's com-
mon law husband took the child to a California hospital for treatment.
The child evidenced severe battering, but the examining physician
failure to recognize the battered child syndrome") (citations omitted); Settlement in Case Involv-
ing Failure to Diagnose Battered Child Syndrome, 8 VERDICrs, SETrLEMENTS & TACriCS 166
(1988) (report on substantial 1988 settlement of suit against United States Air Force under Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, applying California malpractice law, after Air Force physicians failed to
diagnose child abuse, abuse continued, and child suffered severe and permanent injuries as a
result).
89. See infra notes 100-03, 107-18 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 104, 119-24, 294-308 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
92. In 1967 Professor Monrad G. Paulsen performed a landmark study on child abuse report-
ing laws which has admirably withstood the passage of nearly thirty years. Paulsen, Child Abuse
Reporting Laws, supra note 87. For more recent discussion on this subject, see, e.g., Brooks et
al., Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Laws: Understanding Interests, Understanding Policy, 12
BEHAVIORAL SCI. & LAW 49, 49 (1994); Fraser, supra note 14; Mitchell, supra note 86, at 725;
Mosteller, supra note 13, at 211-14; John E.B. Myers, A Survey of Child Abuse and Neglect
Reporting Statutes, 10 J. Juv. L. 1 (1986); Rosencrantz, supra note 86, at 339-42.
93. For a discussion of criminal penalties for failure to report abuse, see, e.g., BESHAROV, TIE
VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER, supra note 57, at 25-29; Aaron, supra note 11, at 188; Fraser,
supra note 14, at 665-66; Mitchell, supra note 86, at 732-33; Myers, supra note 92, at 62-71.
94. For cases featuring criminal prosecutions for failure to report child abuse, see, e.g., Barber
v. State, 592 So. 2d 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Gladson v. State, 376 S.E.2d 362 (Ga. 1989);
People v. Caviani, 432 N.W.2d 409"(Mich. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Grover, 437 N.W.2d 60 (Minn.
1989); Morris v. State, 833 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1387 (1993).
For a discussion of criminal prosecutions, see, e.g., BESHAROV, THE VULNERABLE SOCIAL
WORKER, supra note 57, at 27-29; Slovenko, supra note 14, at 483-84.
95. Kohlman, supra note 12, at 122; Miles, supra note 11, at 704, 709-10.
96. 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976).
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failed to diagnose battered child syndrome 97 and did not report the
child's condition to the authorities for appropriate intervention. In-
stead, the child was sent home with her mother. Once there, she suf-
fered further severe abuse until another doctor at another hospital
correctly diagnosed the child's battered child syndrome, promptly re-
ported it, and the child was taken from her mother and placed in pro-
tective custody.98 The child's representative then sued the original
physician and hospital in common law and statutory negligence 99 for
the injuries she suffered after she was discharged into the care of her
mother. The California Supreme Court upheld her two causes of
action.
Turning initially to common law negligence, the Landeros court first
held the standard of care in medical malpractice cases may require
physicians to know how to diagnose and treat the battered child syn-
drome, depending on the opinions of experts.100 It then found the
essential physician's duty to report because of the reporting stat-
utes, 10 1 which "evidence a determination by the Legislature that in the
event a physician does diagnose a battered child syndrome, due care
includes a duty to report that fact to the authorities."' 1 2 Because it
concluded that it was a question of fact whether the defendant physi-
cian should have foreseen that the child further would be injured if he
97. Id. at 393-94. Dr. C. Henry Kempe and others wrote the seminal work on this syndrome
in 1962. C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17 (1962). As one
author has described:
"Battered child syndrome" describes the condition of children who have sustained
repeated and/or serious physical injuries by non-accidental means. Injuries are charac-
teristically inflicted by someone who is caring for the child, and there is usually a
marked discrepancy between clinical findings and the child's medical history as sup-
plied by his parents or guardians. Several factors are characteristic of the condition:
evidence of multiple bone injuries; subdural hematomas with or without skull fractures;
serious, unexplained physical injury; evidence of soft tissue injury; evidence of sexual
abuse or general neglect; and multiple injuries present at the same time. Evidence of
nutritional neglect and emotional abuse are also indicative of the syndrome.
Aaron, supra note 11, at 183 n.3 (citations omitted).
98. The child's mother and her common law husband subsequently were convicted of the
crime of child abuse. Landeros, 551 P.2d at 391-92.
99. The child alleged statutory negligence due to failure to report under the mandates of the
child abuse statute and two related laws requiring physicians and hospitals to report injuries
inflicted in violation of the criminal law. Id. at 392.
100. Id. at 393-94.
101. id. at 392; see supra note 99.
102. Landeros, at 394 n.8. Thus, apparently the court's finding of a duty was based on the
reporting statutes rather than any common law duty to act. Actually, the duty should have been
based on a special relationship between the treating physician and the abused child rather than
the fact that the statute existed. The statute would be relevant when statutory negligence, rather
than common law negligence, was the issue. See Miles, supra note 11, at 710 & n.67 (discussing
the source of the duty to report abuse).
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merely discharged the child to her mother without first reporting the
abuse, the California Supreme Court rejected the physician's conten-
tion of supervening intervening cause/proximate cause as a matter of
law. Finally, and as an alternative to common law negligence, the
Landeros court upheld the use of statutory negligence as a means of
finding a physician who did not report child abuse to the authorities
civilly liable pursuant to the requirements of a reporting statute.
10 3
Landeros's landmark status perhaps was best illustrated by the
spate of predominantly laudatory articles which appeared soon after
the California Supreme Court decided it.1°4 Indeed, health journals
and related sources frequently have reported its holdings as if they
were the governing law nationwide. 10 5 However, the judicial recep-
tion has been much more guarded. On the common law negligence
front, only a few courts really have endorsed imposing a duty to report
abuse. In J.A. W. v. Roberts,0 6 a former child sexual abuse victim sued
a number of individuals who knew about his abuse but did not report
it, alleging they had a duty to act, did not, and thus acted unreasona-
bly and were negligent. The trial court held the defendants owed the
plaintiff no duty to report the molestation. 107 On appeal, the Court of
Appeals of Indiana evaluated the relationship between the plaintiff
and each individual defendant to see if a special relationship, and thus
a duty, was present. The court reaffirmed the law that "knowledge of
another's peril, even knowledge of the existence of criminal activity,
standing alone, imposes no common law duty on one possessing such
knowledge to take any affirmative action. '"108 The court then rejected
103. Landeros, 551 P.2d at 396-97.
The court did somewhat limit its Landeros holding, as it found that a non-reporting physician
would be liable civilly only if he or she intentionally failed to report-i.e., that the physician
thought reportable abuse was present yet did not act. Id. at 397-98.
104. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 11; Brown & Truitt, supra note 12; Clymer, supra note 87;
Lehto, supra note 12; Susan Maidment, Some Legal Problems Arising out of the Reporting of
Child Abuse, 31 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 149, 158-59, 165-66 (1979); McDonald, supra note 58.
But see Mazura, supra note 12 (criticizing the imposition of civil liability in Landeros).
105. See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION DIAGNOSTIC AND TREATMENT GUIDELINES
ON CmULD SEXUAL ABUSE 11, 13-14 (stating that "[i]n every state, a potential cause of action
exists for a physician's failure to diagnose and report child abuse"); Mark B. DeKraai & Bruce
D. Sales, Liability in Child Therapy and Research, 59 J. CONSULTING & CUNICAL PSYCHOL. 853,
858 (1991) ("States provide various penalties for failure to report and include both civil and
criminal liability."); Janine Fiesta, Protecting Children: A Public Duty to Report, NURSING
MOMT., July 1992, at 14, 14-15; Kathryn C. Halverson et al., Legal Considerations in Cases of
Child Abuse, 20 PRIMARY CARE 407, 408 (1993) ("Failure to report could also be the basis for a
civil lawsuit that could result in the physician being held financially responsible for the harm to
the child that followed a failure to report."); Sandberg et al., supra note 18, at 6, 7.
106. 627 N.E.2d 802 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
107. Id. at 806.
108. Id. at 809. The J.A.W. court elaborated:
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the plaintiff's contention that the sister of the plaintiff's chief mo-
lester (the plaintiff's foster father) had a duty to report the molesta-
tion because it held she and the plaintiff lacked a "level of interaction
or dependency between the parties that surpasses what is common or
usual,"'1 9 the hallmark of a special relationship. Similarly, the court
found no special relationship between the plaintiff and both a clergy-
man and a counsellor who knew of the abuse but lacked "a level of
interaction or dependency which can be characterized as a special re-
lationship." 110 Thus, merely knowing about the abuse did not impose
a duty; there had to be more-a special relationship."'
When it considered another clergyman/defendant, however, the
J.A.W court tentatively found differently. 112 The plaintiff alleged he
and this clergyman had spoken over fifty times over a four year period
about the plaintiff's sexual relationship with his foster father, with the
clergyman counselling the plaintiff on spiritual matters. If this were
true, the court held a special relationship would have existed between
the plaintiff and this clergyman which could generate a duty to report
the abuse. 1 3 The court noted that it was foreseeable to the clergyman
that the plaintiff's foster father would continue molesting the plaintiff
unless the clergyman reported the abuse to the authorities, and ruled
that "the foreseeability of continued abuse weighs in favor of impos-
Generally, one has no legal obligation to go to the aid of a victim in peril. As one
commentator observed "[t]here is no legal duty to be a Good Samaritan. Such a rule
represents an attitude of rugged, perhaps heartless, individualism, and the tendency of
the courts is to increasingly restrict it." This court has held that when a defendant's
alleged negligence arises from nonfeasance, the complete omission or failure to per-
form, as opposed to misfeasance, negligent conduct or active misconduct, then the duty
to act must arise from a special relationship between the parties. Absent a special
relationship between a plaintiff and a defendant, we will not impose a duty on the
defendant to take affirmative steps to prevent harm to the plaintiff.
Id. (citations omitted). As the court ultimately concluded: "Absent codification, we are not
convinced that extending a civil remedy to a victim of abuse or neglect against all persons who
know of child abuse and fail to report child abuse is good public policy." Id. at 813.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 810. The counsellor was a marriage counsellor who was counselling the plaintiff's
foster mother and father. Id. The counsellor learned of the foster father's abuse of the plaintiff
during the counselling sessions, but apparently did not individually counsel the plaintiff. Id. The
plaintiff spoke with the clergyman about the abuse at church and at social or church functions,
but the court deemed this insufficient for a special relationship. Id. "[K]nowledge of criminal
activity, standing alone, is not enough to impose a common law duty on the person in possession
of such knowledge." Id.
111. Id. at 812-13.
112. The court ultimately reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the sec-
ond clergyman-defendant and sent the case back to the trial court for it to resolve whether a
special relationship existed between the plaintiff and the clergyman. Id. at 811, 813-14.
113. Id. at 811.
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ing a common law duty to report alleged child abuse to the
authorities."1
14
J.A. W. holds that there can be a common law tort duty to report
child abuse, but only when a special relationship exists between the
abuse victim and the person who failed to report. A Michigan court in
Marcelletti v. Bathani"15 indicated that a duty to report can arise be-
tween a physician and his or her abused child/patient when a special
relationship is present." 6 Other tribunals have been less charitable.
A number have indicated there is no common law duty to report pos-
sible child abuse." 7 It is uncertain whether future courts will emulate
Landeros, J.A. W, and Marcelletti or apply the traditional no-duty
approach.
When courts have considered the statutory negligence issue in fail-
ure to report child abuse liability cases, the post-Landeros record also
has been mixed. At least one tribunal has agreed with Landeros that
statutory negligence applies to physicians and other mandatory abuse
reporters who do not report." 8 A number of other jurisdictions, how-
ever, have refused to extend statutory negligence to violations of child
abuse reporting statutes. 19 For example, in Borne ex rel. Borne v.
114. Id. at 812.
115. 500 N.W.2d 124 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
116. Id. at 129-30. For more on special relationships between physicians and their patients,
see infra notes 139-147 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Letlow v. Evans. 857 F. Supp. 676, 678 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (finding no private
cause of action against school official); Thelma D. v. Bd. of Educ., 669 F. Supp. 947,950-51 (E.D.
Mo. 1987) (holding that school teacher owed no common law duty to student to report suspected
child abuse); Freehauf v. School Bd., 623 So. 2d 761, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (finding no
private cause of action against school board for failure to report suspected child abuse);
Cechman v. Travis, 414 S.E.2d 282, 285-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (finding no tort action against
doctor for not reporting suspected abuse); Borne ex rel. Borne v. N.W. Allen County Sch. Corp.,
532 N.E.2d 1196, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that there is no civil tort action for failure to
report child 'abuse). For the English view, apparently imposing no duty in child abuse cases, see
generally W. V. H. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT at vii-ix (14th ed. 1994); W. V.
H. Rogers, Tort Law and Child Abuse: An Interim View from England, 3 TORTS L.J. 257,265-73
(1994).
118. Williams v. Coleman, 488 N.W.2d 464,471-72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); see Doran v. Priddy,
534 F. Supp. 30, 33 (D. Kan. 1981) (containing dicta endorsing Landeros' statutory negligence
holding); Kansas State Bank & Tr. Co. v. Specialized Transp. Servs., 819 P.2d 587, 611-13 (Kan.
1991) (Lockett, J., concurring in part on other grounds and dissenting) (disagreeing with major-
ity opinion that Kansas legislature did not intend a statutory negligence action).
119. See, e.g., Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (holding that
Michigan reporting statute does not create a statutory negligence action); Letlow v. Evans, 857
F. Supp. 676 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (holding that Missouri statute requiring school officials to report
suspected child abuse does not create a statutory negligence action); Thelma D. v. Board of
Educ., 669 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (holding no Section 1983 cause of action against non-
supervisory teacher for failure to report suspected child abuse); Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist.,
637 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mo. 1986), aff'd, 901 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that Missouri
reporting statute creates a duty owed to general public and not for individuals); Nelson v. Free-
1996] BATTERED SPOUSES' DAMAGE ACTIONS
Northwest Allen County School Corp.,120 the Indiana Court of Ap-
peals concluded that the legislative purpose in enacting Indiana's child
abuse statutory scheme was not to create a private right of action
against non-reporters of abuse: "When the provisions of the act are
considered as a whole, there is no apparent intent to authorize a civil
action for failure of an individual to make the oral report that may be
the means of initiating the central procedures contemplated by the
act.1 21 Since the legislature did not intend for a private right of ac-
tion, statutory negligence, in turn, would not lie and the plaintiff had
no cause of action.'2 2 Several other courts have agreed with Borne's
characterization of the nature of legislatures' intent when enacting
mandatory child abuse reporting laws.
123
Landeros did not consider a final way to establish an abused child's
case against a non-reporting physician-use of an express statutory
liability provision.' 24 Several jurisdictions have laws which mandate
civil liability against those who do not fulfill their statutory duty to
report child abuse.' 25 Absent problems like proximate cause, it
man, 537 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983) (concurring with Doe
"A"); Freehauf, 623 So. 2d 761 (holding that Florida reporting statute does not create a statutory
negligence action); Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (finding no civil
cause of action for psychologist's failure to report suspected child abuse); Cechman, 414 S.E.2d
282 (finding a doctor's failure to report suspected child abuse does not create a statutory negli-
gence action); J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that absent codi-
fication, imposing civil liability against all who fail to report suspected child abuse would be
against public policy); Borne ex rel. Borne, 532 N.E.2d 1196 (holding no statutory negligence
action against school, principal or teacher for failure to report suspected child abuse of student);
Kansas State Bank, 819 P.2d 587 (holding that statute did not create a statutory negligence action
for psychologist's failure to report suspected child abuse); Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 303, 312-
14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (indicating that statute did not create statutory negligence action for
psychologist's failure to report suspected child abuse).
120. 532 N.E.2d 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
121. Id. at 1203.
122. Id.; see supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing how legislative intent can
allow for a special relationship to be created).
123. See, e.g., Isely, 880 F. Supp. at 1148 (interpreting Wisconsin reporting statute and deter-
mining that legislature did not intend a statutory negligence action for failure to report); Letlow,
857 F. Supp. at 678 (denying statutory negligence action because Missouri legislature did not
establish it); Freehauf, 623 So. 2d at 763-64 (indicating legislative intent was to provide for wel-
fare of public and not to create a statutory negligence action for an individual); J.A.W., 627
N.E.2d at 813 (reporting that Indiana legislature has declined to create statutory negligence ac-
tion for an individual); Kansas State Bank, 819 P.2d at 603-04 (suggesting that if Kansas legisla-
ture had intended a statutory negligence action it expressly would have provided for it).
124. See, e.g., BESHAROV, THE VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER, supra note 57, at 31-32 (indi-
cating that about eight states have statutory liability for violating reporting statutes); Besharov,
Failing to Report, supra note 58, at 67-68; Lehto, supra note 12, at 158-60.
125. For code sections imposing civil liability for damages proximately caused by failure to
report child abuse, see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-504(b) (Michie Supp. 1993); CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 19-3-304(4)(b) (Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.75(2) (West 1994); MICH. COMP.
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should be relatively easy to establish physician liability in such a
state.126
In sum, the promise of Landeros only partially has been realized.
Some child abuse victims have prevailed against physicians who did
not report abuse, but others have been thwarted in their efforts. The
surest road to recovery, the express statutory liability provision, was
not even an issue in Landeros and is viable in only a few states. The
overall uncertain nature of this most-explored basis for civil liability
for non-reporting may (but ought not to) portend an equally unsure
course for domestic violence victims considering claims against their
physicians.
2. Physician Duty to Report Elder Abuse
Elder abuse law presents much the same non-reporting civil liability
issues as the child abuse area, albeit in a less developed fashion. Elder
abuse is another serious national problem.127 Much has been written
about mandatory reporting of elder abuse12 8-a good deal of it nega-
LAws ANN. § 722.633(1) (West Supp. 1994); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 420 (McKinney 1992); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 40-11-6.1 (1990). The Montana statute is typical, and provides, in pertinent part:
"Any person, official, or institution required by law to report known or suspected child abuse or
neglect who fails to do so or who prevents another person from reasonably doing so is civilly
liable for the damages proximately caused by such failure of prevention." MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 41-3-207(1) (1993).
126. See, e.g.. Marcelletti v. Bathani, 500 N.W.2d 124, 127-28 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Williams
v. Coleman, 488 N.W.2d 464, 472 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Bartels v. County of Westchester, 429
N.Y.S.2d 906, 909 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); see also Gross v. Myers, 748 P.2d 459, 461 (Mont.
1987).
127. See, e.g., Frank Glendenning, What is Elder Abuse and Neglect?, in Tim MISTREATMENT
OF ELDERLY PEOPLE 11-14 (Peter Decalmer & Frank Glendenning eds., 1993) (providing a de-
tailed analysis of rates of various forms of elder abuse); Anthony J. Costa, Elder Abuse, 20
PRIMARY CARE 375, 377 (1993) (reporting various countries' rates of elder abuse); Margaret F.
Hudson, Elder Mistreatment: Current Research, in ELDER ABUSE: CoNFLicr IN THE FAMILY
152-53 (Karl A. Pillemer & Rosalie S. Wolf eds., 1986) (indicating that studies show up to ten
percent of elders are abused); Vicki Gottlich, Beyond Granny Bashing: Elder Abuse in the
1990s, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 371, 372 (1994) ("[I]n 1991 alone, 1.57 million older persons
were victims of physical abuse, neglect, and exploitation."); Jeffrey S. Jones, Elder Abuse and
Neglect: Responding to a National Problem. 23 ANNALS EMERO. MED. 845, 845, 848 (1994)
[hereinafter J. Jones, Elder Abuse] (reporting that one in every twenty older Americans are
victims of elder abuse); Audrey S. Garfield, Note, Elder Abuse and the States' Adult Protective
Services Response: Time for a Change in California, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 859, 863-66 (1991) (dis-
cussing Congressional finding that elder abuse is increasing yearly and is much more likely to go
unreported than child abuse).
128. See, e.g., Stephen Crystal, Social Policy and Elder Abuse, in ELDER ABUSE: CONFLICr IN
rmE FAMILY, supra note 127, at 336-39; Rick A. Brewer & Jeffrey S. Jones, Reporting Elder
Abuse: Limitations of Statutes, 18 ANNALS EMERO. MED. 1217 (1989); Lawrence R. Faulkner,
Mandating the Reporting of Suspected Cases of Elder Abuse: An Inappropriate, Ineffective and
Ageist Response to the Abuse of Older Adults, 16 FAM. L.Q. 69, 69-71 (1982); Note, Elder Abuse:
The Merit of Mandatory Reporting Laws and the Minnesota Response, 9 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
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tive129-and a number of states have statutes, patterned after the
mandatory child abuse reporting laws,130 requiring that it be re-
ported.131 From the spouse abuse perspective, elder abuse is even
more relevant than child abuse since it typically involves competent
adults rather than children. 132 While there is no case authority on the
point, many commentators, including those in various health-related
fields, 133 agree that courts may apply the principles of Landeros to
365 (1984) [hereinafter Mandatory Reporting Laws]; Thomas J. Hierl, Note, The Prevention,
Identification, and Treatment of Elder Abuse Act of 1987: Is It A Proper Federal Response to
Elder Abuse?, 6 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 383, 390-95 (1989); Katheryn D. Katz, Elder Abuse,
18 J. FAM. L. 695 (1980); Garfield, supra note 127, at 874-85; Dorothy Ann Gilbert, The Ethics of
Mandatory Elder Abuse Reporting Statutes, 8 ADVANCES NURSING Sci. 51 (1986); Gottlich,
supra note 128, at 374-75; Dyana Lee, Note, Mandatory Reporting of Elder Abuse: A Cheap But
Ineffective Solution to the Problem, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 723 (1986); David P. Mathews, Com-
ment, The Not-So-Golden Years: The Legal Response to Elder Abuse, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 653, 661-
67 (1988); Christine A. Metcalf, Comment, A Response to the Problem of Elder Abuse: Florida's
Revised Adult Protective Services Act, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745 (1986); John Palincsar &
Deborah Crouse Cobb, The Physician's Role in Detecting and Reporting Elder Abuse, 3 J.
LEGAL MED. 413 (1982).
129. See, e.g., Brewer & Jones. supra note 128, at 1219 (indicating that a physician's report of
elder abuse may actually make the patient's situation worse); Crystal, supra note 128, at 336-39
(discussing various faults with elder abuse reporting laws); Faulkner, supra note 128, at 89-90
(arguing that reporting laws can be intrusive and negatively effect elder persons' lives); Garfield,
supra note 127, at 877-85 (criticizing reporting laws because they imply elders are incompetent);
Hierl, supra note 128, at 394-95 (claiming that reporting laws may cause unconstitutional inva-
sion of privacy in elder persons' lives); Katz, supra note 128, at 711 (expressing concern about
elder's loss of freedom resulting from reporting laws); Lee, supra note 128, at 730-35, 764-65
(indicating that reporting laws can hinder elder's freedom and promote age discrimination); Ma-
thews, supra note 128, at 662-67, 675-76 (arguing that mandatory reporting laws infantilize el-
ders); Metcalf, supra note 128, at 754 (indicating that reporting laws can result in elders being
removed from their homes).
130. See, e.g., Costa, supra note 127, at 386 (criticizing the fact that elder abuse laws are based
on child abuse laws despite the fact that they are separate entities); Crystal, supra note 128, at
334-35 (finding that many states pattern elder abuse laws on child abuse laws); Faulkner, supra
note 128, at 74 (indicating elder abuse reporting laws are modeled after their child abuse coun-
terparts); Gottlich, supra note 127, at 374 (indicating many states pattern elder abuse reporting
laws after child abuse laws); Lee, supra note 128, at 727 (reporting that first major study on elder
abuse recommended modeling reporting laws on child abuse laws); Mathews, supra note 128, at
662 (criticizing elder abuse reporting laws based on distinctions between children and elders);
Metcalf, supra note 128, at 775 (suggesting that elder abuse reporting statutes should be modeled
after spousal abuse laws instead of child abuse laws); see generally Katz, supra note 128, at 716-
17 (comparing similarities between abused children and elders).
131. See, e.g., Gottlich, supra note 127, at 374 (reporting in 1990 that 42 states had mandatory
reporting laws for elder abuse); Lee, supra note 128, at 766-71 (containing chart describing vari-
ous state elder abuse reporting statutes).
132. Battered spouses and abused elders have much in common. Indeed, some battered
spouses are elders, so they fit both categories. See, e.g., Faulkner, supra note 128, at 86 (describ-
ing similar characteristics of abused elders and abused spouses); Metcalf, supra note 128, at 775
(stating that "approximately one-fifth of elder abuse is among elderly couples").
133. See, e.g., Diagnostic and Treatment Guidelines on Elder Abuse and Neglect, 2 ARCHIVES
FAM. MED. 371, 380 (1993); Brewer & Jones, supra note 128, at 1220; J. Jones, Elder Abuse,
supra note 127, at 847.
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non-reporters of elder abuse.134 These authors tend not to distinguish
between Landeros's common law and statutory negligence aspects.
Several states have statutes which expressly hold those mandated to
report elder abuse civilly liable for injuries elders suffer after the re-
porter fails to report the abuse.135
3. Physician Duty to Report Spouse Abuse
As noted above, a battered spouse who desires to sue her non-re-
porting physician in negligence must establish a special relationship
with that physician. 136 As Landeros demonstrated, that can be done
through the common law and/or statutory negligence routes. While
the statutory negligence approach may be easier to pursue in states
which have appropriate legislation, the common law one is more uni-
versal since it should be available in all jurisdictions regardless of their
statutory schemes. 137 Various sources, both legal and medical, duti-
fully have predicted that physicians who do not report domestic vio-
lence of their patients may be civilly liable in negligence when the
patients suffer subsequent harm. 38 To date, no case law supports (or
definitively undermines) this prophecy. It is, however, very appropri-
ate that courts find that physicians have a duty to report the spouse
abuse of their patients, whether or not their jurisdictions feature some
form of mandatory reporting law.
134. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 128, at 713 (indicating that professionals may be criminally or
civilly liable for their failure to report); Metcalf, supra note 128, at 753 (suggesting that physi-
cians and clergy might be civilly liable for not reporting suspected elder abuse); Palincsar &
Cobb, supra note 128, at 424 (indicating that a physician who fails to report elder abuse may be
liable for victim's subsequent harm). But see Lee, supra note 128, at 743-44 (expressing uncer-
tainty about whether courts would apply liability to professionals who fail to report elder abuse).
135. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-28-202(b) (Michie 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400-
lle(1) (West 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.557(7)(b) (West 1983).
136. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (indicating that a special relationship must
exist for a negligence action to exist against a physician for failing to report suspected abuse).
137. As the Landeros ruling demonstrated, courts in jurisdictions with mandatory spouse
abuse reporting statutes may-albeit probably inappropriately-use them to generate a com-
mon law duty to report. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (discussing this principle
and, in particular, suggesting duty usually is based on a special relationship).
138. See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION DIAGNOSTIC AND TREATMENT GUIDELINES
ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 12-13 (1992) (discussing the AMA's warning to physicians about the
consequences for failure to report suspected child abuse); Guidelines for Identifying and Helping
Abused Patients, 82 J. MED. Ass'N GA. 327, 332 (1993) [hereinafter Guidelines] (indicating that
most physicians will encounter domestic abuse in their practices and should be aware of the
potential liability for failure to report it); Smith, Mental Health Malpractice, supra note 13, at 251
(stressing possible negligence liability against mental health professionals for failure to report
suspected abuse); Smith, Privileges and Confidentiality, supra note 43, at 530 (indicating that
physicians have affirmative duty to report child, spouse, and elder abuse and may face civil
liability for their failure to do so).
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a. Common Law Negligence
Tort law long has recognized that public policy can dictate a special
relationship, and hence a duty, between doctor and patient.139 This
can include a duty to disclose things against the wishes of the patient
for the benefit of others, such as in the contagious disease cases 140 or
their offshoot, the well-known Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California'4' line of authorities. Indeed, in Tarasoff the California
Supreme Court specifically held a special relationship exists between
physicians and their patients, 142 a result which various other jurisdic-
tions also have reached. 43 Courts have generally unfettered discre-
139. See, e.g., Lehto, supra note 12, at 148-49 (stating that patient-physician relationship is
sufficient to impose an affirmative duty to warn, rescue, or report). For articles indicating that a
physician has a duty when his or her patient is a child, see, e.g., Hurley, supra note 13, at 657;
Isaacson, supra note 87, at 770-71.
140. See, e.g., Davis v. Rodman, 227 S.W. 612 (Ark. 1921) (holding physician had duty cor-
rectly to warn about patient's typhoid); Reisner v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding physician had duty correctly to warn about patient's AIDS); Hoff-
mann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (holding physician had duty cor-
rectly to warn about patient's tuberculosis); Skillings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663 (Minn. 1919)
(holding physician could have duty correctly to warn about patient's scarlet fever); Edwards v.
Lamb, 45 A. 480 (N.H. 1899) (holding physician had duty correctly to warn about patient's infec-
tion); Jones v. Stanko, 160 N.E. 456 (Ohio 1928) (holding physician had duty correctly to warn
about patient's smallpox); Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920) (holding physician
had duty to warn about patient's syphilis); DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County, Inc., 583
A.2d 422 (Pa. 1990) (holding physician had duty correctly to warn about patient's hepatitis B);
Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1993) (holding physician had duty to warn about
patient's Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever); Frederick R. Fahrner, Comment, The Physician's
Duty to Warn Non-Patients: AIDS Enters the Equation, 5 CooLEY L. REV. 353 (1988). For a
discussion of a physician's duty to warn third parties at risk of contracting AIDS from their
patients, despite physician-patient confidentiality, see, e.g., Kenneth E. Labowitz, Beyond
Tarasoff AIDS and the Obligation to Breach Confidentiality, 9 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 495
(1990); Jill Suzanne Talbot, Note, The Conflict Between a Doctor's Duty to Warn a Patient's
Sexual Partner that the Patient has AIDS and a Doctor's Duty to Maintain Patient Confidentiality,
45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 355 (1988).
141. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
142. Id. at 343; accord, e.g., Reisner, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 520 (following Tarasoff, holding that
special relationship exists between physician and patient); Collier, supra note 30, at 203 (report-
ing that the California Supreme Court has found a special relationship between a psychiatrist
and patient); Miles, supra note 11, at 711 (indicating that courts view the physician-patient rela-
tionship as being a special relationship); Talbot, supra note 141, at 377 (stating that duty to warn
third party of risk of AIDS from patient arises out of special relationship between physician and
patient).
143. See, e.g., Mahomes-Vinson v. United States, 751 F. Supp. 913, 923 (D. Kan. 1990) (indi-
cating that a special relationship could exist between a psychiatrist and third party victim if the
doctor's patient posed a foreseeable risk of harm to the victim); Chrite v. United States, 564 F.
Supp. 341, 345 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (citing cases that hold the psychotherapist-patient relationship
satisfies the special relationship necessary to impose a duty to warn identifiable victims); Lipari
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 189 (D. Neb. 1980) (holding therapist-patient rela-
tionship imposed duty for benefit of third party); Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 775 P.2d
1122, 1129 (Ariz. 1989) (holding special relationship exits between psychiatrist and patient);
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tion whether or not to recognize a duty, 144 and do so when "a
weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk in-
volved, and the public interest in imposing the duty under the circum-
stances"'145 shows it to be appropriate to find one.146 It clearly is
appropriate for courts to find that physicians owe a duty to their bat-
tered patients. They have a close professional link with these patients
which far surpasses the typical one which exists in society at large, a
truly "special" relationship. 1
47
Assuming that physicians owe a common law duty to their patients,
then the real question is the scope of the duty-should it extend so far
as to require the physician to notify the authorities that the patient is
being battered, whether or not the patient agrees to the notification
and whether or not the patient is a competent adult? Notwithstanding
the apparent opinions of much of the medical establishment, 148 the
Seibel v. City & County of Honolulu, 602 P.2d 532, 538 (Haw. 1979) (finding doctor-patient
relationship sufficient to create duty to warn third party of foreseeable harm); Bell & Hudson,
P.C. v. Buhl Realty Co., 462 N.W.2d 851, 853 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that doctor-patient
relationship is special under Michigan law); Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 311 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995) (holding special relationship exists between psychologist and patient); MacIntosh v. Mi-
lano, 403 A.2d 500, 509-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1979) (holding that psychiatrist-patient relationship
created duty for doctor to protect third party from danger by patient); Petersen v. State, 671 P.2d
230, 237 (Wash. 1983) (concluding that psychologist had duty to protect persons at risk from
being harmed by patient); Guidelines, supra note 138, at 332 (citing a Georgia statute which
requires certain health care workers to report); see also THOMAS G. GUTHEIL & PAUL S. APPEL-
BAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 141 (2d ed. 1991) (indicating that
New Jersey and Nebraska have followed the Tarasoff holding).
144. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 11, at 194.
145. Macintosh, 403 A.2d at 508.
146. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL-, supra note 63, § 53 (describing "duty" under the law); Collier,
supra note 30, at 196-200, 202-07 (explaining factors to be considered when determining if a
special relationship exists and citing examples).
147. See, e.g., J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). This relationship
could stretch beyond the physician-patient relationship to encompass the situation where the
therapist of a spouse abuser learns of what her patient is doing to his victim and generates a duty
from the therapist to the victim along the lines of Tarasoff or the infectious disease cases. This
Article does not consider extending a duty this far. See supra note 13 (limiting the scope of this
Article to cases where a physician learns of the abuse directly from the victim and not a third
party).
148. See, e.g., Wanda G. Bryant & Sondra Panico, Physicians' Legal Responsibilities to Victims
of Domestic Violence, 55 N.C. MED. J. 418, 420-21 (1994) (suggesting that requiring physicians to
report abuse of their patients may prevent the formation of the trusting relationship that is nec-
essary between a physician and patient); Loretta M. Frederick, The Physician's Response to Do-
mestic Violence: Legal Issues, MINN. MED., Feb. 1992, at 35, 37 (discussing patient confidentiality
concerns with regard to reporting abuse); Holtz & Furniss, supra note 1, at 50-51; Hyman et al.,
Reporting of Domestic Violence, supra note 37, at 1783-86 (expressing view that doctors should
not be required to report because it can result in further harm to victims, loss of autonomy, and
compromises their privacy); Letter, Reporting Abuse of Competent Patients, 268 JAMA 2377,
2377-78 (1992) (indicating that AMA Council of Ethical and Judicial Affairs opposes mandatory
reporting of elder abuse); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Protection for Domestic Violence Victims: A
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answer should be yes. Just as in the analogous J.A.W. v. Roberts149
and Marcelletti v. Bathani150 child abuse cases, if/when a physician has
the requisite special relationship with his battered spouse patient he
should have the duty to report abuse of that patient irregardless of the
existence of a mandatory reporting law and should be civilly liable for
any injuries the patient suffers which are proximately caused by the
physician's failure to discharge that obligation. In reaching that con-
clusion, one must deal with various criticisms of reporting, including
those based on physician-patient confidentiality and on potentially
detrimental effects of reporting on the abused patient. Debate has
raged over compulsory reporting in the context of whether legislatures
should enact laws requiring it,151 and while that issue is slightly differ-
ent from the question whether or not a common law court effectively
should command it, the two are close enough to consider the legisla-
tive arguments in the judicial forum.
When the advisability of mandatory reporting of abuse-whether
child, elder, or spouse-is the question, there is no immediate, clear-
cut answer. Instead, there are various factors which weigh one way or
another, good arguments to be made on both sides. Evaluating
mandatory reporting requires a real balancing process as one consid-
ers the patient's rights to privacy, confidentiality, and self-determina-
tion on the one hand and society's need to protect the abused, even
when doing so may be against their own wishes, on the other.152 What
one values more, as well as how one assesses the results of reporting,
can determine how one feels about obligatory reporting.
Those who favor making physicians and others notify the authori-
ties of abuse point to various results, which they perceive as beneficial,
which flow from that behavior. Such a requirement increases the
quantity of abuse reports turned in to the authorities153; reporting pro-
Guide for the Treating Physician, 43 MD. MED. J. 899, 901-02 (1994); see also supra note 129 and
accompanying text (discussing the negative reaction to mandatory reporting of elder abuse).
149. See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text (discussing the J.A.W. opinion).
150. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text (discussing the Marcelletti opinion).
151. Controversy occurs in states like Kentucky and California which have enacted mandatory
reporting in domestic violence cases. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 86, at 2; Gilbert, supra note 128, at 59-60; Metcalf, supra note
128, at 746; Smith-Bell & Winslade, supra note 13, at 180; George Thomson, Confidentiality and
the Compulsory Reporting of Child Abuse, 2 HEALTH L. CAN. 15, 15 (1981).
153. See, e.g., BESHAROV, THE VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER, supra note 57, at 24 (finding
that reported cases of child abuse went from 150,000 in 1963 to 1.3 million in 1981); Aaron, supra
note 11, at 189-90 (indicating that reporting laws have increased the number of reports of sus-
pected abuse, but professionals are still not in full compliance); Douglas J. Besharov, "Doing
Something" About Child Abuse: The Need to Narrow the Grounds for State Intervention, 8
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 545 (1985) [hereinafter Besharov, "Doing Something"] (reporting
a dramatic increase in reports of child abuse and attributing it in part to mandatory reporting
19961
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ponents view this as advantageous because these reports help society
detect and prevent crime (abuse), identify and protect the victims of
abuse, and collect data on the problem of family violence (domestic
violence in the spouse abuse context).' 54 Identification particularly is
advanced since it is very difficult for the authorities to determine
which individuals are abuse victims-who so often do not come for-
ward on their own-unless either the abuse is reported or is so bad for
so long that it becomes obvious (and quite possibly causes permanent
injuries or is fatal). 155 Data collection is also a real issue as without
obligatory reports there is significantly less information available for
measuring this type of criminal activity (and if statistics show abuse is
a major problem, society is much more likely to respond to it both
with attention and adequate resources 56).157
If courts require reporting this will demonstrate concern over family
violence and a commitment to public action.' 58 Without reporting, ul-
timately abusers often continue their behavior until they kill or se-
verely injure their victims.' 59 Mandatory reporting reminds the many
physicians who are reluctant to report abuse that they have to whether
laws); Maidment, supra note 104, at 151 (citing conclusion that increased reports of child abuse is
a desirable effect of reporting laws); Jessica Yelas, Mandatory Reporting of Child Abuse and the
Public/Private Distinction, 7 AUCKLAND U. L. REv. 781, 788 (1994). One way mandatory re-
porting generates more of a response from the medical community is slightly convoluted, but
works like this: if reporting is obligatory, failure to report will be actionable negligence. A
hospital or other employer could be vicariously liable for its medical employee's negligent non-
feasance. Knowing this, the employer would be likely to discipline or discharge employees who
put it at risk by not reporting abuse, whether or not litigation resulted from this inaction. And,
finally, knowing all this, and wanting to stay employed in good standing, the employee will re-
port abuse, thereby obeying the law, doing the right thing, and promoting the goals of reporting.
See BESIAROv, THE VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER, supra note 57, at 42-43 (indicating that
some employers discharge their employees who fail to report suspected child abuse).
154. See, e.g., Bell & Tooman, supra note 28, at 338, Brooks et al., supra note 92, at 50; Bar-
bara Daly, Willful Child Abuse and State Reporting Statutes, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 283, 303
(1969); Gottlich, supra note 127, at 374 (indicating that advocates believe mandatory reporting
laws will result in more reports and increased awareness of the problem); Hyman et al., Report-
ing of Domestic Violence, supra note 37, at 1781, 1783; Maidment, supra note 104, at 154.
155. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 11, at 184 (suggesting that identification of abuse victims is an
essential step in preventing further abuse); Hierl, supra note 128, at 390-91; Kohlman, supra note
12, at 120; Mathews, supra note 128, at 662 (indicating that reporting laws are necessary because
many abused elders will not come forward).
156. See, e.g., Mandatory Reporting Laws, supra note 128, at 387 (suggesting that recognition
of problem is an incentive for improvement).
157. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 128, at 54 (indicating that in order to prevent elder abuse
data is needed to understand it); Mathews, supra note 128, at 662.
158. See, e.g., Yelas, supra note 153, at 788-89.
159. See, e.g., Bell & Tooman, supra note 28, at 347; Besharov, Failing to Report, supra note
58, at 67 (reporting that over 40 percent of the children that died from abuse in Texas over a
three year period were the result of failure to report previous abuse).
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they want to or not.160 Domestic violence is a crime which will not
truly be curtailed until it is reported to the appropriate authorities as
fully as any other offense. 161 Once they learn of the violation, the
authorities can take suitable steps, including the offer of voluntary
protective services to the victim and the possible prosecution of the
abuser. This can protect and empower the victim as well as hold the
batterer accountable for his actions, which in turn helps his victim (by
stopping the abuse-hopefully permanently). It also can aid the bat-
terer himself by forcing him to obey the rules, obtain any needed
treatment services, and learn the consequences of not doing So. 16 2
Required reporting helps those victims who are too dependent on
their batterers, and too afraid of them, to seek help on their own.163 It
gives physicians and others a means for having possible abuse cases
investigated, a central place to take information about their battered
patients. 164 It can encourage some to report what they otherwise
might fear to bring out absent the defense mandatory reporting pro-
vides.165 It lets the physician see her report of abuse taken seriously
160. See, e.g., BESHAROV, THE VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER, supra note 57, at 25, 27;
Monrad G. Paulsen, The Law and Abused Children, in THE BATTERED CHILD 153, 163 (Ray E.
Heifer & C. Henry Kempe eds., 2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter Paulsen, Abused Children]; Maidment,
supra note 104, at 170.
One again should note, see supra note 14, that when the first obligatory child abuse reporting
statutes were enacted, they only applied to physicians; this was in part because lawmakers be-
lieved that physicians were uniquely able to detect and report abuse, but also because many
physicians would not report abuse absent such a requirement. See, e.g., Paulsen, Child Abuse
Reporting Laws, supra note 87, at 3-4 (discussing reasons why model reporting statutes limited
reporting requirement to doctors). The AMA opposed these laws, while the American Acad-
emy of Pediatrics supported them. Id. at 5; Sussman, supra note 14, at 271. As noted, the AMA
and the medical establishment today oppose mandatory reporting, by physicians, of domestic
violence inflicted upon their patients; indeed, in Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra note 1,
the AMA steadfastly resisted it. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing fur-
ther the Physicians and Domestic Violence article). Various United States Surgeons General
have adopted this view, with one notable exception. See, e.g., A. JONEs, BATTERING & How TO
STOP IT, supra note 6, at 148 (indicating that Surgeon General Novello recommended mandatory
reporting of suspected child abuse); Pike, supra note 19, at 1953 (reporting that former Surgeon
General Koop did not advocate mandatory reporting of domestic violence). Their positions are
certainly consistent with physicians' general aversion to reporting, outlined supra notes 18-29
and accompanying text.
161. Bryant & Panico, supra note 148, at 420.
162. See, e.g., Bell & Tooman, supra note 28, at 345; Smith-Bell & Winslade, supra note 13, at
189 (indicating that supporters of reporting laws believe they can be beneficial for the abuser by
subjecting them to rules and consequences); Catherine L. Waltz, The Effectiveness of Interven-
tion With Batterers, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1994, at 78, 80.
163. Gottlich, supra note 127, at 374.
164. Palincsar & Cobb, supra note 128, at 437, 438.
165. As one commentator has noted:
Professionals are often faced with difficult decisions whether to report their aware-
ness of abuse. For example, in a small rural town, professionals may be frightened to
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by the authorities, 166 and forces all physicians - not just the ones who
report abuse voluntarily - to bear ratably the various economic and
non-economic costs of reporting (e.g., time spent in filing reports and,
perhaps, testifying in court; lost income for time spent on reporting
rather than treating other patients; cost of office staff who help in the
reporting process; and lost income from patients who change physi-
cians as they do not want a physician who reports abuse to treat them
or their victims-clearly not a problem if all physicians report pursu-
ant to an obligatory rule).
167
In sum, to quote one distinguished author who wrote on the
mandatory reporting of child abuse:
A real need exists in this country to stimulate more consistent and
frequent reporting of physical abuse .. .[B]attering has reached
truly epidemic proportions....
The cure.., is protection for the innocent victim and psychologi-
cal treatment for [her] tormentor. Recurrent abuse.., can only be
prevented by disclosure and identification of the battered [victim].
[She] must be sought out.... Without minimizing the necessity for
every citizen to report incidents of... abuse, doctors and hospitals
are particularly skilled and strategically located to accomplish the
enormous task of locating and identifying this growing group of suf-
fering [victims]. All necessary diagnostic tools are available. Civil
and criminal immunity is accorded those who report. Legal and so-
cial units are trained and ready to respond to incident reports. But
complete cooperation of doctors and hospitals is lacking...168
Such cooperation will be far more forthcoming if reporting is
mandatory and unexcused failure to report violates the standard of
care and thus subjects the non-reporting physician to civil tort liability.
Notwithstanding the numerous factors which support the policy of
requiring physicians to report abuse, many criticize it harshly for a
variety of reasons, some ethical and some more pragmatic.169 The
report because of pressure from others in the community. Such a feeling emerged at a
meeting of nurses and other professionals in one small town: "[E]veryone [knows] eve-
ryone else and it [is] impossible to hide the identity of the person who [reports] the
abuse-especially when there [is] no 'need' to do so.
There was consensus at that meeting that "mandatory reporting would provide some
measure of protection."
Yelas, supra note 153, at 788 (footnotes omitted).
166. Bell & Tooman, supra note 28, at 348.
167. Id. at 352.
168. Kohlman, supra note 12, at 185. Mr. Kohlman was co-counsel to the plaintiff-child abuse
victim in the landmark Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389, 390 (Cal. 1976). See supra notes 96-103
and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., RONALD MUNSON, INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION: BASIC ISSUES IN MEDI-
CAL ETHICS 32-34 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing ethical considerations, such as beneficence and
nonmaleficence); Garfield, supra note 127, at 884-85 (noting that mandatory reporting can en-
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ethical objections to mandatory reporting mainly center upon the con-
cepts of an abuse victim's rights to self-determination and confidenti-
ality/privacy. As numerous authors in the abuse literature have noted,
spouse abuse victims (and many elder abuse victims) usually are com-
petent adults. 170 Unfortunately, they often choose, for whatever rea-
son, not to call in the authorities to help deal with their abusive
situations. Should the state force third parties to do this for them by
mandating reporting and imposing penalties on those who do not re-
port? If it does, is it violating every woman's right to determine her
own fate and deal with her problems and relationships as she believes
best, even if that means staying in an abusive predicament-with all
that entails-until/if she chooses to abandon it or seek outside inter-
vention to ameliorate it?
Landeros, which found a duty to report, featured child abuse, and
there is a big difference between children and adults. Children are, by
definition, incapable of self-determination as they cannot make in-
formed decisions, such as whether to allow abuse to continue, and
generally cannot save themselves from others without some outside
intervention. 17 1 Battered women, on the other hand, are legally com-
petent to manage their own lives. Many argue that these victims
should take control over themselves and seek assistance via a protec-
tive order, battered women's shelter, and related remedies rather than
depend upon an outsider for help. 172 Critics argue that domestic vio-
lence victims already feel disempowered, and when the state injects
itself into an abuse situation against the victim's will, it may worsen
courage ageism by creating the appearance that the elderly are incompetent); Hyman et al.,
Reporting of Domestic Violence, supra note 37, at 1785 (stating that mandatory reporting reduces
patient autonomy).
170. See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 127, at 878 ("'[O]nce the age of majority is reached the
making power over one's life belongs to the individual .......") (quoting Katz, supra note 128, at
717 (1979-1980)). Different considerations would come into play if the victims were not compe-
tent adults. These should dictate that they be treated, for mandatory reporting purposes, like the
major groups of incompetent abuse victims: children and incompetent elders. See also id. at
877-78 (explaining that the law helps to protect children because of their own ignorance and
vulnerability).
171, See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 127, at 877-78 (stating that in child abuse cases, the state
has a role to act for those who cannot speak for themselves); Hyman et al., Reporting of Domes-
tic Violence, supra note 37, at 1785 (stressing the importance of outside intervention); Katz, supra
note 128, at 717 (noting the need for a supervisory role); Lee, supra note 128, at 730-31 (calling
the state the parens patriae, who must protect abused children).
172. See, e.g., Bryant & Panico, supra note 148, at 420; Gottlich, supra note 127, at 375; Holtz
& Furniss, supra note 1, at 50, 52; Katz, supra note 128, at 719; Palincsar & Cobb, supra note 128,
at 439, 440.
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the victim's sense of powerlessness. 173 Some elder abuse victims may
believe they have good reasons to remain in an abusive environment
(such as the fear that institutionalization-and early death-is their
only alternative) and thus oppose mandatory reporting.174 Battered
women also may feel that way for equally valid-seeming grounds and
similarly may not welcome state intervention. Some characterize this
state action as a form of paternalism, of the state treating this compe-
tent adult as if she is unable to care for herself, and making for her
the choices society permits and expects of adults. 175 They would ar-
gue that mandatory reporting perpetuates society's perception that
spouse abuse victims are helpless and childlike, 76 and that it goes
against the basic medical ethical emphasis on promoting patient au-
tonomy. 77 Several scholars have pointed out that society permits
competent adults to exercise the "right to die" by refusing medical
treatment, and ask why one who has the right to choose to die cannot
have the right to decide whether or not to seek state assistance when
she is in an abusive environment. 78
The second major ethical component of the attack against
mandatory reporting179 of spouse abuse focuses on the right of a com-
173. See, e.g., Letter, supra note 148, at 2378 (stating that mandatory reporting further dis-
empowers the patient); Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 3192. This could have
serious effects, such as feelings of hopelessness and/or depression.
174. For sources explaining that an elder's decision to stay in an abusive relationship often can
be a reasoned one, see Crystal, supra note 128, at 336-37, Kim Curtin, Intervention in Elder
Abuse: A Swift Blade, Or a Dull-Edged Saw?, 152 CANADIAN MED. Ass'N J. 1121 (1995); Faulk-
ner, supra note 128, at 84-85; Garfield, supra note 127, at 879; Katz, supra note 128, at 710-11;
Lee, supra note 128, at 731-33; Palincsar & Cobb, supra note 128, at 436. Of course, most states
have chosen to ignore such sentiments and mandate elder abuse reporting for reasons which
seem compelling. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
175. For sources arguing that mandatory reporting infantalizes the abused and reinforces the
misconceived notion of their helplessness, see Faulkner, supra note 128, at 90; Garfield, supra
note 127, at 878; Hyman et al., Reporting of Domestic Violence, supra note 37, at 1785; Mathews,
supra note 128, at 663-64.
176. See Garfield, supra note 127, at 884-85.
177. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 128, at 60 (discouraging mandatory reporting as defeating to
the patient's well-being); Hyman et al., Reporting of Domestic Violence, supra note 37, at 1785
(stating that mandatory reporting reduces patient autonomy); see also EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO
& DAVID C. THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT'S GOOD: THE RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN
HEALTH CARE 12-22, 43-50 (1988) (arguing that although autonomy is important to society, the
real hallmark of a peaceable society is a proper balance between individual autonomy and limit-
ing that autonomy for the common good).
178. See Garfield, supra note 127, at 879-81 (explaining that granting an elder the right to die
by refusing medical treatment but depriving that person of the right to decide whether to seek
state assistance permits him or her to decide when to end his or her life but not how to live it);
Katz, supra note 128, at 720 (explaining that if a patient has the right to refuse medical treat-
ment, then a patient should have the right to make less life-threatening decisions).
179. See GUTHBIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 143, at 4 (phrasing this issue as merely an off-
shoot of a patient's right to self-determination/privacy).
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petent adult patient and her physician to maintain the confidentiality
of their relationship. The twin concepts of physician-patient privilege
and confidentiality are, of course, both well-established and time-
honored.180 Many argue that forcing physicians to report abuse of
their patients seriously may disrupt the essential confidential and
trusting relationship between a woman and her physician, possibly
forcing her to hide things from the physician lest they be disclosed to
the authorities.181 The critics contend the harm from such disclosure
will outweigh any benefit which may be derived from it.182 They also
believe that disclosure is unethical for deontological1 83 reasons, that
patients reveal personal information to physicians because the physi-
cians create "situations in which confidentiality is implicitly or explic-
itly promised" and as a result the physician must keep the
confidence.184
180. They may, however, be honored in the breach. See Smith, Privileges and Confidentiality,
supra note 43 (providing an extensive review of physician-patient confidentiality); infra notes
272-77 and accompanying text (discussing not honoring confidentiality when a physician reports
in good faith).
For sources explaining the difference between confidentiality, the right not to have certain
communications conveyed to third parties, from privilege, which is the right legally to bar a
person with those confidential communications from testifying, see GuTifEIL & APPELBAUM,
supra note 143, at 4; Coleman, When Psychiatrist Knows Best, supra note 13, at 1137.
181. See, e.g., Bell & Tooman, supra note 28, at 349-50 (noting the resulting disruptions to the
physician-patient relationship caused by mandatory reporting); Bryant & Panico, supra note 148,
at 420 (stating that a trusting relationship cannot be created with mandatory reporting); Freder-
ick, supra note 148, at 37 (noting the ensuing dangers to the physician-patient relationship);
Hurley, supra note 13, at 662-63 (finding that without a promise of confidentiality, a victim may
not disclose information to her physician). Note the common wisdom that a physician who must
report abuse to the authorities must warn the patient of that obligation before treating her,
thereby alerting her to the possibility of disclosure and thus perhaps depriving her of medical
care or, at a minimum, adversely affecting her candor. See, e.g., GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra
note 143, at 25; James C. Beck, The Basic Issues, in CONFIDENTIALrrY VERSUS THE DUTY TO
PROTEcTr. FORESEEABLE HARM rN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 1, 5 (James C. Beck ed.,
1990); Levine, supra note 13, at 722-26; Smith, Privileges and Confidentiality, supra note 43, at
543-44; Smith-Bell & Winslade, supra note 13, at 190; infra note 192 and accompanying text
(discussing how some victims subsequently may not receive medical care).
One author opined that mandatory reporting forces a physician to breach his implied contract
of confidentiality with his patient. Agatstein, supra note 13, at 141-43. That author further has
expressed the view that attorneys are quick to demand confidentiality for themselves and their
clients yet are swift to deprive other professionals and those with whom they work, like physi-
cians and their patients, of the same right (and thus, perhaps, are hypocritical?). Id. at 141. The
Kentucky Attorney General's opinion exempting attorneys from the spouse abuse disclosure law
is interesting in that regard. See supra note 43.
182. See, e.g., GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 143, at 5.
183. "[D]ependent on an analysis of moral duties rather than on the consequences of the act."
Id.
184. Id. See Smith, Privileges and Confidentiality, supra note 43, at 479 (stating that physicians
keep confidence as a matter of honor).
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Two other points should be mentioned. First, some argue that re-
quired reporting fosters classism and racial stereotyping because it im-
pacts disproportionately on poor and minority women and resulting
figures incorrectly will make domestic violence seem to be focused on
those groups.185 Second, others, mostly medical ethicists, focus on
medical concepts like beneficence ("to help") 18 6 and nonmaleficence
("to do no harm") 187 and how they impact mandatory reporting re-
quirements. Under the nonmaleficence doctrine, physicians should
subject their patients to no unnecessary or unjustified risks lest the
physicians thereby leave the patients worse off than when they first
came to the physicians. 188 Reporting critics argue that reporting does
exactly that, because it may bring down retribution and other negative
consequences upon domestic violence victims, allegedly without offer-
ing them any tangible benefit. 189 Beneficence orders physicians to
help others-especially their patients-when the physicians are able
to do so,190 and this forms a significant portion of the basis for the
AMA's aforementioned call for physician involvement in domestic vi-
olence (albeit not through mandatory reporting).' 9' Proponents of
beneficence and nonmaleficence emphasize educating physicians
about the horrors of domestic violence and having them advise their
battered patients about available resources (counselling, spouse abuse
185. See Hyman et al., Reporting of Domestic Violence. supra note 37, at 1784 (arguing that
mandatory reporting may perpetuate stereotypes); Yelas. supra note 153, at 791-92 (stating that
reporting and intervention can be classism because of a disproportionate impact on the poor).
186. For sources discussing how beneficence is the ethical principle of attempts to "do good,"
see JOHN G. BRUHN & GEORGE HENDERSON, VALUES IN HEALTH CARE: CHOICES AND CON-
FLICrs 304 (1991); MUNSON, supra note 169, at 34; PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 177;
Hyman et al., Reporting of Domestic Violence, supra note 37, at 1784-85; Physicians and Domes-
tic Violence, supra note 1, at 3190.
187. For a discussion of how nonmaleficence is the ethical guideline mandating that a physi-
cian should not do harm to a patient, see BRUHN & HENDERSON, supra note 186, at 304; MUN-
SON, supra note 169, at 32; PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 177, at 26; Hyman et al.,
Reporting of Domestic Violence, supra note 37, at 1784-85; Physicians and Domestic Violence,
supra note 1, at 3190.
188. See, e.g., MUNSON, supra note 169, at 32-34; Hyman et al., Reporting of Domestic Vio-
lence, supra note 37, at 1784-85; Jecker, supra note 4, at 779.
189. See Hyman et al., Reporting of Domestic Violence, supra note 37, at 1785.
190. See, e.g., MUNSON, supra note 169, at 34; Hyman et al., Reporting of Domestic Violence,
supra note 37, at 1784-85.
191. Hyman et al., Reporting of Domestic Violence, supra note 37, at 1784-85; Jecker, supra
note 4, at 779; Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 3190; see supra notes 38-39 and
accompanying text. Dr. Nancy S. Jecker contends that an additional medical ethical duty, jus-
tice, applies here via fostering a patient's self-respect in the face of the onslaught of a spouse
batterer's abusive treatment of the patient. Jecker, supra note 4, at 779-80. She feels that justice
requires physicians to respond to domestic violence more strongly than beneficence or
nonmaleficence. Id. at 779.
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centers, orders of protection, etc.) rather than forcing them to report
abuse.192
Among the litany of practical objections to mandatory reporting,
some are based upon the possible impact of reporting on the victim or
her immediate family unit. Many contend that if compulsory report-
ing is instituted, it effectively will deprive the abused from medical
care either (1) because the victim will be afraid that the physician will
report the abuse if she seeks treatment, so the victim will not seek it
(or else will not be candid if she does), or (2) because her assailant will
fear being reported, and accordingly will stop the victim from going
for any medical assistance. 193 Some argue that reporting risks inciting
serious retaliation by the abuser against the victim 94 or even the
abuse reporter (typically the physician), 95 thereby worsening an al-
ready bad situation. Some contend that it may disrupt, or even de-
stroy, the victim's family unit' 96 and further upset the victim, who may
feel she destroyed her family.197 Reporting accomplishes something
she may not have wanted to do-turn in her own spouse to the au-
thorities' 98-and in the process publicizes her very private suffering to
others, potentially to the entire community, nation, or world. 199
Watching her partner arrested (and possibly jailed), prosecuted and
tried for his crimes may be particularly traumatic for the battered
192. See, e.g., Bryant & Panico, supra note 148, at 420 (emphasizing physician education on
abuse topics); Hyman et al., Reporting of Domestic Violence, supra note 37, at 1786 (stating that
policy alternatives to mandatory reporting should be considered, such as developing medical
staff programs on domestic violence); Jecker, supra note 4, at 779-80; Lee, supra note 128, at
761-64 (stating that even with mandatory testing, abuse education programs are a key factor in
increasing the reports of abuse). For a discussion of the medical ethical concept of justice in the
domestic violence context, see Jecker, supra note 4, at 779-80.
193. For sources stating that mandatory reporting may prevent abuse victims from obtaining
medical treatment altogether, see Brewer & Jones, supra note 128, at 1219; Bryant & Panico.
supra note 148, at 420; Chez, supra note 18, at 70; Frederick, supra note 148, at 37; Gottlich,
supra note 127, at 375; Mathews, supra note 128. at 667; Metcalf, supra note 128, at 753; Murphy,
supra note 148, at 901; Pike, supra note 19, at 1956.
194. See Agatstein, supra note 13, at 140; Hyman et al., Reporting of Domestic Violence, supra
note 37, at 1783; Smith-Bell & Winslade, supra note 13, at 190. Cf. Brooks et al., supra note 92,
at 51; Chez, supra note 18, at 69-70.
195. Bell & Tooman, supra note 28, at 344.
196. See, e.g., Agatstein, supra note 13, at 137-39; Brooks et al., supra note 92, at 51; Smith-
Bell & Winslade, supra note 13, at 190. This is a particular problem when the abusive family
member is incarcerated. See Agatstein, supra note 13, at 139.
197. See Brooks et al., supra note 92, at 51.
198. See Meier, supra note 5, at 1344-45 (explaining why some women may not wish to report
their abuse); Palincsar & Cobb, supra note 128, at 429.
199. See Brooks et al., supra note 92, at 51 (recognizing the harms from publicity, such as
having loyalties interrupted, being the object of retaliation, and being blamed for the report).
Notably, the O.J. Simpson case started out as an all-too-common type of domestic violence situa-
tion which happened to feature a celebrity wife batterer.
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spouse.200 Erroneous reports may destroy the reputations of sup-
posed abusers,2 01 and even correct ones can have adverse conse-
quences for one the domestic violence victim did not wish to see
suffer.202
Critics of required reporting point to other problems they state it
may cause or exacerbate. They attack the number and quality of re-
ports which will be filed, first contending that mandating physicians to
report will open the floodgates, inundating state officials in paper as
physicians take the course of least resistance, practice "defensive
medicine," and report all remotely questionable patient complaints as
abuse.20 3 In this anticipated torrent of reports, critics claim that seri-
ous ones will get lost in the pile. Moreover, they charge that most of
the valid accounts will be needlessly duplicative because the authori-
ties already may know about the vast majority of the abuse situations
physicians report to them even before the reports are filed.2°4 Finally,
they allege erroneous descriptions will be a serious problem, causing
great difficulty for the innocent and potentially paralyzing the agen-
cies which must evaluate the reports.20 5 They also adversely might
affect the quality of the data on abuse which is collected (and thus
undermine one of the rationales for reporting)206
Critics of mandatory reporting further focus on its effect on govern-
ment and the legal system. Initially, they contend that government
currently is unable adequately to serve those abuse victims of whom it
is aware.207 Then, they argue that if agencies cannot help this number,
mandatory reporting only will overwhelm the already overtaxed sup-
200. For a description of the emotional costs to the family following an abuser's legal prosecu-
tion, see Brooks et al., supra note 92, at 51-52; Levine, supra note 13, at 721; Smith-Bell &
Winslade, supra note 13, at 190.
201. See Besharov, "Doing Something," supra note 153, at 554-62; Yelas, supra note 153, at
791.
202. See Brooks et al., supra note 92, at 52-53. All too often, some allege, the abusers them-
selves are victims whom society did not help when they needed assistance. Costa, supra note
127, at 386.
203. See, e.g., BESHAROV, THE VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER, supra note 57, at 24-25; Cole,
supra note 86, at 7-8.
204. See Crystal, supra note 128, at 331, 336; Faulkner, supra note 128, at 78; Garfield, supra
note 127, at 882.
205. See, e.g., Bell & Tooman, supra note 28, at 346; Besharov, "Doing Something, " supra note
153, at 556 (discussing unfounded reports); Costa, supra note 127, at 386 (discussing the
problems with erroneous descriptions); Metcalf, supra note 128, at 753.
206. For a discussion of problems with inaccurate data collection, see Gottlich, supra note 127,
at 374; Hierl, supra note 128, at 392; Hyman et al., Reporting of Domestic Violence, supra note
37, at 1784. Connecticut legislators apparently let a reporting law lapse due to this quality of
data issue. See id.
207. For claims that agencies often cannot handle the number of cases they have under the
current system, see Bryant & Panico, supra note 148, at 420; Crystal, supra note 128, at 336-37,
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port system.20 8 They then conclude that since overburdened agencies
will not help the abused, there is no reason to risk retaliation and
other related problems by having reporting in the first place.209 They
also note the negative effects of reporting on others who must deal
with it within the legal system. These include law enforcement of-
ficers, who must exercise considerable discretion, expend significant
financial resources, and assume great risk of physical harm when re-
sponding to violence reports210 ; attorneys211 ; and judges.21 2 This fur-
ther encompasses a more amorphous group, all those who are
disheartened, discouraged, and disillusioned by the system's alleged
failure adequately to respond to reports of abuse-be they the victim
(whose hopes may have been raised when her abuse was reported,
then dashed if nothing was done about it), the reporting physician
(whom the law required to report when he or she may not have
wanted to get involved and then saw nothing done with the informa-
tion he or she provided), 21 3 the agency employee, the police officer,
attorney, judge, or an ordinary citizen-onlooker.
214
A final group of practical concerns centers on the mandatory re-
porter, typically the victim's physician. First, of course, there are the
aforementioned direct and indirect financial costs to the physician of
339; Hyman et al., Reporting of Domestic Violence, supra note 37, at 1784; Mathews, supra note
128, at 664; Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 3192.
208. The mere requirement of reporting will not help without funding to handle these cases.
Besharov, "Doing Something," supra note 153, at 563; Brooks et al., supra note 92, at 57-58;
Katz, supra note 128, at 707-08; Lee, supra note 128, at 752; Yelas, supra note 153, at 790-91.
209. See Brewer & Jones, supra note 128, at 1219; Faulkner, supra note 128, at 77, 81; Gar-
field, supra note 127, at 884; Lee, supra note 128, at 733-34, 752; Letter, supra note 148, at 2378.
210. Brooks et al., supra note 92, at 59; Jones, Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage Actions,
supra note 8, at 254-55; Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1, at 8-9
& n.8.
211. Brooks et al., supra note 92, at 59-60.
212. Id. at 60-61.
213. The reporting physician also may have incurred significant costs by reporting. See supra
note 167 and accompanying text (listing costs, such as time spent in filing reports, lost income
from time spent filing reports rather than treating patients, extra office staff, and lost income
from patients who change physicians because of reporting). Note the special problem of the
whistleblowing employee/reporter who may have endangered her position by filing a report. See
BESHAROV, T-m VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER, supra note 57, at 43-45 (noting that employees
of agencies who report institutional maltreatment of children are often retaliated against by the
agency through dismissal).
214. See, e.g., Brewer & Jones, supra note 128, at 1219 (stating that laws mandating reporting,
yet failing to provide adequate resources can be harmful by causing false expectations); Brooks
et al., supra note 92, at 58 (describing the demoralization inaction on reports can have upon
those working in the system); J. Jones, Elder Abuse, supra note 127, at 847 (noting that
mandatory reporting may inflict harm through false expectations),
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reporting.215 Physicians point to other potential "costs," mostly non-
economic, of reporting. They say that it may irretrievably rupture
their relationship with an abused patient who does not want them to
report the abuse and feels betrayed when they do so.216 They worry
that patients can sue them on the grounds of invasion of privacy,
breach of confidentiality, or some related cause of action when they
report abuse against the patient's wishes. 217 Reporting can create a
sense of disempowerment and/or internal conflict of interest for physi-
cians, who may not believe it will help a particular patient yet must do
so or else face civil and/or criminal liability.218 One critic of
mandatory reporting of elder abuse makes a final, somewhat meta-
physical, point about physicians, a rhetorical question which asks
whether physician time and resources should be expended in report-
ing abuse against a competent adult who should take care of herself
(presumably by calling the authorities herself, or taking some other
remedial action). 219
In conclusion, legal and medical critics have raised a number of ob-
jections, both practical and ethical, to requiring physicians to report
abuse of their adult patients to the authorities. One author has sum-
marized these complaints succinctly yet thoroughly: "Mandatory re-
porting may threaten the safety of battered women, discourage them
from seeking care, fail to improve the health care of battered patients,
lead to inadequate responses to reports of abuse, result in biased case
identification, and violate patient autonomy and confidentiality." 220
Although some of these points are well-taken, on balance22' the mer-
its of mandatory reporting outweigh the criticisms.
Many of the common arguments against required abuse reporting
are refutable. Others can be, and in fact have been, addressed through
law or policy. On the ethical front, the primary focus is on the domes-
tic violence victim's right to determine her own fate, including
whether or not to have government assistance in coping with her situ-
215. See supra note '167 and accompanying text (listing types of pecuniary losses to physicians
resulting from mandatory reporting).
216. See, e.g., Bell & Tooman, supra note 28, at 349-50; Brooks et al., supra note 92, at 55;
Hurley, supra note 13, at 662-63; Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 3192.
217. For a discussion of doctor's liabilities for disclosing information, see DeKraii & Sales,
supra note 105, at 856; Mark A. Hall, Hospital and Physician Disclosure of Information Concern-
ing a Patient's Crime, 63 U. DET. L. REV. 145, 146-47 & n.3, 147-51 (1985); Hyman et al., Report-
ing of Domestic Violence, supra note 37, at 1783; supra note 23 and accompanying text.
218. Agatstein, supra note 13, at 148-51; Brooks et al., supra note 92, at 55.
219. Palincsar & Cobb, supra note 128, at 436-37.
220. Hyman et al., Reporting of Domestic Violence, supra note 37, at 1786.
221. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing of interests).
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ation forced upon her.222 The right of self-determination is fundamen-
tal,223 and any effort to hinder it must be both strictly justified and
limited. But mandatory reporting need not disrupt self-determina-
tion. Granted, any reporting system which does anything with reports
beyond merely compile data will interfere, to some degree, with a bat-
tered spouse's life. But it need not meddle unduly. Perhaps some of
the self-determination debate involves differing views over how intru-
sively government will act. This Article does not purport to define
exactly how agencies should respond to reports, a topic which exceeds
its scope. Courts considering whether to impose a duty to report on
physicians need merely determine if government can respond appro-
priately and, if so, find whether the costs of it so doing outweigh the
benefits. Clearly, agencies can, as demonstrated by the Kentucky ex-
perience. 224 There, spouse abuse reports are evaluated and investi-
gated by the agency charged with overseeing them, and agency
workers offer various protection and advocacy services to the spouse
abuse victim. This is akin to how many states handle mandatory elder
abuse reports, offering services to victims without necessarily intrud-
ing unduly into their lives.225 At times law enforcement must get in-
volved, but its reaction can be tempered by the circumstances. Thus,
interference with self-determination is minimized.
Still, mandatory reporting and subsequent state follow-up, no mat-
ter how measured, does inject the state into the battered spouse's life
without her consent. Is this appropriate governmental concern over
the safety of its citizens or officious intermeddling in a competent
adult's life which is intolerable in a free society? Answering that
question requires considering again the nature of domestic violence.
As noted, spouse abuse is a terrible social problem involving control-
ling, violent, criminal behavior against those often unable to protect
themselves.226 If such conduct happened in any other context, society
would never tolerate it. But because it typically arises between people
in relationships, usually with women as the victims, traditionally it has
been treated differently-as a "private" concern, not for state inter-
222. See supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text (discussing ethical arguments regarding
mandatory reporting).
223. See BRUHN & HENDERSON, supra note 186, at 304 (stating that autonomy is fundamental
to a value system).
224. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 127, at 892-98 (discussing ways in which agencies can mini-
mize intrusion into victims' lives). Note how in the case of the female elder abuse victim dis-
cussed in Curtin, supra note 174, at 1121-22, she ultimately rejected all proffers of assistance and
remained with her abusive spouse despite heroic efforts to convince her to leave him.
226. For an explanation of the power and control that an abuser seeks through his violence,
see sources cited at supra note 5.
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vention.227 However, violent, criminal acts are not "private," regard-
less of against whom they are directed.228 Spouse battering is as
"public" a problem as any robbery or assault, rape or murder, and
needs to be pursued just as vigorously, whether or not the victim (or
her survivors) demands outside intervention. Various writers have ex-
plored the essence of the family unit and concluded that it is inappro-
priate to retreat from its legal issues by using the label "private
concern. 22 9 For all too long, areas involving mostly women have
been designated as "private," places government should avoid (or at
least handle differently) 230 regardless of what is being done to those
there. By keeping them "private," society has kept them out of view,
and also out of thought. Such treatment has meant problems like
child abuse, elder abuse, and spouse abuse have continued on for cen-
turies without serious governmental interference or restriction.2 31 Fi-
nally, government is starting to get involved, making a dent in these
problems; claims that they are "private" matters can only hinder its
efforts.
When a problem is public, the government must try to deal with it,
and that can mean prosecuting or otherwise pursuing criminals re-
gardless of the wishes of the victims because crime is an offense
against both individual victims and society, not just the victims alone.
Victim safety and wishes should be considered, but cannot govern
227. See Chez, supra note 18, at 70; Jecker, supra note 4, at 780.
228. See Chez, supra note 18, at 70; Jecker, supra note 4, at 780.
229. For a discussion of the public and private natures of domestic abuse, see Besharov, "Do-
ing Something," supra note 153, at 554; Burge, supra note 15, at 372; Ruth Gavison, Feminism
and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992); Jecker, supra note 4, at 777-79, 780;
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991); Yelas, supra note
153. As one recent article explained:
[T]he public/private distinction ... has defined the limits of governmental intervention
in the lives of individuals by asserting that there are certain areas of human existence in
which government should not intervene. The family has traditionally been considered
one of these areas. Attempts to combat ... abuse, a social problem centered in the
family, have thus encountered difficulties. [T]oo many of th[e] arguments [surrounding
the mandatory reporting debate] rely on some form of the public/private distinction as
an excuse not to intervene effectively where ... abuse most often occurs.
Yelas, supra note 153, at 781-82.
Even the AMA recognizes the negative effects of assuming domestic violence is a "private"
matter. Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 3191-92.
230. Police traditionally managed violence in the home very differently from violence
on the street. They tried to mediate domestic "disputes," i.e., have the abuser walk
around the block and attempt to calm things down. The message was that assaults in
the home were permissible; victims were not afforded adequate protection and assail-
ants were not subject to consequences.
Holtz & Furniss, supra note 1, at 50.
231. "Injustices towards women, both discreet and discrete (in the sense that they have been
seen as one-off, personal mishaps, rather than systemic abuse) have remained undocumented
and hence ignored by legislators and other social architects." Yelas, supra note 153, at 796.
236
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whether the issue is whether to prosecute or the more threshold issue
of whether to report something which will not be discovered, much
less prosecuted, unless someone brings it to public attention. After all,
the victim's "wishes" may not be her own at all, but rather those of the
batterer who controls her.2 32 The state does intrude into the victim's
life when it acts on mandatory abuse reports, but then it frequently
meddles with people's lives (hopefully for valid reasons) through tax
laws, motor vehicle registration and drivers' licensing provisions, seat
belt use and motorcycle helmet wearing requirements, etc. without
having these actions successfully challenged for violating individual in-
dependence and self-determination. 2
33
Requiring reporting, and follow-up investigations, is not so onerous
for the victims that the community ought to ignore the abuse inflicted
upon them in order to protect their right to be left alone.23 This is
particularly true in light of society's distinct interest in preventing an
ongoing pattern of violence from permanently injuring or killing its
members, as domestic violence tends to be continuing behavior rather
than an isolated criminal act. If victims cannot,2 35 or will not, protect
themselves then government must step in to prevent worse things
from happening in the future. Their psychological needs, including
worsened senses of powerlessness, can be met through counselling
and other spouse abuse resources after their physical safety is assured.
Helping those in severe need is not really "paternalistic," or at least
not in any negative sense-society has to look after itself and its mem-
bers, even if that can entail some interference with someone's present
232. See, e.g., Asmus et al., supra note 5, at 118 (providing an example of the technique an
abuser might use to impose his will upon the victim).
233. Id. at 800.
234. Indeed, the follow-up can prove very beneficial both when it helps protect the abused
and when it leads to the dismissal of unsubstantiated abuse charges.
235. This raises the possible issue of the "battered woman syndrome," which
describes a symptom complex characterized by repetitive, deliberate physical trauma
and multiple injuries, often escalating over time. Psychologically, there is a loss of self-
esteem and symptoms of anxiety or depression. The term battered woman syndrome
has also been used to describe a psychological response similar to the post-traumatic
stress disorder. This definition of the battered woman syndrome has been used success-
fully as a legal defense in criminal prosecutions of battered women who have retaliated
against their abusers.
Holtz & Fumiss, supra note 1, at 47. For more detailed explanations of the battered woman
syndrome, see Dutton, supra note 1, at 1215-42; Meier, supra note 5, at 1314-17. At the risk of
incurring the charge of paternalism, one must observe that to the extent that spouse abuse vic-
tims are rendered incapable of caring for themselves by their batterers' actions, state interven-
tion through the mandatory reporting route may be justified. See Bryant & Panico, supra note
148, at 420 (stating that an abused woman may be as vulnerable as a child); Jones, Battered
Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1, at 40-41 (noting that abuse victims can be
incapable of caring for themselves).
1996]
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perceptions, perhaps ill-founded, 236 of her wishes.237 The right to die,
even according to some who raise it in the right of self-determination
context, is not really comparable to the right to veto the filing of abuse
reports.238 Thus, although the issue is not without doubt, on balance
the fundamental right to self-determination should not overcome the
state's obligation to protect its citizens and enforce the law.
Mandatory reporting is a valuable, measured tool which must be up-
held, although it certainly should be implemented so as to minimize
any negative effects it may have upon some of the women it is
designed to help.
The other major category of ethical objections to mandatory report-
ing focuses on medical and legal concepts of Confidentiality in the phy-
sician/patient relationship. 239 A partial answer is that it clearly is
legally permissible to relate otherwise confidential information to the
authorities when some compelling public purpose, such as protecting
battered women from further abuse, is served by so doing.240 But that
may not completely resolve the ethical question of whether a breach
of confidentiality truly is justified, even in egregious domestic violence
situations so that it precludes further discussion. As a practical mat-
ter, this may be a non-issue with most battered spouses because there
is evidence that most patients do not know about their right of confi-
dentiality in the first place. Hence, they cannot be deterred from go-
ing to their physicians by fears about something whose very existence
is unknown to them.241 As for those who know about the right (and
all the others who are entitled to it whether or not they know about
it), they face an ethical balancing process as their interest in confiden-
236. If battered spouses knew the resources which would be brought to their assistance if their
plight were reported, would as many be reluctant to seek government aid on their own (or object
to physician reporting)?
237. Note that, in a sense, universal reporting of abuse-whetfier child, elder, or spouse-
helps offset this problem. It is harder to argue that battered women are treated paternalistically
or discriminatorily by mandatory reporting when the state handles all abuse victims the same.
See, e.g., Mathews, supra note 128, at 675 (stating that if reporting is made mandatory, it should
be aimed at reporting abuse of any adult, not just the elderly, thereby avoiding the promotion of
the notion that the elderly are incompetent).
238. See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 127, at 881 (arguing that the right to die and the right to
prevent the filing of reports are not really analogous, because abuse reporting implicates a less
significant interest than the refusal of medical treatment-the interest in preventing reporting
being liberty or privacy, while in medical treatment, the interest involves one's right to choose
between life or death).
239. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text (discussing confidentiality).
240. See infra notes 269-82 and accompanying text (discussing when physicians may report).
241. GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 143, at 5; see also Smith, Privileges and Confidential-
ity, supra note 43, at 548-49 (stating that most patients probably do not understand the limits of
confidentiality).
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tiality is measured against society's interest in protecting them from
further abuse. There must be exceptions to confidentiality when they
are necessary for the welfare of the patient or others.2 42 That should
resolve the ethical confidentiality issue in favor of disclosure.
243
Turning to classism and racial stereotyping,2 "4 it must be made clear
that domestic violence cuts essentially equally across racial and socio-
economic lines.2 45 Mandatory reporting will help document this fact,
as if all physicians report then the true number of upper and middle
class abuse victims will become apparent. When beneficence and
nonmaleficence are considered, 246 they should not pose significant
problems for reporting. If one assumes that reporting proves benefi-
cial for the battered woman, or at least does her no harm, both doc-
trines will be furthered.
247
Addressing the more practical objections to reporting, it is possible
that reporting will keep some battered women from seeking medical
care.248 Effectively being deprived of healthcare would, of course, be
a serious problem for domestic violence victims. But it seems unlikely
that the injured will shun physicians. Parents take their abused chil-
dren to hospitals and physicians for treatment notwithstanding
mandatory reporting laws,249 and adult women should act similarly
when they themselves are the victims. 250 It is equally possible, or even
likely, that some abusers will retaliate against the battered spouse and/
242. See infra notes 277-82 and accompanying text (noting exceptions to confidentiality, such
as universal child abuse reporting laws, elder abuse reporting provisions, and some communica-
ble disease reporting legislation).
243. Such will be consistent with the sense of such recent rulings as the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Veronia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995), that
the benefits of mandatory random drug testing of student athletes outweigh their privacy con-
cerns and the New Jersey Supreme Court's determination in Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J.
1995), that notifying residents when a convicted sex offender moves into their neighborhood
does not transgress the offender's confidentiality rights.
244. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (noticing that some argue mandatory report-
ing impacts the poor and minorities disproportionately).
245. See Louis HARRIS & Assocs., INC., A SURVEY OF SPOUSAL VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN IN KENTUCKY 2, 16-18 (1979); Asmus et al., supra note 5, at 121; Dutton, supra note 1,
at 1214; Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 3191. But see Welch, supra note 17,
at 1136 (stating that domestic abuse is not restricted to discrete segments of society).
246. See supra notes 186-92 and accompanying text.
247. See Gilbert, supra note 128, at 53-54 (arguing that mandatory reporting removes harm by
stopping abuse of an older adult and by alerting nurses to the problem).
248. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (arguing that if compulsory reporting is insti-
tuted, the abused practically may be deprived of medical care).
249. See, e.g., Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws, supra note 87, at 9 (contending that only
a small number of parents will put their own safety before the lives of their children).
250. This will be particularly true assuming the governmental response to abuse reports is
adequate. See infra notes 259-63 and accompanying text (explaining the social and political
forces which foster governmental reaction to the abuse problem).
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or the reporting physician when they learn they have been reported to
the authorities,2 51 but confidential protective service action and a cau-
tious police response can reduce this problem. Moreover, society
does not disregard other types of criminal behavior because of the risk
that case investigation or the offer of protective services will spark
retribution against the victim or the citizen who reported the crime.
Sometimes victims and/or witnesses are injured or killed, but not seek-
ing to offer protective services to victims and to hold perpetrators ac-
countable to avoid such instances would be unconscionable and would
encourage criminals to continue their activities unchecked. Leaving
the scourge of domestic violence to continue to spread because of fear
of retaliation simply makes no sense. Other factors may ameliorate
these problems as well. Some have noted that when reporting is
mandatory, the abuser is more likely to be angry at the person who
reported the abuse than the victim, who truthfully can say all she did
was seek medical treatment; she did not call the police or any other
state agent for help.252 If the batterer considers turning his anger to-
wards the reporting physician, he can consider that the physician
merely was obeying the mandates of the law in an almost ministerial
fashion, so the physician is not a good target for his rage either.253
When one considers the multitude of other complaints about the
impact of reporting on the spouse abuse victim or her batterer,254
none are sufficiently compelling to bar it. Reporting and its conse-
quences very likely will change the victim's family, hopefully for the
better. The status quo before reporting presumably was not so won-
derful that it ought to be preserved at the expense of continued abuse,
and possible death. It is unfortunate if some battered women blame
themselves for the changes in their families, but hopefully family,
friends, the police, and other support personnel can help them under-
stand that the real individuals who altered their households were the
men who battered them. It also is unfortunate either if reporting
brings an abuse victim's plight to the attention of her neighbors or
even the public at large when she wants to maintain her privacy or if
the victim is traumatized over her partner's fate. However, informa-
tion, advocacy, and related assistance can show her that she has noth-
ing to be ashamed about and that her assailant brought whatever
251. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., Paulsen, Abused Children, supra note 160, at 162; Bryant & Panico, supra note
148, at 420.
253. See, e.g., Paulsen, Abused Children, supra note 160, at 163 (arguing that parents will find
a physician's actions in reporting more palatable if required by law).
254. See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
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happens to him on himself. Above all, the domestic violence victim's
situation here is essentially the same as many other crime victims, yet
society does not ignore serious criminal behavior against those victims
because of the fear of the impact of prosecution on the victim. Cer-
tainly, mandatory reporting of child abuse, elder abuse, and crimes
committed with dangerous weapons,255 along with general investiga-
tion and prosecution of offenses like rape, arson, assault and battery,
statutory rape, incest, and numerous others all proceed despite the
existence of concerns like those raised about spouse abuse victims.2 56
When society balances these victim interests against the need to stop
crime and punish criminals, it has to enforce the law first and worry
about the victim's feelings second.2 57 Finally, it is both important not
wrongly to accuse men of being wife batterers, and unfortunate for
even the rightly accused to be forced to suffer the consequences of
their actions.2 58 However, this is true of all crimes and criminals.
There is nothing unique about these issues in the spouse abuse context
which should bar the sort of mandatory reporting which is the law in
other cases, including child or elder abuse.
Turning to attacks on the impact of reporting on government,259 the
state simply will have to adapt to the volume of reports. If additional
resources are needed, they will have to be found. It is unconscionable
to argue that a crime like domestic violence must continue on as it is
because it is too expensive to take the steps necessary to control it.260
255. See infra note 286 and accompanying text (discussing the state statutes which require
mandatory reporting by physicians treating certain injuries).
256. Consider in this regard, for example, the recent sex offense prosecution and jury convic-
tion of Congressman Mel Reynolds of Illinois. Maurice Possley & Peter Kendall, The Reynolds
Trial; Judge Lectures Heard About Silence, Cm. TRiB.. July 28, 1995, at 1. Not only was he
prosecuted against the express wishes of his teenaged alleged victim, but the victim herself was
incarcerated until she testified about events which transpired when she was sixteen. Although
this author is not necessarily advocating incarcerating battered women who refuse to testify
against their abusers, the Reynolds case does show a court emphasizing the societal interest in
prosecuting the guilty even over the victim's objections.
257. These concerns may reflect aspects of the "public/private" nature of domestic violence
conundrum. See supra notes 223-33 and accompanying text (pointing out that this is a public
legal issue which must be dealt with like other violations of the criminal law. It cannot be swept
under the carpet by treating it as a "private," "family" matter, lest the problem continue to grow
unabated).
258. For the point that spouse abusers often were abuse victims themselves, see supra note
202. This may be something for a court or other agency to consider when it considers treatment
or other alternatives for the abusers. It certainly is no reason to allow wife battering to go
unreported and, thereby, to possibly continue unabated potentially indefinitely.
259. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text (arguing that required reporting will para-
lyze the agencies who evaluate the reports).
260. See Yelas, supra note 153, at 800-01. Perhaps this is another reason that spousal abuse
must be recognized as a public, criminal law concern rather than a private one to be downplayed
and ignored by the authorities. See supra notes 222-33 and accompanying text.
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And, it can be managed without bankrupting government.261 Some
reports may be duplicative,2 62 but they can be dealt with; duplication
certainly is no reason not to receive those reports which are not. Gov-
ernment carefully can evaluate reports to minimize problems with er-
roneous ones (such as by classifying them as substantiated versus
unsubstantiated reports), thus maintaining the integrity of the data
base on the nature and extent of spouse abuse. Difficulties cannot be
eliminated entirely, but an important resource in the attack on domes-
tic violence should not be abandoned simply because of the possibility
that some mistakes in reporting will happen.2 63
Complaints about the quality of government's past response to wife
beating, and some skepticism about its present and future commit-
ment to stopping it, certainly are justified. Many, including this au-
thor, have written about the historically pathetic police response in
this area. 264 If that tradition were to persist, it would be doubtful
whether mandatory reporting (or any intervention, for that matter)
should be required-it certainly would make no sense to risk any of
the possible negative consequences of reporting if nothing were to be
done with the reports. But that pattern cannot continue. As with the
increasing litigation against the nonresponsive police, physician liabil-
ity for failure to report will help hold those professionals accounta-
ble-as decisions like Landeros and its more numerous law
enforcement liability decision cousins265 are decided and publicized,
police and physicians will fulfill their responsibilities both because it is
the right thing to do and because they fear the possible consequences
if they do not. Other governmental agencies should be liable under
the same legal theories as the police should they shirk their duty to
deal appropriately with domestic violence reports. 266
261. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussing Kentucky's basically successful
experience with mandatory reporting of domestic violence).
262. It also seems unlikely that with a problem as pervasive yet hidden as domestic violence
the authorities will already know about the vast majority of cases which physicians report to
them. If that is true, why does government not act to stop the abuse?
263. See supra note 53 (demonstrating that in Kentucky over 75% of mandatory spouse abuse
reports are substantiated by state investigators).
264. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9.
265. See Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1, at 13-14 n.34-38
(listing various law enforcement liability decisions).
266. See supra note 86 (noting that the school, social worker, and related governmental de-
fendants already called to task for failure to report child abuse). Social workers and others are
also held both civilly and criminally responsible for failing adequately to investigate the reports
of child abuse and related problems they receive or to follow-up properly on their investigations.
See, e.g., Mammo v. State, 675 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a state agency
had a duty to act with reasonable care when it received information from a non-custodial parent
concerning a threatened child); Turner v. District of Colom., 532 A.2d 662, 675 (D.C. 1987)
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There will, moreover, be other forces driving government agencies
to act. As the enormity of wife battering increasingly has become ap-
parent, there have been escalating political pressures which force
agencies to address the problem. Politicians already have enacted var-
ious valuable domestic violence legislation, both state and federal,267
and more undoubtedly will follow. At a time when groups like the
AMA have thrown their efforts into the fight against wife battering,268
government has done the same. It is understandable, but erroneous,
to assume that because government's reaction to spouse abuse once
was woefully inadequate it will continue to be the same. Rather than
oppose mandatory reporting, perhaps its critics should focus their con-
siderable political skills on insuring that government continues work-
ing to address domestic violence so that there is no question that
abuse reports promptly and competently will be processed and acted
upon.
Concern over the impact of reporting on both the police and other
officials269 may be at least somewhat explainable as well, but it does
not outweigh the benefits of reporting. Police economic and safety
concerns in domestic violence cases do not justify blocking report-
(holding that a special relationship is created between abused and neglected children and the
Child Protective Services division so that action can be taken against the District of Columbia
for breach of this duty); Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Yamuni, 529 So. 2d
258, 261 (Fla. 1988) (holding that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has a
statutory duty to prevent further harm to children when reports of child abuse are received);
Brodie v. Summit County Children Servs. Bd., 554 N.E.2d 1301, 1308 (Ohio 1990) (holding that
the county children services board has a duty to take affirmative action when it receives a report
that child abuse or child neglect is suspected); Jensen v. Anderson County Dep't of Social Servs.,
403 S.E.2d 615, 620 (S.C. 1991) (concluding that a cause of action may be brought against a
social worker for failing properly to investigate a report of child abuse); Susan L. Abbott, Note,
Liability of the State and Its Employees for the Negligent Investigation of Child Abuse Reports, 10
ALASKA L. REV. 401 (1993) (arguing that liability should be imposed on the state, rather than on
the individual social workers, for the negligent investigation of child abuse reports); Kim Boyer,
Comment, County Welfare Department Liability for Handling Reports of Child Abuse. 30 SAN
DIEGo L. REV. 187 (1993) (analyzing contexts which trigger a special relationship with a county
welfare department); Laura Huber Martin, Comment, Caseworker Liability for the Negligent
Handling of Child Abuse Reports, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 191 (1991) (arguing that the state, rather
than the caseworkers, should be liable if a negligence claim in the handling of child abuse reports
can be proven).
267. See Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1, at 24-26 nn.97-98
(listing the numerous state laws which address domestic violence, including the many order of
protection statutes in place across the nation). On the federal front, perhaps the best example of
legislative concern is the recently enacted Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, § 40001, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).
268. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the AMA's commitment to domes-
tic violence).
269. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text (noting that reporting affects law enforce-
ment officials both physically and financially).
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ing,270 nor do those of attorneys, judges, or others in the legal system.
That mandated reporting will force people to do their jobs is not a
basis for rejecting it even if it means increased workloads. As for
psychic damage to those discouraged by the lack of response to re-
ports, 71 to the extent this occurs it should be remedied by officials
who respond appropriately to reports, not by eliminating the reports.
Once all see government respond enthusiastically to stopping domes-
tic violence, any disillusionment should end.272
With regards to the interests of the reporting physician,2 73 while
mandatory reporting definitely will entail economic costs they should
not be excessive for most reporters (each of whom presumably do not
have vast numbers of battered patients), and often only may entail a
telephone call. They certainly should not be any greater compara-
tively than those expenses physicians already incur in dealing with pa-
tient insurance; working with governmental health (e.g., Medicare,
Medicaid) or benefits (e.g., Social Security) or workers' compensation
programs; testifying about patients' medical condition in civil and/or
criminal trials; and handling other administrative matters involving
their patients, such as the school immunization and examination re-
ports pediatricians fill out on their small charges. If physicians can
handle, or pass on directly or indirectly, the costs of these efforts, they
can do the same with that of reporting spouse abuse.
When the issue focuses on possibly rupturing the relationship be-
tween the physician and the patient who did not want her abuse re-
ported, once again the explanation that reporting is mandatory should
help avoid, or repair, the schism. Indeed, there is some indication that
mandatory reporting does not drive a wedge between patient and phy-
sician, and even that it actually may strengthen the relationship be-
tween the patient and her physician who, after all, actually took her
270. See Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1, at 3-4 n.8 (address-
ing the motives which underlie police hesitation and inaction in domestic violence situations).
Forcing them to exercise the good judgment they are being paid to develop and use is also not a
justification. (Should the police be protected from difficult events which are out of the ordinary
lest they have to overtax their faculties? Should the police abolish SWAT teams, or maybe ban
requests for their use, because if called upon their members must use extraordinarily good sense
in dangerous and tricky situations? The notion is ridiculous, and insulting of the capabilities of
the dedicated professionals in law enforcement.)
271. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text (listing those groups who would be dis-
heartened by a mandatory reporting system's failure to respond to reports of abuse).
272. Manifestly, the way to deal with a problem like spouse abuse is not essentially to ignore it
and hope it goes away on its own-it is to address it and resolve it. Once this is done, all the
secondary issues like discouragement over a lack of response will take care of themselves.
273. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text (discussing the economic and non-eco-
nomic costs to the reporting physician).
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situation seriously enough to report it.274 When possible lawsuits by
the patient against the reporting physician for breach of confidential-
ity, invasion of privacy, or the like are stated as the issue, they are red
herrings. While such causes of action can be extremely viable in the
appropriate situation, a mandatory reporting scenario ordinarily
would not fit the bill. That is because of a well-established qualified
privilege to report in good faith, albeit erroneously, on matters in
which there is a compelling public interest which extends to available
tort actions for wrongful disclosure.2 75 This privilege has been codi-
fied in some reporting situations such as the aforementioned spouse
abuse reporting statutes in several states,276 the universal child abuse
reporting legislation,2 77 the elder abuse reporting provisions,2 78 and
some communicable disease reporting laws. 279 Additionally, com-
mentators generally agree that the privilege for good faith reporting
274. See, e.g., Bell & Toomer, supra note 28, at 345 (arguing that mandatory reporting pro-
motes trust in the patient-therapist relationship); Brooks et al., supra note 92, at 56 (arguing that
although the therapeutic bond between patient and physician may be injured by reporting, re-
search shows that the relationship may actually improve over time); Levine, supra note 13, at
734-35 (arguing that there are benefits to physician reporting of abuse in that reporting strength-
ens the therapeutic alliance between patient and therapist and it helps the patient focus on previ-
ously avoided abuse issues).
275. See, e.g., Arnett v. Baskous, 856 P.2d 790, 791 (Alaska 1993) (holding that a physician
could not be held liable for breach of patient confidence when he released a patient's medical
records pursuant to a court order); Bryson v. Tillinghast, 749 P.2d 110, 113 (Okla. 1988) (holding
that a doctor's act of providing police with patient information, which ultimately led to a convic-
tion, did not violate the physician-patient privilege and benefitted the public at large); GUTHEIL
& APPELBAUM, supra note 144, at 13 (indicating that the obligation to report represents a legis-
lative decision that public knowledge is more important than confidentiality); DIANE H.
ScmETKY & ELISSA P. BENEDEK, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW
81-82, 122 (1992); Besharov, Failing to Report, supra note 58, at 70-71; Paulsen, Abused Children,
supra note 161, at 173-74 (indicating that liability will not be imposed on a physician for breach
of confidence if he or she reports in good faith).
276. See supra notes 40-53 and accompanying text (commenting on the operation of spouse
abuse reporting statutes in Kentucky, California and New Mexico).
277. See, e.g., Hope v. Landau, 486 N.E.2d 89, 91-92 (Mass. 1985) (holding that a writer of a
child abuse report required by statute is immune from liability regardless of correctness of be-
lief); Besharov, Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 14, at 477-78 (discussing the importance of
abrogation of privileged communication in child abuse cases); Fraser, supra note 14, at 664 (dis-
cussing the abrogation of privileged communications in child abuse cases); see generally Robert
F. Danelen, Statutory Immunity Under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act: From First
Impression to Present Day, 12 J. Juv. L. 16 (1991) (discussing absolute immunity for mandatory
reporters under the California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act); Craig S. Steinberg,
Reporting of Child Abuse: Is Absolute Immunity Too Much to Offer?, 14 J. Juv. L. 167 (1993)
(arguing that absolute immunity is an unnecessary protection for child abuse reporters).
278. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 128, at 53 (discussing mandatory reporting of elder abuse by
nurses and immunity from liability if reports are made in good faith).
279. See Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920) (holding that a physician is not
liable to his patient for disclosing a contagious disease when the physician acts in good faith,
even if the physician made a mistaken diagnosis).
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exists whether or not specifically provided for by statute.280 Thus,
physicians need not worry about such litigation so long as they act in
good faith when they report,281 and certainly ought not to use it as a
rationale for not reporting.2 82 Finally, arguments about creating a
sense of disempowerment and conflict of interest for the physician
may be worrisome, but should be alleviated when the physician sees a
positive governmental response to abuse reports.
A final observation should be voiced. Physicians have proposed
many reasons why forcing them to report the abuse of their patients is
a bad idea,283 some more valid than others. All these objections lose
sight of a large point, first made nearly thirty years ago in the context
of child abuse reporting, which is equally valid today in the domestic
violence arena-whether or not to have mandatory reporting is a mat-
ter of social policy, not merely a medical matter to be left in the hands
of physicians. 284 It is for the courts and legislatures to determine after
weighing all the issues, medical and otherwise, and considering the
gravity of the problem.285 After doing so, legislatures have decided to
require reporting of child and elder abuse, and several progressive
280. See, e.g., BESHAROV, THE VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER, supra note 57, at 38-39 (illus-
trating with cases the immunity from liability for those who report in good faith and asserting
that all states grant this immunity); Besharov, Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 14, at 475
(indicating that all states grant mandatory reporters immunity from civil and criminal liability for
good faith reports, and forty states extend this to voluntary good faith reporters): Fraser, supra
note 14, at 664 (discussing the abrogation of privileged communications in child abuse cases);
Maidment, supra note 104, at 163-64 (arguing that in child abuse cases, the truth of the report is
irrelevant as long as it was made in good faith); Paulsen, Abused Children, supra note 160, at
173-74 (arguing that liability to the physician may arise from state statute or judicial considera-
tion of the ethical concepts underlying the practice of medicine); Sussman, supra note 14, at 294
(indicating that good faith is available as a defense for a reporter).
281. If suit is brought against a reporter, it should be summarily dismissed absent tangible
allegations of bad faith reporting. BESHAROV, THE VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER, supra note
57, at 39-42. See supra note 46 (discussing the California statute which reimburses reporters for
attorneys' fees they incur while opposing litigation brought against them for good faith
reporting).
282. Another, practical consideration generally precludes such litigation-"the normal course
of a suit would probably result in additional release of very private information." Smith, Privi-
leges and Confidentiality, supra note 43. at 484 (emphasis added). Licensure sanctions against
disclosing physicians similarly should not pose any real problem. Id.
283. See, e.g., supra notes 215-19 (discussing the practical concerns of the physician, such as
costs, time and damage to the physician-patient relationship).
284. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 154, at 305-06; Paulsen, Abused Children, supra note 160, at
162; Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws, supra note 87, at 8; Sussman, supra note 14, at 271-
72.
285. And as a recent analogous Missouri failure to warn about child abuse case determined:
[W]hen the cost of imposing this duty and the economic burden upon the actor are
balanced against the magnitude of preventable injury suffered, the outcome over-
whelmingly weighs in favor of imposing a duty. The execution of the duty ... only
requires a simple telephone call to ... appropriate authorities. The burden imposed on
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bodies like those in California and Kentucky have extended the rule
into the lives of battered women.286 For the reasons discussed above
and the safety of the abused, courts should consider this the appropri-
ate result in all cases, and therefore conclude that public policy dic-
tates that physicians have a duty to report whether or not a statute
requires them to do so. In so doing, tribunals will further what one
author has described as "an almost universal assumption throughout
the English-speaking world ... that ... abuse reporting laws are a
necessary and integral part of a protective . . . abuse legislative
program."287
b. Statutory Negligence
Regardless of how courts feel about proclaiming a common law
duty for physicians to report domestic violence, they should not hesi-
tate to declare a reporting obligation in any of the many jurisdictions
which have some version of statutorily mandated reporting. This
should be accomplished pursuant to the well-established statutory
negligence doctrine, which generates a special relationship, and hence
a duty, where there otherwise might not be one.288 As noted,
mandatory physician reporting of domestic violence exists, in some
form, in a number of jurisdictions. 28 9 These include states like Ken-
tucky and California with well-developed spouse abuse reporting re-
quirements,2 90 as well as others with more general reporting laws.
Typical are those (1) requiring physicians to report injuries caused by
firearms, knives, or other sources attributable to criminal acts or else
face criminal sanction and, (2) immunizing them from liability for
their reports.291 Given the inherent nature of domestic violence, these
an individual in fulfilling this duty is greatly outweighed by the potential or actual harm
suffered as a result of failure to fulfill this duty.
Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
286. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Kentucky and California
statutes which require that physicians report suspected abuse).
287. Maidment, supra note 104, at 150-51.
288. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (explaining the doctrine of statutory
negligence).
289. See Hyman et al., Reporting of Domestic Violence, supra note 37, at 1781 (providing a
comprehensive, recent overview of the area, including an extensive collection of statutory cita-
tions). Forty-five states now have some sort of domestic violence reporting law. Id.
290. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text (evaluating the operation of spouse abuse
statutes in Kentucky and California).
291. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-135 (1991) is representative, and provides in pertinent part:
(1) It shall be the duty of every physician who attends or treats a bullet wound, a
gunshot wound, a powder burn, or any other injury arising from the discharge of a
firearm, or an injury caused by a knife, an ice pick, or any other sharp or pointed
instrument which he believes to have been intentionally inflicted upon a person, or any
248 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:191
laws mandate reporting in many spouse abuse cases, whether they are
seen in hospital emergency rooms, physicians' offices, or elsewhere.
The laws are enacted for various purposes, including the protection of
victims, the detection of crime, and the collection of crime data (in-
cluding domestic violence information).292 As previously noted, even
the AMA agrees that physicians should report violent acts committed
against their patients when a statute mandates that they do so. 293 The
statutory negligence doctrine should generate the basis for holding
them negligent if they do not.
The reasons for and prerequisites of statutory negligence are clear.
According to the leading commentator, courts impose it "to further
the ultimate policy for the protection of individuals which they find
underlying the statute [in question], and which they believe the legis-
lature must have had in mind. '2 94 The authors of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts define when courts should apply the statutory negli-
gence doctrine as follows:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable
man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administra-
tive regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one
whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which
has resulted, and
other injury which he has reason to believe involves a criminal act to report such injury
at once to the police of the city, town, or city and county or the sheriff of the county in
which the physician is located. Any physician who fails to make a report as required by
this section commits a class 2 petty offense . . . and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than three hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the
county jail for not more than ninety days, or both by such fine and imprisonment.
(2) Any physician who, in good faith, makes a report pursuant to subsection (1) of
this section shall have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that might other-
wise be incurred or imposed with respect to the making of such report, and shall have
the same immunity with respect to participation in any judicial proceeding resulting
from such report.
For analogous statutes in other states, see, e.g., ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3806 (1989); IND.
CODE ArNN'. § 35-47-7-1 (Bums 1994); MAss. ANN. LAws ANNy. ch. 112, § 12A (West 1991); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 28-902 (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.20 (1994); N.D. CEr. CODE § 43-17-41
(1993); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.25 (McKinney 1989); TENN. CODE ArN. § 38-1-101 (1991); UTAH
CODE Ar. §§ 26-23a-2, -3 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.995 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
292. Hyman et al., Reporting of Domestic Violence, supra note 37, at 1781.
293. Physicians and Domestic Violence, supra note 1, at 3192; see supra note 39 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the limitations on the AMA mandate that physicians report domestic
abuse).
294. KEETON ET AL, supra note 63, § 36, at 222.
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(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from
which the harm results.
2 95
Numerous courts have employed this basic test when determining
whether they should declare the provision in question begets a
duty.296 On the other hand, a court may conclude the enactor of a
statutory provision did not intend for it to give rise to a statutory neg-
ligence claim/duty. The Restatement (Second) of Torts further states
that:
The court will not adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable
man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administra-
tive regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively
(a) to protect the interests of the state or any subdivision of
it as such, or
(b) to secure to individuals the enjoyment of rights or privi-
leges to which they are entitled only as members of the public,
or
(c) to impose upon the actor the performance of a service
which the state or any subdivision of it undertakes to give the
public, or
(d) to protect a class of persons other than the one whose
interests are invaded, or
(e) to protect another interest than the one invaded, or
(f) to protect against other harm than that which has re-
sulted, or
(g) to protect against any other hazards than that from
which the harm has resulted.
297
Courts can reject statutory negligence claims on the basis of the vari-
ous tenets of this provision's search for legislative intent.
298
295. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965). See, e.g., Freehauf v. School Bd., 623
So. 2d 761, 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing that whether a statute generates statutory
negligence turns on considerations set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
296. See, e.g., Crown v. Raymond, 764 P.2d 1146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a gun
shop owner's sale of a handgun to a minor who later committed suicide was negligent per se);
Sanchez v. Galey, 733 P.2d 1234 (Idaho 1986) (explaining the criteria that must be met for a
finding of negligence per se, particularly that the plaintiff injured is a member of the class of
persons the statute was designed to protect); Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920) (hold-
ing that the failure to display lights on a vehicle, as required by statute, constituted negligence);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 36 (noting that violation of a statute designed to protect a
certain class of persons constitutes negligence per se).
297. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288 (1965).
298. See, e.g., Freehauf, 623 So. 2d at 762-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to create
statutory negligence for breach of a child reporting statute without a clear legislative mandate);
Borne ex rel. Borne v. Northwest Allen County Sch. Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1196, 1202-03 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that it was not the intent of the legislature to generate statutory negligence
for breach of a duty to report child abuse); Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v. Specialized Transp.
Servs., 819 P.2d 587, 602-04 (Kan. 1991) (recognizing that the legislature did not intend to gener-
ate statutory negligence for violation of mandatory child abuse reporting statutes).
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The obvious question is whether mandatory reporting laws are the
types of provisions courts should enforce through statutory negli-
gence. As noted,299 several courts have applied the doctrine in analo-
gous child abuse reporting situations. While one did so in the context
of a specific child abuse reporting law, which included an express civil
liability provision, rather than one of the more general statutes man-
dating the reporting of criminal acts,300 Landeros utilized statutory
negligence both pursuant to California's specific child abuse reporting
law and its general criminal acts reporting one. 30' Both believed that
statutory negligence furthers the legislative purpose to guard abused
children from further abuse which gave rise to the original protective
legislation. Numerous commentators on child abuse reporting have
agreed that those who do not report should be liable for statutory
negligence. 302 Several have cited to various early decisions, which
held physicians statutorily negligent when they do not obey laws re-
quiring them to report certain infectious diseases suffered by their pa-
tients and harm results to the patients or others due to the failure to
report, as a basis for imposing statutory negligence liability here.303
299. See supra notes 103, 118 and accompanying text (discussing the Landeros decision, which
held a physician who did not report child abuse liable under statutory negligence).
300. Williams v. Coleman, 488 N.W.2d 464, 466-67, 471-72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
301. Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389, 397 (Cal. 1976).
302. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 11. at 195-200 (discussing the statutory duty to report);
Besharov, Failing to Report, supra note 58, at 68 (discussing fact that a violation of a reporting
statute may be negligence per se); Clymer, supra note 87, at 547-51 (discussing the statutory
liability theory in child abuse cases); Isaacson, supra note 87, at 747-65 (discussing the origins of
the statutory liability approach, and applying it to the conduct of a non-reporting doctor in a
child abuse case); Lehto, supra note 12, at 149-58 (discussing statutory negligence for the failure
to report child abuse); McDonald, supra note 58, at 489-90 (discussing the negligence per se
theory in child abuse cases, which imposes a duty to report on a defendant). A practitioner's
guide has summarized the statutory negligence analysis in failure to report child abuse cases:
The basic elements of this theory are that:
(1) the physician, by failing to report a suspected case of child abuse, violated his statu-
tory duty; (2) as a proximate result of that violation, the child suffered subsequent inju-
ries; (3) the child was a member of the class of persons which the statute was designed
to protect; and (4) the subsequent injuries were the result of acts that the statute was
designed to prevent.
Jimmie E. Tinsley, Failure to Report Suspected Case of Child Abuse, 6 PROOF OF FACTS 2D 345,
356 (1975).
303. See, e.g., Medlin v. Bloom, 119 N.E. 773,775 (Mass. 1918) (holding that a physician could
be liable for statutory negligence for failure promptly to report infant patient's eye infection as
required by law when infant lost vision as a result); Jones v. Stanko, 160 N.E. 456 (Ohio 1928)
(holding that a physician could be liable for statutory negligence for failure to report patient's
black smallpox as required by law when neighbor contracted disease and died as a result);
Dietsch v. Mayberry, 47 N.E.2d 404 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942) (holding that a physician could be
liable for statutory negligence for failure to report infant patient's eye infection as required by
law when infant lost vision in one eye as a result); Clymer, supra note 87, at 547-48 (discussing
early medical malpractice cases based on negligence per se for violation of mandatory reporting
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But what about the various child abuse rulings to the contrary? 304
These decisions concur that reporting violations do not fit the parame-
ters of statutory negligence because the legislature did not intend it,305
and present a real roadblock for the attorney representing a battered
spouse in her claim against a non-reporting physician. They reflect a
narrowing view of when statutory negligence is appropriate, 306 far out-
number the decisions in favor of statutory negligence,307 and include
several very recent opinions.308 They hold that being in the protected
class (by being a child abuse victim) does not suffice to generate statu-
tory negligence coverage, that the victim must "demonstrate[ ] a clear
legislative intention to provide for civil remedies" 30 9 and that report-
ing laws are intended to protect the general public rather than a spe-
cific class of individuals. 310
Regardless of these cases, courts should exercise their considerable
discretion and extend statutory negligence to violations of child abuse
reporting laws. They certainly were enacted to help protect children
from abuse (even if there were other rationales also), and under the
terms of the Restatement qualify for statutory negligence. 311 Because
of their focus on abused children they do not protect merely the state
statutes); Isaacson, supra note 87, at 759-61 (reviewing cases which dealt with a doctor's negli-
gent non-compliance).
304. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text (discussing decisions which have refused
to extend statutory negligence to violations of child abuse reporting statutes).
305. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the courts
which have refused to extend statutory negligence to child abuse reporting statutes).
306. See, e.g., Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785, 789 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (listing factors
to determine when legislation qualifies for statutory negligence); Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d
302, 312-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a statute which required psychologists to report
sexual abuse was not intended by the legislature to create a statutory negligence action).
307. Compare notes 102, 117, supra with note 119, supra (evaluating those cases which en-
dorse statutory negligence in comparison to those cases which do not recognize a statutory negli-
gence action).
308. See, e.g., Iseley v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138, 1147-48 (E.D. Mich. 1995)
(holding that a reporting statute which requires school administrators to report injuries or other
forms of child abuse did not generate a statutory negligence action); Letlow v. Evans, 857 F.
Supp. 676, 678 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (holding that there was no statutory negligence for a violation of
a child abuse reporting statute); J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that absent codification, extending a civil remedy to an abuse victim against all persons
who know of child abuse and fail to report is not sound public policy); Bradley v. Ray, 904
S.W.2d 302, 312-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a statute which required a psychologist to
report sexual abuse did not support a statutory negligence claim).
309. Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 314.
310. Freehauf v. School Bd., 623 So. 2d 761, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); see also Doe "A"
v. Special Sch. Dist., 637 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (E.D. Mo. 1986), aff'd, 901 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1990)
(refusing to recognize a statutory negligence action for violation of a child abuse reporting stat-
ute because the statute created a duty owed to the general public, rather than to individuals).
311. See supra note 288 and accompanying text (indicating when the statutory negligence doc-
trine is applicable).
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at large, thereby transgressing the Restatement.312 Employing statu-
tory negligence will help motivate reporters to take actions which will
facilitate protection for child abuse victims, certainly a legislative pur-
pose which meets any statutory negligence test. These laws are analo-
gous to the order of protection statutes in domestic violence cases,
which various courts have indicated qualify for statutory negligence
treatment.313 Those provisions also arguably benefit the general pub-
lic, but in addition they more specifically help protect an unfortu-
nately large group of individuals from injury attributable to domestic
violence. If, as these courts have found, battered spouses merit statu-
tory negligence treatment due to the presence of order of protection
laws, so should they and child abuse victims covered by a mandatory
reporting law.
The recent child abuse precedents could be particularly worrisome
when statutory negligence for a failure to report domestic violence is
the issue. All those cases involved specific child abuse reporting laws,
which thus were focused relatively narrowly. On the other hand, in all
but a few states the only reporting laws which apply to spouse abuse
are general ones which extend to crimes across the board. They ac-
cordingly are even more vulnerable to attack than the child abuse pro-
visions because at least the child abuse laws applied only to
children. 314 The laws in Kentucky or California fit the mold of spe-
cific child abuse reporting statutes, leaving even them subject to attack
as in the number of states which decline to impose statutory negli-
gence for child abuse reporting violations. Still, as Landeros and this
discussion have demonstrated, the doctrine ought to apply whether
the statute in question is a specific spouse abuse reporting law or a
general crime reporting one. Both fit the letter and spirit of the Re-
statement's classic statutory negligence-generating provision. The
public policy which favors mandatory reporting as a major weapon in
the fight against domestic violence equally favors courts using the stat-
utory negligence approach as a means for making reporting an even
more effective tool. The judiciary ought freely to use it regardless of
narrow decisions to the contrary.
312. See supra note 290 and accompanying text (discussing legislative intent).
313. See, e.g., Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050, 1055-56 (2d Cir. 1990); Sorichetti
v. City of N.Y., 482 N.E.2d 70, 76 (N.Y. 1985); Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage
Actions, supra note 1, at 23-29, 37-38.
314. Or, if they applied more broadly, they were roundly attacked as not constituting suitable
foundations for statutory negligence. See Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785, 790 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that a psychiatrist's failure to report the abuse of the child of one of his
patients did not provide that child with a statutory negligence action).
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C. Remaining Steps In Negligence Analysis
Once a battered spouse demonstrates the non-reporting physician
owed her a duty via the common law and/or statutory negligence
methods for establishing one, she still must show that the physician
breached that duty and that the breach was the cause in fact and the
proximate cause of the injuries she suffered. Although the spouse
may encounter difficulties in doing so-particularly when the physi-
cian contests causation-she should be able successfully to advance
through the breach and causation stages.315 Physicians who do not
report abuse will have breached their duty and accordingly face negli-
gence liability like anyone else who violates the standard of care.
Courts will be setting the duty, so obdurate physicians will not be able
to block it by arguing it is the custom in their community not to report
so they did not violate the standard of care by their inaction.
316
After the spouse abuse victim reaches this stage in her suit against
the physician who did not report her condition to the proper authori-
ties, she still may have to cope with such defenses to negligence which
the physician may raise as contributory negligence, assumption of the
risk, and/or comparative fault.317 Courts are unlikely to permit the
physician successfully to proffer such defenses for policy reasons, since
one reason states enact reporting and domestic violence legislation is
to help those unable or unwilling to help themselves. It makes no
sense to recognize that this is the condition of many battered spouses
and then penalize them, through negligence defenses, for not taking
care of themselves.318 Still, although defenses ought not to apply to
domestic violence suits, claimants should be ready to fend off any at-
tempts to raise them. 319
315. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing proximate cause).
316. See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) (holding opthamologist negli-
gent in failing to give glaucoma test, despite expert testimony that it was the standard in the
profession not to administer that test); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965) (stating
that the standard by which the actor's conduct is compared is fixed by judicial decisions); KEE-
TON ET AL, supra note 63, § 33 (discussing the application of the standard of reasonable
conduct).
317. Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1, at 40.
318. For arguments that helplessness is part of the cycle of abuse, see id. at 40-41; supra note
230 and accompanying text.
319. Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1, at 41. Such a defense
might arise in the following situation: A domestic violence victim consults her physician for
treatment of injuries her spouse inflicted upon her. The physician duly notes the injuries and
realizes their source, but fails to report them to the authorities although he has a duty to do so.
The spouse subsequently severely beats the patient, causing serious permanent injuries. She sues
the physician (her abuser is now incarcerated and penniless) for negligent non-reporting, and he
counters with a comparative fault/assumption of the risk defense. He charges that the patient
should not have stayed with her abuser and that any recovery she gets from him should be
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Several special issues might come up in statutory negligence situa-
tions. Many courts have let defendants in such cases raise the typical
negligence defenses. 320 However, given the particular reporting laws
at issue here, it is unlikely that courts would treat domestic violence
cases grounded upon them like ordinary negligence ones. A number
of tribunals absolutely forbid defendants who violate special safety or
other laws from raising any of the ordinary defenses to negligence on
the basis that the defendants ignored essentially strict liability provi-
sions requiring them to safeguard certain people from foreseeable
harm.321 To do otherwise would undermine the legislature's clear in-
tentions by allowing those defendants, partially or completely, to es-
cape accountability solely on the basis of a protected person's own,
often predictable, error.322 Although such laws are not typical, nu-
merous courts have treated a wide variety of specific laws as immune
from statutory negligence defenses. 323
Reporting requirements should be considered part of this small cat-
egory of protective laws. Legislatures pass them, at least in part, be-
cause they believe domestic violence must be reported and that its
victims cannot bear the burden of reporting it themselves. 324 Al-
lowing physicians to raise negligence defenses in such cases would un-
dercut the very rationale underlying mandatory reporting statutes.
Thus, battered spouses ought not to lose their damage claims against
non-reporting physicians, or even see them partially reduced, because
of their own actions.325
In conclusion, when a battered spouse can prove that a physician's
failure to report her abuse to the authorities contributed to her subse-
reduced in recognition of her own role in the domestic violence scenario. If these defenses get to
a jury, they could have serious negative ramifications for the patient's suit.
320. See id. at 41 (citing Valentine v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 77, 82-83 (D.D.C. 1989); King
v. Magnolia Homeowners Ass'n, 253 Cal. Rptr. 140, 143 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Brady v. Ralph M.
Parsons Co., 572 A.2d 1115, 1122 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1965)).
321. Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1, at 41.
322. Id. at 42.
323. See id. at 42 (citing Wren v. Sullivan Elec., Inc., 797 F.2d 323, 326-27 (6th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a subcontractor which violated state and federal safety statutes by not installing
adequate temporary lighting at construction site could not assert assumption of risk or contribu-
tory negligence defenses against injured construction worker); Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116
So. 2d 421, 422-24 (Fla. 1959) (concluding that a store that sold a rifle to a minor in violation of
both a state statute and a municipal ordinance could not assert contributory negligence nor com-
parative fault defenses against the minor); Lomayestewa v. Our Lady of Mercy Hosp., 589
S.W.2d 885, 887 (Ky. 1979) (deciding that a hospital that violated a state regulation by failing to
erect a detention screen to prevent a mental patient from falling or jumping out of the window
could not assert the contributory negligence defense against the injured patient)).
324. Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1, at 42-43.
325. See id.
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quent harm, she should be able to recover from him under common
law negligence for his negligent failure to report. Moreover, if her
jurisdiction has some form of statutory reporting requirement, she
also should be able to recover from the physician on a statutory negli-
gence theory. Negligence defenses should not partially or completely
derail her claim due to its inherent nature. This approach has borne
fruit in the analogous child abuse reporting violation area,326 and
should do so for domestic violence victims as well. Negligence law
should offer the battered spouse her principal source of redress from
the non-reporting physician.
II. BATITERED SPOUSES' STATE COMMON LAW STATUTORY
TORT SUITS
Some abused spouses may raise another tort against physicians, a
common law statutory tort claim.327 For centuries328 courts have im-
326. See, e.g., Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d 389 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (stating that physician
and hospital could be held liable for injuries sustained by abused child if they negligently failed
to diagnose and report battered child syndrome); J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994).
327. This author has discussed the implied statutory tort in detail elsewhere. See Jones, Bat-
tered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1, at 43-50. For overviews of the law
concerning implied state (and sometimes also federal) rights of action, see, e.g., John H.
Bauman, Note, Implied Causes of Action in the State Courts, 30 STANFORD L. REV. 1243 (1978)
(examining federal and state court analyses for deciding whether to imply a private right of
action); Caroline Forell, The Statutory Duty Action in Tort: A Statutory/Common Law Hybrid,
23 IND. L. REV. 781, 787 (1990) [hereinafter Forell, The Statutory Duty Action] (examining the
sources and different kinds of statutory duty actions and proposing analysis for "judges to apply
when presented with statutory duties"); Caroline Forell, The Interrelationship of Statutes and
Tort Actions, 66 OR. L. REV. 219 (1987) [hereinafter Forell. Interrelationship] (urging courts to
replace the vague notion of negligence per se with a more "principled examination of the inter-
relationship of statutes and tort actions."); H. Miles Foy, III. Some Reflections on Legislation,
Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV.
501 (1986) (discussing the history of implied private actions); Gordon Gamm & Howard Eisberg,
The Implied Rights Doctrine, 41 UMKC L. REV. 292 (1972) (discussing the theoretical basis of
the implied rights doctrine, its application by the federal and Missouri courts, and the reasons
that Missouri should expand its present application of the doctrine); Note, The Use of Criminal
Statutes in the Creation of New Torts, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 456 (1948) [hereinafter New Torts]
(examining the doctrine of implied actions and the soundness of its underlying rationale); cf.,
e.g., R. A. Buckley, Liability in Tort for Breach of Statutory Duty, 100 LAW Q. REV. 204 (1984)
(examining the implication of civil remedies for statutory violations in the United Kingdom);
G.H.L. Friedman, Civil Liability for Criminal Conduct, 16 OTTAWA L. REV. 34 (1984) (examin-
ing the implication of civil remedies for statutory violations in Canada); see also, e.g., Ezra Rip-
ley Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914) (providing an
influential early discussion of this area).
328. In 1986, Professor H. Miles Foy, III wrote an exhaustive and fascinating article in which
he traced English and American implied private actions back as far as the fifteenth century. Foy,
supra note 327, at 524-28; see also Thomas J. Andre, Jr., The Implied Remedies Doctrine and the
Statute of Westminster 11, 54 TuL. L. REV. 589 (1980) (analyzing the origins of the implied reme-
dies doctrine); Graham L. Fricke, The Juridical Nature of the Action Upon the Statute, 76 LAW Q.
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plied private civil actions against those who violate legislation which
protects specific people.329 They do so in order to uphold legislative
REV. 240, 240-41 (1960) (stating that the second statute of Westminister has received little atten-
tion from historians and has remained largely unnoticed, despite its provision of a private rem-
edy available to those aggrieved by the neglect of statutory duties). In the process, Professor
Foy discussed very early cases where courts upheld such suits based upon violations of penal
statutes. See, e.g., Lord Cromwell's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 12 b, 76 Eng. Rep. 877 (K.B. 1578) (holding
that a statute which outlawed false statements about leading nobles and/or great "men" of realm
gave rise to implied civil action although statute did not provide for one); Prior of Bruton v. Ede,
Y.B. Pasch. 10 Edw. 4 (Q.B. 1470), reprinted in 47 SELDEN SociETY 31 (N. Neilson, Ph.D. ed.
1931) (providing that a statute which outlawed forcible entry of premises of another gave rise to
implied civil action although statute did not provide for one); Foy, supra note 327, at 527 n.86
(citing additional English cases from 1422, 1470, and 1605 which held statutory violations gener-
ated implied civil actions although statutes in question did not provide for them); see also Andre,
supra, at 605-07, 610-12 (citing numerous early English statutes and cases which held statutory
violations generated implied civil actions although statutes in question did not explicitly provide
for them). He further noted the statement of Sir Edward Coke, the celebrated English late
sixteenth and early seventeenth century barrister, jurist, politician, and scholar, to the effect that
one who violated a criminal provision would be civilly liable for commission of a statutory tort as
well. Foy, supra note 327, at 524, 603-04 ("[E]very Act of parliament made against any injury,
mischiefe [sic], or grievance doth either expressly, or impliedly give a remedy to the party
wronged, or grieved .... ) (quoting EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTrrUTES OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (1642)) (emphasis added). This viewpoint continued in England into
the nineteenth century. Id. supra, at 530-32. It crossed the Atlantic to the United States. But
see Note, supra note 327, at 457 ("There is no evidence that this [implied right of action] doctrine
existed in Anglo-American law before 1854 .... 9). It is reflected in cases like Bullard v. Bell, 4
F. Cas. 624, 639 (C.C.N.H. 1817) (No. 2,121) (adopting the English approach of implying civil
actions for violations of criminal statutes although statutes did not provide for them), or the
celebrated Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 154-73 (1803) (indicating agreement with prece-
dents implying civil actions for violations of criminal statutes although statutes did not provide
for them). Foy, supra note 327, at 533-35. Notwithstanding a few detours, id. at 536-48, includ-
ing the rise of the law of negligence and the use of statutes to generate negligence duties rather
than independent implied private tort actions, id. at 540-46; see also supra notes 80-83, 279-305
and accompanying text; implied actions have survived, and flourished, up to the present. See
Foy, supra, at 548-69 (evaluating the theories of recovery in the modem period); Karen Majcher
Art, Note, A New Tort for Violation of a Statutory Duty: Nearing v. Weaver, 20 WILLAMETrE L.
REV. 579, 584-85 (1984) (analyzing the general concept of statutory tort and its place within the
development of tort law).
329. See, e.g., Transamerica Fin. Corp. v. Superior Court, 761 P.2d 1019 (Ariz. 1988) (en banc)
(holding that lender which violated Consumer Loan Act had implied tort liability for its failure
to comply with law); Castillo v. Friedman, 243 Cal. Rptr. 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that
landlord who violated rent stabilization ordinance had implied tort liability for his failure to
comply with law); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (III. 1978) (holding that an employer,
which violated Workmen's Compensation Act, had implied tort liability for its failure to comply
with law); Bortz v. Rammel, 376 A.2d 1261 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 384 A.2d
518 (N.J. 1977) (finding that construction contractor which violated Construction Safety Act had
implied tort liability because of its failure to comply with law); County of Broome v. State, 507
N.Y.S.2d 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding that a state, which violated a statute requiring it to
reimburse counties for the legal fees incurred in defending against Native Americans' challenges
to land titles, had implied tort liability for its failure to comply with law); cf. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (holding that brokers and others who
violated Commodity Exchange Act had implied federal tort liability to private plaintiffs for their
failure to comply with law); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979)
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intent.330 In evaluating this aim, courts consider laws' relative speci-
ficity, the adequacy of existing remedies, the impact of upholding a
statutory tort action upon them, the significance of the legislative pur-
pose at issue, how drastically recognizing new implied private torts
will affect current law, and the burden they will inflict on the judicial
system.331 Once claimants persuade tribunals that they should imply
statutory torts, they then must convince the tribunals that they belong
to the groups for whose benefit the legislature enacted the provisions
and that the harm they suffered is the type the legislature wanted
erased.332
An implied statutory tort action differs markedly from a statutory
negligence suit. There, a court merely employs a law in connection
with traditional, and preexisting, negligence principles; the plaintiff
still must show all the elements of, and fend off the various defenses
to, negligence. In an implied private civil action case, on the other
(holding that investment adviser which violated Investment Advisers Act of 1940 had implied
federal tort liability for its failure to comply with law).
330. The Restatement expresses the essence of the cause of action very well:
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring
certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it
determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legisla-
tion and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured mem-
ber of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of
action analogous to an existing tort action.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A (1979).
331. See, e.g., Credit Managers Ass'n v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co.. 809 F.2d 617, 624
(9th Cir. 1987) (denying the plaintiff's claim of a cause of action under California Insurance
Code Section 803, since Section 803 aimed to protect a class of persons and not insurers); Lally v.
Copygraphics, 413 A.2d 960, 963 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980), aff'd, 428 A.2d 1317 (N.J.
1981) (holding that an employee had a judicially cognizable cause of action against his employer
for violation of the statute); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 514 N.E.2d 116, 119 (N.Y. 1987)
(noting that whether a statutory negligence action is granted should depend on legislative intent
and the purposes underlying the applicable legislative scheme); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 874A cmt. h (1979) (providing the factors courts should evaluate in determining
whether to provide a tort remedy).
332. See, e.g., Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 393 N.E.2d 718 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (denying
plaintiffs' claims against insurance company due to failure to establish that they fell within the
class of persons whom the statute was designed to protect); State v. Kansas City Firefighters
Local No. 42, 672 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (noting the legislature's intent to benefit
the public employer or employee, but not to benefit a third party); County of Broome v. State,
494 NY.S.2d 638, 640 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1985), aff'd, 507 N.Y.S.2d 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (stating
that whether a statutory negligence action for damages was intended should depend first on
whether the claimants are members of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A cmt. i (1979) (setting forth tort liability for violation
of a legislative provision).
For more on the mechanics of qualifying for a common law statutory tort claim, see Forell, The
Statutory Duty Action, supra note 327; Forell, Interrelationship, supra note 327; Bauman, supra
note 327, at 1253-61. For more of the various cases where courts have upheld such claims, see
supra note 320.
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hand, the tribunal crafts the legislation into a totally new tort claim in
which, for example, negligence defenses should play no role.333 Thus,
333. Courts in statutory tort cases could handle negligence defenses like contributory negli-
gence, assumption of the risk, or comparative fault as they are treated in statutory negligence
ones. See supra notes 311-14 and accompanying text. On the other hand, tribunals might refuse
even to recognize some or all of those defenses, or even decide invariably to uphold them. Un-
fortunately, very few authorities have discussed the way defenses operate under state implied
statutory tort law. But see Art, supra note 328, at 583-84 (discussing statutes as a source of civil
liability); Jennifer Friesen, Recovering Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 TEx. L. REv.
1269, 1282-83 (1985) (discussing liability under section 874A Of the Restatement of Torts); cf
David S. Ruder & Neil S. Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5, 1972 DuKE L.J.
1125; Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REv. 285,
296-97 (1964) (stating that a court which recognizes a private remedy from a federal regulatory
statute must also place limitations on the remedy in terms of available defenses, statute of limita-
tions and venue requirements). Luckily, it is fairly clear how they ought to work there.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A cmt. j (1979) states that a court which must decide what
defenses apply in an implied statutory tort action should look at the legislation from which the
claim arises for guidance. It further directs the court to apply "all the recognized defenses ex-
isting for the established tort that the court has adapted to cover this situation .... Id. Com-
ment f to Section 874A also speaks of assimilating an implied statutory negligence action "to the
most similar common law tort." Id. cmt. f. In the case of the statutory tort asserted by a bat-
tered spouse, the analogous common law tort obviously is a suit for statutory negligence. As
discussed supra note 320 and accompanying text, defendants in many statutory negligence cases
are free to assert defenses like contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, or comparative
negligence there. "If they successfully prove a defense, they may be able to prevent those suing
them from recovering anything." Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra
note 1, at n.197. At the least, they perhaps can limit the plaintiffs' damages through an offset for
the portion of their injuries attributable to their own fault. Id.
Fortunately for battered spouses, however, a different rule applies in a few statutory negli-
gence suits. See supra notes 321-22 and accompanying text (discussing the unavailability of neg-
ligence defenses when defendants violate special safety laws). There, negligence defenses are
unavailable when the quasi-absolute liability statute in question reflects the legislature's clear
desire to protect those who cannot guard themselves regardless of their own actions. Id.
"Courts ought to deem protective domestic violence reporting laws to be of this type." Id.; see
supra note 316 and accompanying text (arguing that physicians who do not report suspicions of
domestic violence should not be permitted to raise negligence defenses since such defenses
would undercut the very rationale underlying mandatory reporting statutes).
Various state law courts seem to have followed Section 874A by carrying over to the statutory
tort realm the rule which outlaws all negligence defenses to statutory negligence claims which
are derived from violations of focused protective legislation. For example, in Nearing v. Weaver,
670 P.2d 137 (Or. 1983) (en banc), the Oregon Supreme Court apparently held that when a
battered spouse sued the police for violating a provision which required that they arrest certain
designated spouse abusers, the statute in question qualified for special status under statutory
negligence law. Hence, no negligence defenses were available under either that law or the
analogous implied private action which would be assimilated to it. Nearing, 670 P.2d at 141-42,
143-44. But see Cain v. Rijken, 717 P.2d 140, 147 (Or. 1986) (en banc) (stating that because a
statute merely provided that a mental health provider "may" (as opposed to "shall") take a
person into custody, the statute did not create a Nearing v. Weaver statutory tort). As a result,
the only defenses the law enforcement defendants in Nearing could assert were those which were
defenses to violations of the underlying law itself. Nearing, 670 P.2d at 141-42, 143-44.
A number of other tribunals in appropriate statutory tort and related cases have rejected
traditional negligence defenses. See H. WooDs, COMPARATIVE FAULT §§ 10:1-:5 (2d ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1994) (discussing violations of statutes which bar defenses or are silent on their applicabil-
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the court acts much more dramatically when it generates a completely
original tort than when it merely further refines a well-established
one.334 Such judicial behavior can rate both praise and criticism.335
In 1983, the implied statutory tort entered the domestic violence
arena when the Oregon Supreme Court implied a private civil action
when law enforcement officers ignored Oregon statutes mandating the
arrest of certain spouse abusers. 336 The court held that when the po-
ity). A New York statute requires contractors and building owners to erect scaffolding, ladders,
ropes, and other similar safety devices to protect construction workers from harm. N.Y. LABOR
LAw § 240(1) (McKinney 1986). Many New York courts evidently have implied a statutory tort
for violations of this provision. Furthermore, they have banned the negligence defenses defend-
ants have tried to advance against it as if in a statutory negligence case and imposed absolute
liability because of the nature of the law and the legislature's intent when it enacted it. See, e.g.,
Berndt v. Aquavello, 527 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (holding that contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk were not defenses to imposition of absolute liability under the
statute); Spose v. Ragu Foods, Inc.. 508 N.Y.S.2d 810 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (concluding that
comparative negligence was no defense to a worker's cause of action under a statute imposing
absolute liability where the injuries resulted from the failure to provide equipment for protection
of employees); Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts. Inc., 482 N.E.2d 898 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1985) (holding that an owner or contractor who failed to provide any safety devices for
workers was absolutely liable in damages for injuries sustained by workers). New York law goes
even further and directly imposes liability on those whose failure to obey federal, state, or local
regulations causes harm to firemen who are hurt or killed in the line of duty. N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAw § 205-a (McKinney 1986). In Johnson v. Riggio Realty Corp., 544 N.Y.S.2d 589 (N.Y. App.
Div.), appeal dismissed, 549 N.E.2d 481 (N.Y. 1989), the court construed this law and concluded
that contributory or comparative negligence are not defenses to its infringement.
. Some tribunals have upheld negligence defenses in statutory tort situations. See, e.g., Sage v.
Johnson, 437 N.W.2d 582 (Iowa 1989) (holding that two defendants who served alcohol to minor,
who was subsequently injured in a drunk diving accident, in violation of state alcohol regulatory
statute, could be sued in statutory tort action, but made the claim subject to the comparative
fault defense). However, the holdings of these courts can be explained. As in the statutory
negligence setting, the statutes construed in such cases simply were not the special type which
merit absolute liability status.
In sum, despite the relative lack of authority on the point, it seems clear that battered spouses
who contend physicians committed either a statutory tort or statutory negligence when they did
not help the spouses by reporting the spouses' situation are in almost the identical position when
the physicians try to use negligence defenses against them. In either event, the spouses can
argue forcefully that the statutes in question implicitly impose near absolute liability so that the
negligence defenses simply do not apply. Non-negligence defenses could still create difficulties
in some cases. See Nearing, 670 P.2d at 141-42, 143-44 (stating that liability was not absolute
since these defenses might be asserted). However, the most worrisome excuses-contributory
negligence, comparative negligence, or assumption of the risk-should not trouble them.
334. For more on the difference between statutory forms of negligence and new causes of
action implied from legislation, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 874A cant. e (1979);
Forell, The Statutory Duty Action, supra note 327, at 782, 789 & n.41; Forell, Interrelationship,
supra note 327, at 220-21; Friesen, supra note 333, at 1282-83; Gamin & Eisberg, supra note 329,
at 296-97.
335. See, e.g., Gamm & Eisberg, supra note 327, at 297-301 (discussing some of the pros and
cons of implying new tort causes of action from statutes).
336. Nearing, 670 P.2d 137. For commentary on Nearing, see Ruth Gundle, Civil Liability for
Police Failure to Arrest. Nearing v. Weaver, 9 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 259 (1986); Forell, Interre-
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lice violated the mandatory terms of the arrest statute their actions
gave rise to a statutory tort.337 The decision was important because it
established the principle that some domestic violence statutes are suf-
ficiently focused and definite that their violation creates implied tort
actions. 338
At least some mandatory spouse abuse reporting laws should rate
similar treatment. The focused ones of jurisdictions like California
and Kentucky 339 demonstrate clear legislative intent to require report-
ing by physicians to help victims in domestic violence cases which
should support statutory tort liability. The more general crime report-
ing laws of the various states seem less designed for such a purpose
but still might qualify for a private implied cause of action as well; the
key issue may be whether courts decide those laws were enacted to
protect specific crime victims like battered spouses or for some
broader societal purpose. Presumably, the less definitively a legisla-
ture expresses its purpose, the less likely courts will be to imply pri-
vate tort actions arising out of protective legislation.
While a statutory tort action might present a battered spouse with
the only practical chance to recover, it also may offer no real advan-
tage over one sounding in statutory negligence; defendants may be
unable to use negligence defenses in either action.340 Nevertheless,
state implied private actions may transform some abused spouses,
doomed to be unsuccessful under a negligence theory, into winners.
Counsel representing battered spouses should remember that the im-
plied statutory tort action theory may be open to them and may prove
extremely useful in some cases.
III. BATrERED SPOUSES' STATUTORY LIABILITY CLAIMS
Domestic violence victims could have another source of remedy
against physicians who do not report their abuse. This depends on
provisions like those in some child 341 and elder342 abuse reporting
lationship, supra note 327, at 255-59; M.B., Case Note, 22 J. FAM. L. 767 (1983-84); Art, supra
note 328.
337. Nearing, 670 P.2d at 142, 143; Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra
note 1, at 49.
338. See Jones, Battered Spouses' State Law Damage Actions, supra note 1, at 49 (analyzing
the significance of the Nearing decision).
339. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text (reviewing some particular state statutes
which govern a physician's duty to report suspected domestic violence).
340. See supra notes 317-19 and accompanying text (arguing that domestic violence cases
ought to be included among those where negligence defenses are not available to those who
violate mandatory reporting statutes).
341. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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laws mandating civil liability against non-reporters. To date, no state
has adopted such a law for non-reporters of spouse abuse. If one
does, it will provide a greatly simplified means for the compensation
of battered women, and happily eliminate the need for most of the
discussion herein.
IV. CONCLUSION
Spouse abuse continues to be a major American, and international,
scandal about which something fundamental must be done. Society
must find new ways to identify battered women so it can intervene
appropriately on their behalf. Because many domestic violence vic-
tims seek medical treatment, physicians and other healthcare person-
nel can be an excellent source for identifying the battered. But many
physicians refuse to come forward voluntarily, raising numerous ob-
jections to reporting. The clear alternative is mandatory reporting-
taking this issue out of physicians' discretion. Since some physicians
will not report even when required by reporting laws to do so, some-
thing is needed to engender obedience to required reporting. The
main ways to do that are criminal and/or civil penalties. These can
convince physicians that beyond the safety of their patients, their own
interest demands that they report. Unfortunately, criminal penalties
have proved ineffective in making them report either child, elder, or
spouse abuse, so civil liability is the preferable means for compliance.
It provides a strong incentive for non-reporting physicians to report,
for if they do not they may suffer severe adverse financial conse-
quences which could prove far more certain than what are, at best,
misdemeanor criminal sanctions.
Civil liability is possible under several different theories. The most
likely is negligence, either common law or statutory. Common law
negligence has the advantage of being available in all jurisdictions so
long as the courts there are willing to find that physicians have a negli-
gence duty to report spouse abuse inflicted upon their patients. This
may be a somewhat controversial point, but when all factors are con-
sidered courts should find public policy dictates such a duty. Statutory
negligence ought to be obtainable in all jurisdictions with either do-
mestic violence statutes which include physician reporting provisions,
general physician crime reporting laws, or both. In such places, it pro-
vides an even more solid remedy than common law negligence.
Some battered spouses also may profit from a second, albeit far less
used, cause of action-the implied statutory tort claim. While this
claim is similar in many ways to one for statutory negligence, it still
can be of great help to claimants who are, for some reason, foreclosed
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from negligence recoveries. Under statutory tort claims, plaintiffs
need only convince a court that they are the beneficiaries of focused
pieces of legislation which impose a duty upon physicians, the viola-
tion of which is impliedly a tort. This can be done through the various
reporting laws already on the books in many states.
Finally, domestic violence victims can employ express civil liability
laws which impose liability on non-reporting physicians once states
start passing such legislation to correspond to the civil liability provi-
sions which already exist in some child or elder abuse statutes. Such
statutes will be an appropriate expression of legislative concern over
the non-reporting physician problem.
In conclusion, domestic violence victims can pursue various avenues
both to encourage physicians to report abuse of their patients to the
authorities so government can intervene and help the battered and to
compensate the victims for the injuries which timely reporting would
have averted. Battered spouses should derive significant benefits
under these approaches. When physicians are convinced to report
past abuse, protective service and law enforcement professionals will
be able to prevent more and more future battering from ever occur-
ring. That facilitates the real goal, which ultimately is not to make
physicians pay damages to patients whose subsequent injuries are at-
tributable to non-reporting; the real goal is to reduce, and eventually
eliminate, domestic violence so that reporting no longer is needed.
Physician civil liability for non-reporting is a necessary and invaluable
component in bringing about that ultimate result.
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